The Beginning and End of the Rise of American Tort Law by Schwartz, Gary T.
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
Sibley Lecture Series Lectures and Presentations
11-11-1991
The Beginning and End of the Rise of American
Tort Law
Gary T. Schwartz
UCLA Law School
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lectures and Presentations at Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Sibley Lecture Series by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this
access For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Repository Citation
Schwartz, Gary T., "The Beginning and End of the Rise of American Tort Law" (1991). Sibley Lecture Series. 65.
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/lectures_pre_arch_lectures_sibley/65
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 26 SPRING 1992 NumBER 3
ARTICLES
THE BEGINNING AND THE POSSIBLE
END OF THE RISE OF MODERN
AMERICAN TORT LAW
Gary T. Schwartz*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1981, as part of a torts symposium in this law review, I pub-
lished an article that chronicled the rise of modern American tort
law-the huge growth in tort liability that had occurred since
about 1960.1 That article characterized that rise as involving "the
vitality of negligence"-that is, the expansion of a defendant's lia-
bility for harm caused by negligent conduct. Yet that article, while
setting forth the doctrinal framework within which the growth in
liability occurred, made little effort to probe the purposes of the
* Professor, UCLA School of Law. The original version of this Article was presented as
the Sibley Lecture at the University of Georgia, on November 11, 1991. Later versions were
presented at USC and the University of Toronto. I am very grateful for the comments of
faculty at these three law schools. Additional thanks to Robert Ellickson, Mark Grady, Jim
Henderson, Dan Lowenstein, Jon Macey, David Owen, Ken Simons, and Michael Wells.
' Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA.
L Rav. 963 (1981) [hereinafter Schwartz, Vitality].
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judges responsible for that growth. One goal of this Article, then, is
to supplement my earlier effort by giving fuller consideration to
the judicial understandings that motivated the rise in modern tort
law. The Article will acknowledge the impact of the judicial activ-
ism of the Warren Court; it will suggest the relevance of the more
general public-policy activism at all levels of government in the
1960s and 1970s; and it will emphasize the particular relevance of a
new public-policy consensus that developed around the problem of
product-related injuries.
While my previous characterization of the growth in liability as
resting on negligence principles has been accepted as generally ac-
curate by tort scholars such as Richard Epstein,2 Robert Rabin,3
and Michael Trebilcock,4 it has perhaps been rejected by George
Priest. In a leading article in 1985, Priest stated that the intellec-
tual history of modern tort law hinges on a theory of "enterprise
liability."' 5 This theory, which Priest suggests was accepted by the
courts beginning in 1960, has tended toward a practice of "absolute
liability"-a practice that would hold product manufacturers liable
for all injuries or harms that result from the use of their products.0
Moreover, in follow-up articles Priest has claimed that the enter-
prise liability idea has spread beyond the products context so as to
reach institutions and professionals that provide a variety of ser-
vices. He therefore suggests-at least in some of his writings-that
these defendants have been subjected to practices that move in the
direction of absolute liability. The emphasis that Priest places on
the law's approach to absolute liability certainly can seem at odds
with my own emphasis on negligence as the criterion of liability. A
second goal of this Article, then, is to defend my own position and
to review and critique that advanced by Priest.
Ten years have now passed since my original Georgia Law Re-
view article. Dean Ellington's invitation to deliver the Sibley Lec-
2 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 88-89 (4th ed. 1984).
3 Robert L. Rabin, Tort Law in Transition: Tracing the Patterns of Sociolegal Change,
23 VAL. L. REv. 1, 24 (1988).
' Michael J. Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North
American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN
DIEGo L. REV. 929, 948 (1987).
1 George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intel-
lectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 463 (1985) [hereinafter
Priest, Enterprise Liability].
6 Id.
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ture at the University of Georgia encouraged me to consider more
fully what has happened to tort doctrine in the course of the last
decade. That consideration has led me to appreciate that during
this interval the expansion of modern tort law has essentially
ended. Between 1960 and the early 1980s, there had been continu-
ous liability-rule innovations in almost all areas of tort law. Since
then, however, the impetus for innovation has lost most of its
power. To be sure, in only a limited number of instances have
courts actually overruled liability-expanding doctrines developed
between 1960 and the early 1980s; what I describe is not "the rise
and fall of modern American tort law." Still, during the last decade
courts have rejected invitations to endorse new innovations in lia-
bility;7 moreover, they have placed a somewhat conservative gloss
on innovations undertaken in previous years. What is here por-
trayed, then, is "the beginning and the end of the rise in modem
tort law."
Admittedly, the tendency to expand liability has by no means
dried up, and I will bring together a number of situations in which
courts during the last decade have broadened liability standards.
These innovations, however, have been clearly outnumbered by
cases in which courts have rejected plaintiffs' liability-expanding
proposals or have conservatively interpreted preexisting liability
rules. Torts cases from the 1960s and 1970s that were included in
early 1980s coursebooks were almost all triumphs for plaintiffs; the
collection of these cases could be referred to as "plaintiffs' greatest
hits." The torts opinions from the last decade that will be included
in the next round of coursebooks will have a quite different charac-
ter. They will commonly entail substantial defense victories. At the
very least, they will involve a mix of results-a mix that stands in
sharp contrast to the pattern of plaintiffs' victories afforded by the
previous two decades.
My appraisal of the tendencies in recent tort decisions has been
facilitated, I can say, by an article published two years ago by
James Henderson and Theodore Eisenberg, describing a "quiet
revolution in products liability" that they see as having taken
These "rejections" have taken two forms. In some instances courts have rejected novel
arguments for expanding liability advanced by plaintiffs. In other instances courts in States
A and B have rejected liability doctrines that previously had been accepted by the courts in
States C and D.
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place between 1983 and 1990.8 The "revolution" they set forth has
operated at several levels. One concerns the published products lia-
bility opinions of state and federal judges; another, the disposition
of products liability cases in federal trial courts." But Henderson
and Eisenberg also discuss trends in appellate doctrine,10 and this
is the portion of their article that has encouraged my current
study. As far as appellate doctrine is concerned, their use of the
term "revolution" is perhaps unfortunate; what they primarily de-
scribe is not the overruling of precedents but rather the rejection
by the judiciary of further expansions of products liability doc-
trine. They can call this a "revolution" because it stands in such
contrast to the growth in doctrine that had occurred between 1960
and the early 1980s. In any event, as assessed by Henderson and
Eisenberg, the "quiet revolution" has been limited to products lia-
bility. When, on occasion, their article considers other areas of tort
law, they suggest that the products liability change-in-direction en-
tails a departure of sorts from the trends operating elsewhere in
tort law.11 My own conclusion is that the stabilization in products
liability doctrine that they assess has been an organic part of a
larger process occurring through much of tort law.
Having described this general process of stabilization and mild
retrenchment, I then attempt to explain it-to set forth the rea-
sons that evidently have motivated the judiciary to alter its course.
Certain of these reasons suggest that the recent years mark the
actual termination of what had been a two-decade period of ex-
panding liability. Other reasons, however, imply that these years
may provide only a pause-a respite in what could turn out to be a
continuing rise in liability. To acknowledge the uncertainty in the
status of the recent experience, my title refers to "the possible end
of the rise of modern tort law."
8 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Lia-
bility: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479 (1990) [hereinafter Hen-
derson & Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution]; see also Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Hen-
derson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 731 (1992);
Teresa M. Schwartz, Product Liability Reform by the Judiciary, 27 GONZ. L. REv. 303
(1991/92).
Henderson & Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution, supra note 8, at 488-98.
Id. at 488-98.
Id. at 527-30, 535-36. To be sure, in dealing with these more general tort trends, Eisen-
berg & Henderson focus on filings and dispositions rather than on appellate rulings of law.
604 [Vol. 26:601
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II. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE RISE
Before undertaking to explain the liability-expanding changes in
tort doctrine during the post-1960 era, let me recap what those
changes have been-and let me furthermore locate those changes
within the larger framework of American tort history. In the nine-
teenth century, American personal injury law -was fashioned by
state judges through a process that included some reliance on pre-
cedent and a considerable measure of creativity.1 2 Early in the
twentieth century, workers' injuries were removed from the tort
system and reassigned to workers' compensation programs. Also,
twentieth-century cases like MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.'3 af-
firmed the negligence liability of manufacturers. Apart from such
developments, however, between 1900 and the late 1950s American
tort law remained generally stable. Twentieth-century opinions, for
the most part, sharpened and clarified tort doctrines that had been
presented somewhat more crudely in nineteenth-century cases."
This early stability in twentieth-century tort law provides the
backdrop for those tort changes after 1960 that demonstrate the
vitality of negligence. 15 These changes included the abolition of im-
12 See Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L Rv.
641, 678-79 (1989) [hereinafter Schwartz, Character].
23 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). MacPherson involved a manufacturing flaw in an automo-
bile. Later cases developed and supported the idea of manufacturers' liability for negligent
designs and for negligent failures to warn. See Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Prod-
ucts, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 796, 799-80 (1983).
"' To be sure, cases like The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287
U.S. 662 (1932), resolved the confusion in nineteenth-century law as to the effect of the
defendant's compliance with custom. Also, twentieth-century courts relied on traditional
rules of strict liability in order to construct a somewhat new concept of strict liability for
ultrahazardous activities. Additionally, new doctrines were developed to protect plaintiffs
against various forms of emotional distress.
"In emphasizing negligence, my earlier Georgia Law Review article entailed my reaction
to the claims of other scholars that modern tort law had witnessed a move away from the
negligence standard in the direction of strict liability. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & Jon T.
Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Tort, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); see also
John G. Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law, 53 V. L. Rav. 815 (1967)
(contending that the negligence standard is obviously unsuitable for a modern industrial
society).
Granted, my examples related to situations in which rules of negligence liability had come
to replace previous rules that had set liability at levels below negligence. My article did not
claim that negligence had replaced previous rules of outright strict liability. It did point out,
however, that strict liability had not really expanded during this period. Schwartz, Vitality,
supra note 1, at 970-77. The doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
had largely been stagnant. Moreover, judges had ignored or neglected various proposals for
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munities for charities, governments, and family mem-
bers-abolitions that rendered such defendants liable under stan-
dards of negligence. Auto-guest statutes and guest doctrines were
eliminated; thereby enlarging the liability of motorists for harms
caused by their negligence. Many courts established a general neg-
ligence principle to cover the liability of landowners, thereby re-
jecting rules of limited liability that had been tied to the plaintiff's
status as a land entrant. The locality doctrine in medical malprac-
tice cases was withdrawn, thereby permitting a fuller consideration
of the question of the doctor's malpractice. New affirmative duties
were recognized, as in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of Califor-
nia1 -duties which defendants violate if, but only if, they behave
negligently. Also, new causes of action were created for the negli-
gent infliction of economic loss and the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. The traditional defense of contributory negligence
was replaced by the doctrine of comparative negligence, which by
apportioning liability in accordance with fault could be seen as an
elaboration of the basic idea of fault liability. As well, many courts
"merged" the defense of assumption of risk into the doctrine of
comparative fault, thereby confirming that negligence is the only
feature of the plaintiff's conduct that merits the law's attention.
To be sure, the liability of manufacturers became governed by a
strict liability doctrine; yet my article interpreted that doctrine in
a way that emphasized its negligence components. In particular,
the modern law of design defect is noteworthy for the way in which
courts have aggressively applied the negligence-like risk-benefit
standard to complex questions of product design. Also, in order to
acknowledge instances of extreme manufacturer fault, punitive
damage awards' in products liability cases were judicially
authorized.
While emphasizing the various ways in which liability had ad-
vanced, my earlier article gave only cursory attention to the rea-
sons behind these advances. All it said was that "a preliminary as-
sessment is that judges have been strongly impressed by the ideas
favoring the negligence principle and have undergone a loss of be-
lief in the host of reasons that have long been relied on to restrain
new rules of strict liability. Also, the primacy of workers'-compensation strict liability had
been eroded by the increasing intrusion of tort causes of action into the employment setting.
16 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (affirming therapist's duty to warn patient's intended victim).
[Vol. 26:601
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that liability."1 Before turning to the "host of reasons" counseling
restraint, let me begin by expanding on those "ideas favoring the
negligence principle."
Negligence liability carries with it, first of all, the resonance of
tradition. The negligence standard has deep roots in English tort
law even prior to the nineteenth century,18 and by 1960 negligence
had been the primary (though not the exclusive) standard of tort
liability in the United States for over a century.19 Negligence liabil-
ity, moreover, is associated with strong fairness values. "Ethically
regarded, the idea of liability for harm caused by one's unexcused
errors and mistakes is both straightforward and intuitive. '20 Yet
negligence liability is also supported by a concern for safety. An
obvious safety advantage of negligence liability is that it can dis-
courage improper harmful conduct; indeed, a deterrence rationale
has been influencing tort judges for over a century.21 In light of all
the tensions that are possible between ethical and economic ap-
proaches to tort law, what is distinctive about the negligence stan-
dard is that it achieves a certain synthesis of fairness and deter-
rence values. Furthermore, many modern judges have probably
believed that loss distribution is an important tort objective.2
Since there are ample numbers of victims whose injuries are at
1 Schwartz, Vitality, supra note 1, at 977 (footnote omitted).
See Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A
Reinterpretation, 90 YAIE LEJ. 1717, 1722-27 (1981).
19 Schwartz, Character, supra note 12, at 679.
20 Schwartz, Vitality, supra note 1, at 1003. This intuition, moreover, can be expanded on
by invoking formal concepts such as corrective justice and compensatory justice, which re-
quire the negligent party to afford reparation to his victim. See Ernest Weinrib, Under-
standing Tort Law, 23 VAT- L Rav. 485 (1989). Negligence liability can be understood as
placing sanctions on defendants who egoistically give more weight to their own welfare than
to the welfare of their possible victims. See Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Compara-
tive Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE LJ. 697, 701-02 (1978) [hereinafter Schwartz, A
Reappraisal].
2' See Schwartz, Character, supra note 12, at 665 & n.146.
To be sure, there can be quite significant ethical and economic arguments in favor of
strict liability. Proposals for strict liability, however, do not reject liability for negligence;
rather, they recommend that negligence liability be supplemented in various ways. More-
over, the arguments on behalf of strict liability tend to be contestable, or applicable only to
a limited range of cases. By contrast, there is considerable support for the general idea of
subjecting the negligent injurer to prima facie liability. To be sure, there are certain disad-
vantages of a broad practice of negligence liability. For discussion of these disadvantages,
see infra notes 190-192 and accompanying text.
"See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
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least arguably due to some defendant's negligence, these judges
could support broadened rules of negligence liability on grounds of
the ability of those rules to achieve a substantial measure of loss
distribution.
A full regime of negligence liability should not be regarded as
modest. To be sure, negligence liability is not "strict" liability, let
alone "absolute" liability. Even so, as noted, plenty of harm in so-
ciety is caused by conduct that is quite possibly negligent. Any le-
gal system that tries to respond to all instances of negligence-or
to deter all of those instances-is accepting a very large responsi-
bility. Before 1960, American tort law had not yet taken on this
task. Rather, the reach of the doctrine of negligence liability was
then limited in any number of ways.
By 1960, several of these limitations seemed like historical
anomalies-legal rules that had become "outmoded"' 3 or obsolete.
The doctrine of governmental immunity, for example, drew sup-
port from the notion that "the sovereign can do no wrong"-a no-
tion that seemed fundamentally at odds with basic principles of
democracy. This immunity doctrine had long been criticized by al-
most every American scholar who had considered it.'4 As of 1960,
the American rule of contributory negligence as a full defense was
out of line with the practice of comparative negligence, which had
already been accepted by most other countries' tort systems;' 5
among legal scholars, the American rule had almost no defenders.2 6
The doctrines establishing the limited liability of landowners were
understood by many as resulting from a feudal, pre-industrial con-
23 See Robert E. Keeton, Comment, Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Con-
tributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 906, 915
(1968).
" E.g., Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (pts. 1-3), 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129,
229 (1924-1925); Edgar Fuller & A. James Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation,
54 HARv. L. REV. 437 (1941).
" See Harry Kalven, Jr., Comment, Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Con-
tributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 897, 899
n.14 (1968), on the "apparent[] worldwide consensus" on behalf of comparative negligence.
,1 In the Vanderbilt symposium, Professor Kalven expressed some ambivalence about
comparative negligence. Id. at 901. However, most of the other commentators were quite
certain that comparative negligence is the better doctrine. E.g., Keeton, supra note 23, at
912-13; Robert A. Leflar, Comment, Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contrib-
utory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 918, 928
(1968).
608 [Vol. 26:601
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ception of the status of landowners.27 In light of this understand-
ing, those doctrines could have easily seemed ripe for reconsidera-
tion. The locality rule in the law of medical malpractice appeared
to derive from a nineteenth-century conception of how the typical
doctor works; given the increasing nationalization of the medical
profession, that rule invited being evaluated as artificially
restrictive.
However, even given such contemporary evaluations, one can ap-
preciate why courts might have been reluctant to revise and mod-
ernize doctrine. One problem was stare decisis-the notion that
courts should not feel free to overturn precedents that have come
to seem unwise. A related problem concerned the idea that basic
changes in the law should be implemented not by courts but rather
by legislatures.28 Courts could assume that legislatures can do a
better job of gathering facts, rendering judgments that are vali-
dated by the political process, and adopting a full package that
includes not only the primary new doctrine but also a host of sub-
sidiary details.
If a narrow conception of the judicial role thus partly explains
why certain restraints remained in American tort law as of 1960,
then in assessing the relaxation of those restraints after 1960 we
can recognize that tort judges were undoubtedly operating under
the influence of the United States Supreme Court. In its constitu-
tional rulings, the Warren Court was the paradigm of judicial ac-
tivism. Its 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education,2' for ex-
ample, initiated the revolution in race relations in the United
States; Brown was the first of what turned out to be dozens of de-
cisions by the Court addressing questions of racial equality. In
1962, the Court in Baker v. Carr0 set the stage for a revolution in
legislative reapportionment; in later decisions, the Court commit-
ted this revolution to the drastic principle of "one person, one
vote."3' In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan"2 in 1964, the Court
E.g., 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JANMEs. JR. LAW OF Toms 1432 (1956).
This idea is expressed, for example, in Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802, 805 (N.Y.
1950).
19 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding school segregation unconstitutional).
-0 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding reapportionment claims justiciable).
31 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
32 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that absent actual malice defamation of public officials is
protected speech).
1992]
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initiated a thoroughgoing reconceptualization of the law of defama-
tion in order to take First Amendment principles into account.
Sullivan was only one portion of a larger transformation of the
First Amendment that was effectuated during the Warren Court
era. Indeed, during that era, one area after another of federal and
constitutional law was subjected to renovation.
The Warren Court of course had its critics. Yet while some law
professors complained about the Court's reasoning, few doubted
the basic social wisdom of its results-the correctness of the
Court's basic directions. Indeed, those directions were widely
praised; in the minds of enlightened public and professional opin-
ion, the Warren Court was certainly commendable and probably
heroic. One can understand, then, the impact of the Warren
Court's apparent success on the orientation of state court judges as
they approached particular tort problems. If the Supreme Court
could insist on dramatic societal reform, the least that state judges
could do would be to clear away various encumbrances operating
on tort law. Compared to the revolution in legislative reapportion-
ment called for by the Supreme Court, the "Rowland revolution"33
could seem like a very modest endeavor. The Warren Court, more-
over, declared rights at the constitutional level; it invalidated fed-
eral and state statutes and effectively prohibited subsequent legis-
lative review of the Court's results. Given the Warren Court's
success, state court judges could easily conclude that they should
not be inhibited in issuing rulings that somewhat broadened tort
liability-rulings that state legislatures would then be free to re-
view and if necessary reverse.
Yet there was more than the Warren Court exerting an influence
on judges in the 1960s and later; for a norm of public policy activ-
ism was then being established at all levels of government. By the
late 1950s the sense was growing that the Eisenhower era had been
marked by a singular complacency. Public policy had been dor-
mant, stagnant. On the economic side, domestic policy had been
quite simply unenlightened, failing to acknowledge even the basic
core of Keynesian ideas. On the social front, serious problems had
been developing and accumulating that social policy was compla-
cently ignoring. Liberals like Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. were able
' See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (expanding landowner liability). See
infra notes 302-307 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rowland.
[Vol. 26:601
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to refer to the "trance" of the Eisenhower era.3'
This trance was ended by the intense debate about public policy
that characterized the 1960 Presidential campaign, which high-
lighted John Kennedy's promise to "get this country moving
again. '' 5 The arrival of the Kennedy administration in 1961
marked the beginning of a ferment in the consideration of public
policy. This ferment became more encompassing during the years
of President Johnson's Great Society. Between 1964 and 1968,
Congress produced new legislation at an historic rate. The Civil
Rights Act was passed in 1964,36 prohibiting discrimination in em-
ployment and public accommodations; it was followed by such
measures as the Fair Housing Act of 1968. 3 Serious problems of
poverty persisting in America were discovered, leading to the dec-
laration of a war on poverty, a war that was implemented along
several fronts. The deterioration of our cities was finally recog-
nized; with high hopes, a new Department of Housing and Urban
Development was created not only to coordinate existing federal
programs but also to develop for the first time a federal urban pol-
icy. A Department of Transportation was also established and
charged with the responsibility of thinking through a national
transportation policy, one that could be "comprehensive" in that it
would include all transportation modes and would take account of
social and environmental perspectives that had previously been ig-
nored by the technicians running such agencies as the Federal Avi-
ation Administration and the Bureau of Public Roads.38
The establishment of new programs continued into the Nixon
administration.39 In 1970, it was President Nixon who, without evi-
dent discomfort, signed the Clean Air Act Amendments"0 and the
34 ARTHuR M. SCHLESINGER, JR. KENNEDY OR NIXON? 33 (1960).
- For consideration of the "grand theme" in the Kennedy campaign, see THzoDoE IL
WHrrE, THE MAKING OF THE PREsinDm'. 1960, at 256-59 (1961).
3' Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 81.
Surprisingly, historians have not yet tried to describe the public-policy excitement that
characterized the 1960s. This will eventually be described in the second volume of Robert
Dallek's biography of Lyndon Johnson.
" Similarly, the traditions of the Warren Court were in many ways adhered to in the
1970s, as the Burger Court recognized abortion rights, applied the Equal Protection Clause
to gender discrimination, and in many ways broadened the First Amendment.
4 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
19921
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
Occupational Safety and Health Act.41 Indeed, more new federal
agencies were created during the Nixon administration than had
been created during the administration of Franklin Roosevelt. 42
Moreover, the new norm of policymaking activism developed at the
federal level produced effects on state and local governments as
well. Many of these governments were invigorated by the arrival of
activist governors and mayors who brought into their administra-
tions large numbers of talented professionals, many of them fresh
from public-policy oriented graduate programs.
On some occasions, the creation of specific public programs exer-
cised an especially clear influence on the development of tort doc-
trine. Consider the adoption of the National Traffic and Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Act of 1966 3 and the Consumer Product Safety Act in
1972." This latter statute had been recommended by the National
Commission on Product Safety, whose Final Report was submitted
in 1970.45 The 1966 Safety Act was the consequence of a new pub-
lic-policy consensus on the subject of product-related accidents-a
new "legal culture. ' 48 The new set of attitudes contained in this
consensus also surrounded the deliberations of the National Com-
mission (set up in 1967) and the subsequent adoption of the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act.
These attitudes enabled policymakers to recognize and affirm
that the level of highway fatalities (and the number of injuries due
to dangerous consumer products) were unacceptably high; the re-
sulting losses were hence recognized as a serious social problem,
inviting the development of public-policy solutions. That new con-
sensus, moreover, brought about a reconceptualization of the basic
nature of the problem of highway and product safety. No longer
was this seen as a problem of driver and consumer error; rather,
the problem related in a fundamental way to vehicle and product
design. During the congressional consideration of the 1966 Act, one
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590.
, See GLEN 0. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 36 (1991).
" Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718.
Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207.
" NATIONAL COMM'N ON PROD. SAFETY, FINAL REPORT (1970) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
There were no law professors on the Commission itself, and only two lawyers.
'0 This is the term employed by Mashaw and Harfst. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L,
HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 20, 40-68 (1990). One could also refer to a new
public-policy "ideology."
[Vol. 26:601
AMERICAN TORT LAW
witness posed this rhetorical question: "Which is easier, to con-
vince 195 million drivers to habitually refrain from panic applica-
tion of the brake in emergencies or to design an anti-locking brak-
ing system in the vehicle? '47  According to the National
Commission, consumer injuries are due to the interaction between
consumers and consumer products within the environment of the
home. The "weak link" in the chain of causation of consumer inju-
ries-the link that public policy could most effectively attack-was
the product itself. "[Manufacturers] can accomplish more for
safety with less effort and expense than any other body," including
"consumers" themselves.48 The Commission appreciated, of course,
that many consumer injuries are immediately due to the careless
use of products by consumers. But the Commission viewed human
error as human nature; these are the occasional lapses in attention
to which all of us are inevitably prone.' 9 Indeed, in 1966, support-
ers of the Safety Act, having acknowledged the likelihood of driver
error, were able to convert that acknowledgment into a strong ar-
gument favoring the proposed federal program: "[a] crashworthy
vehicle can make [driver] failures failsafe."50 The Senate Com-
merce Committee, in reporting out the bill, certainly made clear its
concern for those features of auto design that bring about auto ac-
cidents; still, the Committee was particularly impressed "by the
critical distinction between the cause of the accident itself and the
cause of the resulting death or injury."'  Improving the
crashworthiness of cars was thus a major goal of the Act.
'1 Id. at 65. Another witness, having presented a choice between "eugenics or engineer-
ing," was certain that the engineering solution comes out ahead; it is "the cheapest, because
it is permanent while education and enforcement must be kept up year dfter year." Id. at
63. Consider also Senator Moynihan's assessment that the engineering approach can be im-
plemented by changing the behavior of "a tiny population-the forty or fifty executives who
run the automobile industry." Id. at 65.
4s FINAL REPORT, supra note 45, at 3. As the OSHA program was implemented in the
1970s, OSHA officials, themselves participating in the new legal culture, displayed a strong
preference for engineering solutions to job-safety problems; those officials were reluctant to
support policies that might call for adjustments in employee behavior. See Sidney A. Sha-
piro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA. Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative
Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 11 (1989).
4 FINAL REPORT, supra note 45, at 4.
See MASHAW & HARPST, supra note 46, at 63.
S. RaE. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2709,
2711. The Committee described "graphic evidence" that showed that current cars were
poorly designed to protect against second collisions. Id.
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In its final version, the Act sailed through Congress with fully
unanimous votes.5 2 The consensus brought forward by that Act un-
deniably helps explain the decision of the federal court of appeals
two years later in Larsen v. General Motors Corp.53 The Larsen
court, perceiving that collisions are "a frequent and inevitable con-
tingency" in the use of cars, ruled that negligence law imposes a
"duty" on car manufacturers to design cars in ways that can effec-
tively reduce the seriousness of resulting injuries.5 Both this per-
ception and this duty seem derived from the 1966 Act and its asso-
ciated legal culture.5 5 Moreover, 1970-the year in which the
National Commission's Final Report was submitted-was also the
year in which the California Supreme Court ruled in Pike v. Frank
G. Hough Co.5 6 that principles of both negligence and strict liabil-
ity can be relied on to review the design choices rendered by prod-
uct manufacturers, and that those principles can be applied even
to design hazards that are "open and obvious. ' 57 Given the modern
consensus affiliated with the 1966 and 1972 Acts, it is extremely
easy to understand why courts would have become unwilling to al-
low traditional doctrines such as contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk to serve as broad affirmative defenses in modern
products liability cases.
52 112 CONG. REC. S14,256 (1966); 112 CONG. REC. H19,668-69 (1966).
53 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
" Id. at 502.
Crashworthiness liability had previously been denied in Evans v. General Motors Corp.,
359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966). The Evans majority suggested
that any such basic change in the manufacturer's responsibility should be authorized by the
legislature. Id. at 824. Evans was handed down several months before the Safety Act was
passed; the dissent noted that legislation was then under consideration. Id. at 828.
" In a 1968 case like Larsen, a court might have perceived that the recent creation of a
regulatory program reduced the need for expanded tort liability. But the attitude of the late
1960s made it far easier for courts to assume that regulators and the judiciary should com-
bine their efforts in order to solve an urgent social problem. As a formal legal matter, the
Larsen court properly relied on express language in the Safety Act indicating that the Act
was not meant to preempt state tort liabilities. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 506. The National Com-
mission on Product Safety, in recommending a new federal regulatory program, further rec-
ommended that products liability rules continue to expand. See FINAL REPORT, supra note
45, at 118.
50 467 P.2d 229 (Cal. 1970). The product in Pike-a bulldozer-was a workplace product.
But the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which also was adopted in 1970, anticipated
federal regulations governing the safety features of products that employers provide to their
employees.
" Pike, 467 P.2d at 234-37.
AMERICAN TORT LAW
Return now, howeve, to more general features in the public-pol-
icy mentality of the 1960s and early 1970s. One feature of public
thinking in the 1960s was that major American corporations-and
in particular, the. Big Three automakers-were economic colossi
that could easily bear whatever burdens might be imposed on them
by way of regulation or liability. A second feature of public opinion
was that these corporations should not be held in high respect; in-
deed, they should be frequently distrusted. When the steel indus-
try announced price increases that somewhat insidiously evaded
President Kennedy's efforts at jawboning, the President was
widely quoted as saying that he now believed what his father had
always told him: "all businessmen [are] sons-of-bitches."' 8 After a
dramatic confrontation, the industry rolled back its prices. During
the 1960s, the consumer movement was gaining force; this move-
ment portrayed innocent consumers as needing strong protection
from manufacturers, which frequently treat consumers in shabby
ways-? Ralph Nader's book, Unsafe at Any Speed,0 depicted
General Motors as a villain for selling Corvairs with a known ten-
dency to turn out of control. General Motors then portrayed itself
as a foolish and inept villain when it conducted an investigation of
Nader's private life. By the late 1960s, the environmental move-
ment had begun to gather momentum; and that movement was
able to project the image of major corporations as nasty, insidious
polluters. The willingness of courts by the late 1960s to impose
strong liabilities on major corporations (especially on product man-
ufacturers) was almost certainly facilitated by this discrediting of
corporations that was occurring in the public outlook.
In the 1960s, moreover, a market analysis of problems in society
was not held in high respect. To be sure, on the macro side federal
economic policy was becoming far more sophisticated, incorporat-
ing Keynesian insights and eventually implementing a tax cut. On
the micro side, however, a market approach was not being taken
seriously. For example, in considering the 1966 Safety Act, the
5See ARTHuR U SCHLSINGER. JP. ONE THOUSAND DAYS 635-36 (1965). Schlesinger ap-
provingly discusses Kennedy's condescending attitude toward "business." Id. at 638.
" The impact of the consumer movement (and then the environmental movement) on the
values that underlie modern tort developments has been previously noted in Rabin, supra
note 3, at 13-14. Both of these movements were aided by newly created public-interest law
firms.
60 RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965).
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Senate Commerce Committee made clear its view that the market
could not produce appropriate safety in auto design; indeed, the
Committee reported that auto manufacturers themselves believed
that "safety didn't sell." ' The 1970 Final Report of the Product
Safety Commission reasoned that "market forces" cannot possibly
produce appropriate product safety, since consumers are inevitably
ignorant of the hazards that ordinary consumer products contain. 2
Indeed, the Commission relied on a U.S. Chamber of Commerce
committee report for the idea that it would be hopelessly old-fash-
ioned to believe that the process of "rational consumer choice" can
provide an adequate measure of consumer protection. 3 In the
Commission's view, a strong "[g]overnment presence" was undeni-
ably required to bring about "responsible manufacturing practices
in the interest of safety. '64
Within universities, the faculty of economic departments were of
course devoted to market reasoning, but these departments were
somewhat isolated within their larger universities. Political scien-
tists, for example, still defined their field in a way that largely ex-
cluded economics. 5 The new schools. of public policy that universi-
ties were then creating tended to adopt an eclectic, pragmatic
approach that did not place any primary value on a market ap-
proach."6 And within law schools, the law-and-economics move-
ment did not really begin until the 1970s.67
The general lack of interest in market arguments helps explain
why courts themselves did not take such arguments seriously in
their' tort opinions.6 Modern products liability cases found it
61 S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2709,
2710.
62 FINAL REPORT, supra note 45, at 69.
6 Id. at 71.
e Id. at 72.
' Major works in the emerging literature of public choice were published during the
1960s. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
Not until the mid-1970s, however, did political science departments begin to take this new
literature seriously.
66 After all, these were schools of "public policy": schools that favored various forms of
government action.
" Among the works that helped launch this movement were GuIDo CALABRESi, THE COSTS
OF ACCIDENTS (1970) and Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD, 29
(1972).
"8 A "distrust of markets" is regarded as a basic feature of modern tort law in Peter H.
Schuck, The New Judicial Ideology of Tort Law, in NEw DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 4, 6-
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plainly appropriate to reject a contract or warranty approach to
questions of manufacturer liability. 9 Indeed, the cases referred de-
risively to the "intricacies of the law of sales" as obviously irrele-
vant to the formulation of proper products liability doctrines.70 A
contract analysis might well favor the enforcement of disclaimers
of liability that consumers accept; yet courts gave no weight to this
analysis in adopting a per se products liability rule rejecting dis-
"claimers of liability for personal injury. 1 Because consumers, in
encountering products whose hazards are open and obvious, can
take those hazards into account in deciding whether to buy and
use those products, contract ideas might support limitations on lia-
bility in cases of this sort. Courts disregarded these ideas, however,
as they rejected the "open and obvious" doctrine 2 and narrowed
the defense of assumption of risk. It might be thought that a web
of contracts can often do an adequate job in protecting parties
against economic loss. Some courts ignored this thought and cre-
ated a tort cause-of-action for the negligent infliction of economic
loss. 73 Note here that I do not mean to suggest the results reached
by modern courts in these cases were necessarily wrong. Rather,
my point is that contract-oriented arguments that were regarded
as winners in 1950 were being dismissed as obvious losers by
1970-and that this switch in attitude was in significant part a
consequence of the general devaluation of market reasoning in
public-policy discourse.
The policymaking energy that characterized those years has
been described above. How that sense of energy influenced the de-
velopment of tort doctrine can now be more fully considered. Cer-
tainly, this new energy combined with the influence of the Warren
Court to encourage state court judges to modernize tort law by
eliminating seemingly obsolete restrictions on liability. For that
8 (Walter Olson ed., 1988). Schuck does not, however, associate this judicial attitude with
the more general attitudes that shaped the public-policy process.
" See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
70 See id. at 901 (quoting Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912)).
71 See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 172 (Cal. 1964); RPzwmrasnv'r (SEc-
OND) OF ToRTs § 402A cmt. m (1965).
71 See, e.g., Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229, 235 (Cal. 1970); Micallef v. Mieble
Co., 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976).
73 See J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979), critiqued in Gary T. Schwartz,
Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The Examples of JAire and of Products Liability,
23 SAN DIEGO L REv. 37, 40-50 (1986).
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matter, those judges were encouraged to take even bolder steps.74
Consider, for example, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.71 According
to the Sindell court, "the most persuasive reason" for adopting a
market-share theory of liability is that "as between an innocent
plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost
of the injury. '7 So long as a court is willing to think boldly about
the goals of negligence law, the "reason" given by Sindell is suffi-
ciently persuasive. Absent Sindell, manufacturers of certain cate-
gories of products could anticipate an escape from liability for the
harms caused by their negligence. This expectation could under-
mine the deterrence function of negligence law; the Sindell rule
restores that function. Absent Sindell, the victims of negligently
inflicted injury would receive no compensation, and the negligent
causers of injury would bear no liability. The Sindell rule achieves
the fairness goals of tort law by affording appropriate compensa-
tion to the victims of negligence and by imposing liability on de-
fendants in proportion to the harms their negligence has caused.
Given, then, a bold appraisal of the ideas sustaining the negli-
gence standard-and this was the kind of boldness that modern
courts found quite congenial-the Sindell market-share rule can
be properly defended. What renders the Sindell rule troublesome,
however, are the massive problems of fact and law that predictably
surround the administration of the market-share doctrine. The
Sindell opinion approached these problems by way of a carefully
drafted double negative: "We are not unmindful of the practical
problems involved in defining the market and determining market
share. . .. ,,77 The opinion then went on to characterize these
problems as involving "largely matters of proof" that accordingly
can be ignored at "the pleading stage of these proceedings. '7 8 The
court here may have been driving at either of two points. It might
have been suggesting that such "practical problems" are irrelevant
to the content of legal rules, which themselves should be formu-
lated at a certain level of principle. More likely, the court was ex-
pressing its expectation that the problems involved in administer-
" See infra text accompanying notes 187-188 for discussion of judicial development of
the doctrine of strict liability for manufacturing defects.
7' 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
"' Id. at 936.
7 Id. at 937.
78 Id. at 938.
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ing the market-share rule would in fact turn out to be manageable.
Insofar as the court, under either interpretation, was displaying a
high regard for the capacity of the judicial process, its position can
be seen as a legacy of the Warren era: if courts can administer dis-
trict-wide school desegregation, they can certainly administer
Sindell. But the court's position also stems from the more general
ideas of the 1960s and 1970s that government should be incisive in
diagnosing social problems, ambitious in devising solutions for
those problems, and confident in its ability to implement those
solutions. 79
To recap, in expanding liability modern judges drew upon tort
law's negligence tradition, upon the fairness and deterrence ratio-
nales embedded in that tradition, and upon the modern loss-distri-
bution rationale, which could easily enough be linked with that
tradition. Furthermore, those judges were emboldened both by the
problem-solving judicial activism of the Warren Court and by the
more general reform-minded public-policy discourse of the 1960s
and 1970s. In this latter respect modern tort law can be regarded
as one of those ambitious programs initiated during the Great So-
ciety and then confirmed and further institutionalized during the
1970s. To be sure, such a classification is normatively quite ambig-
uous. Many Great Society innovations-such as HUD-have
turned out to be disappointments, if not debacles. But other inno-
vations, such as the 1964 Civil Rights Act, have become corner-
stones of contemporary America. Medicare relates to modem tort
law in that both were based, in part, on a concern for insuring
against losses. In conjunction with other amendments to Social Se-
curity, Medicare has largely solved the health-care access problems
of older Americans and has also alleviated the more general socie-
tal problem of poverty among the aged.80 These remedies, however,
have proved to be far more expensive than 1960s reformers had
originally expected. Modern products liability was able to draw on
a new public-policy consensus that itself gave rise to new federal
programs for the regulation of consumer products and motor vehi-
cles. The activities of the Consumer Product Safety Commission
7 Whether, in the Sindell setting, this confidence was misplaced is a question that nill be
considered below. See infra text accompanying notes 451-454.6o This problem had been highlighted in MICHE.L HARUNGTON. THE OTHER AMERCA 101-
20 (1962).
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have turned out to be generally ineffectual; 81 but the federal pro-
gram of auto regulation has produced safety benefits that on bal-
ance have been well worth their expense.82
III. MODERN TORT LAW: NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY OR
NEAR ABSOLUTE LIABILITY?
The doctrinal developments on which my earlier article relied in
describing the vitality of negligence have been summarized in Part
II. That article was partly a response to the views expressed by
scholars like Calabresi to the effect that modern tort developments
had entailed a rejection or subordination of the negligence stan-
dard in favor of strict liability.83 In recent years, the scholar who
has been most vigorous in stressing strict liability and downplaying
negligence is George Priest. As noted, a frequent Priest position is
that modern tort law approaches absolute liability in the burdens
it places on products manufacturers and other institutional and
professional defendants 4 According to one article, "the rationale
for the extension of liability has been that providers of products
and services-chiefly corporations-are almost always in a better
position than consumers to prevent accidents and to provide insur-
ance for those accidents that cannot be prevented. 8 5 A few pages
later, the "almost" qualifier is deleted: "[M]odern tort law
presumes that the corporate provider is always in a better position
than the consumer" both to prevent and to insure against inju-
81 See W. Kip Viscusi, REGULATING CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 101-04 (1984).
82 See ROBERT W. CRANDALL ET AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE 45-84 (1986). The dor-
mancy of the program in recent years is considered in MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 46.
But the final version of the program's passive restraint regulation, now being implemented,
will probably be quite effective in saving lives.
83 See supra note 15.
84 At times, Priest's concepts are somewhat less dramatic. One article, for example,
merely refers to modem liability extending "far beyond the simple cost-benefit standard"
associated with negligence law. George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern
Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1538 (1987) [hereinafter Priest, Insurance Crisis]. In much of
Priest's writing, however, "absolute liability" is the rhetoric that dramatizes his argument
and confirms the dominance of enterprise liability theory.
Accordingly, the Priest suggestion of near absolute liability is what this Part primarily
considers. Even so, my review of modem tort doctrine will permit some evaluation of
Priest's "far beyond" claim. One problem with this claim is that outside of products liabil-
ity, Priest does not really identify judicial holdings that clearly move liability standards
beyond the negligence level.
85 George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REv. 1, 7 (1987)
[hereinafter Priest, Modern Tort Law].
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ries56 As another article suggests, these ideas have been leading
American tort law "inexorably toward absolute injurer liability."87
Focusing on medical malpractice in one article, Priest suggests that
the facts of the doctor's behavior in the individual case are not
especially relevant; rather, courts impose liability on doctors
merely because they comprise one of those "generic categories of
actors [who are] in a better position to prevent injuries or to
spread the costs of them."88 In this article Priest equates munici-
palities and hospitals with manufacturers and doctors: all are com-
monly held liable merely because courts perceive that they are "in
a better position than the plaintiff. . both to control the deter-
minants of risk and to spread the risks of injuries once they are
suffered." '
Priest's articles undoubtedly comprise a remarkable exercise in
the writing of intellectual history. He has succeeded in construct-
ing a powerful narrative."0 I have admired that narrative from the
outset; even so, I have entertained doubts about its precision.91
The idea of enterprise liability will be more fully considered in
Part IV below, and is there taken seriously as one of several
sources of modern tort doctrine. The notion of near absolute liabil-
ity as a consequence of that idea is considered in this Part, and is
explicitly rejected. As it happens, there is some uncertainty in
Priest's portrayal of the law's approach to absolute liability. His
exposition of the ideas governing modern tort law might be
thought to imply that modern courts have adopted formal rules of
absolute liability. This, however, is a claim that Priest clearly
68 Id. at 10.
37 George L. Priest, The Modern Irony of Civil Law: A Memoir of Strict Products Liabil-
ity in the United States, 9 T.L Aviv U. STUD. IN L 93, 118 (1989) [hereinafter Priest,
Memoir].
George L. Priest, The New Legal Structure of Risk Control, DAEDALUS, Fall 1990, at
207, 217 [hereinafter Priest, Risk Control].
89 Id. at 221. I should note here that I clearly agree with Priest that absolute liability
would be bad tort policy. I therefore largely side with him in his recent debate with absolute
liability advocates. Compare George L. Priest, Can Absolute Manufacturer Liability be De-
fended?, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 237 (1992) with Stephen P. Croley & Jon P. Hanson, What
Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8
YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1990).
90 His narrative has been largely accepted, for example, by writers like Peter Huber. See
PETER HUBER, LAmrY: LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).
91 See Gary T. Schwartz, Directions in Contemporary Products Liability Scholarship, 14
J. LEGAL STUD. 763, 768 (1985) [hereinafter Schwartz, Directions).
1992]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
enough avoids making. 2 Rather much of the time his position on
near absolute liability relates to judicial opinions which set forth
the subsidiary rules that provide content to the law's basic liability
standards."3 On other occasions, near absolute liability seems to
describe, in a more practical way, the actual pattern of claims and
recoveries. 4
Yet however Priest's thesis is interpreted, as a characterization
of medical malpractice it is incorrect. In malpractice cases, negli-
gence rather than strict liability clearly remains the formal liability
standard.e5 Moreover, in malpractice cases courts have interpreted
the negligence standard in ways that fix it at a level that seems
considerably below the risk-benefit level that is generally associ-
ated with negligence.9 6 As for the pattern of claims, a recent
study" shows that for every 1000 patients who enter hospitals,
about 40 suffer treatment-related injuries; and perhaps 10 of these
injuries are due to malpractice. Yet on average only 1.2 malpractice
claims are actually asserted.9 8 A comparison of the number of these
claims to the number of underlying injuries makes clear that the
claims record falls ninety-seven percent short of any practice of
absolute liability.99
92 Yet Priest does not really, explain why courts, having embraced enterprise liability the.
ory, have not been willing officially to endorse absolute liability standards. See infra notes
182-185 and accompanying text.
93 In a recent article, Priest discusses various "presumptions" developed by courts in ad-
ministering the products liability doctrine of defective warning. Given these presumptions,
warning law has been led to a position "close to absolute liability." George L. Priest, The
Modern Expansion of Tort Liability: Its Sources, Its Effects, and Its Reform, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 31, 41 (1991) [hereinafter Priest, Modern Expansion]. In the same article, Priest
acknowledges that courts after 1960 have continued to apply the negligence rule in many
contexts. He goes on to emphasize, however, that after 1960 "the concept of negligence and
the rules and standards attending it necessarily had to change." Id. at 38.
" See, for example, Priest's reference to "the reality of liability judgments," id. at 41, and
his statement about the liability of drug manufacturers, discussed infra note 138.
" See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
'6 See infra text accompanying notes 328-332.
6 A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events
Due to Negligence, 325 N. ENG. J. OF MED. 245 (1991).
" See id. at 246, 250.
19 As far as hospital liability is concerned, many hospitals as of 1960 were free of all liabil-
ity, on account of doctrines of charitable and governmental immunities. With these immuni-
ties abolished, hospitals are now subject to liability for their managerial negligence and, like
other employers, to vicarious liability for the negligence of their employees (for example,
their nurses). To be sure, since 1960 some courts have considerably expanded the concept of
the hospital's vicarious liability. But even the patient who relies on such an expansion needs
[Vol. 26:601622.
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As for the liability of commercial landowners, even those juris-
dictions that have expanded liability doctrines since 1960 have
typically gone no further than generalizing a rule of negligence lia-
bility.100 As for government agencies, their liability is now governed
by tort claims statutes and state common-law rulings that either
explicitly or implicitly establish negligence as the criterion of lia-
bility. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, for example, the federal
government is liable for its "wrongful act[s]";' 0' in 1972, the Su-
preme Court, interpreting this language, ruled that a plaintiff su-
ing the federal government cannot invoke those modem doctrines
of strict liability that apply to comparable defendants in the pri-
vate sector.10 2 In California, the statutory provisions on liability for
public property in a dangerous condition call on the court to bal-
ance, in a rather precise negligence-like way, the probability and
severity of the injury risk against the cost or burden of preventing
that risk. 03 Moreover, I am unaware of any evidence indicating
that the claims process operates against public agencies or com-
mercial landowners in a way that produces results that are grossly
out of line with the official rules of liability.'"
Turn now to product-related injuries and the doctrine of strict
products liability. The Second Restatement adopts, in section
to establish the negligence or malpractice of the physician who treated him; there is no hint
here of absolute liability for the adverse results of medical treatment.
100 See infra text accompanying notes 302-307 (discussing general landowner liability).
The self-service cases are a special situation in which liability may now exceed the negli-
gence level in a few states. These cases are described infra text accompanying notes 250-252.
1-1 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1989).
102 Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 803 (1972).
101 Ci.. Gov'T CODE §§ 830, 830.2 (West 1980). Moreover, if public officials can show that
they had explicitly approved the original design plan, the plaintiff's burden of proof be-
comes even heavier. See id. § 830.6. For a similar qualified immunity under New York law,
see Friedman v. State, 493 N.E.2d 893 (N.Y. 1986). The discretionary function immunity
under federal law is discussed infra text accompanying notes 392-397.
104 According to Priest, before 1960 tort defendants were found negligent only when their
conduct showed "clear moral culpability substantially antagonistic to social norms". Priest,
Risk Control, supra note 88, at 207. Call this "emphatic negligence" and assume arguendo
that Priest is correct that before 1960 a defendant was held liable only when its "emphatic
negligence" was proven. Assume now that after 1960 a showing of "ordinary negligence"
becomes sufficient to justify liability. This shift would sharply increase the liability of injur-
ers. Obviously, however, the shift would entail an increase in negligence liability rather than
a move toward absolute liability. From this perspective one can consider Priest's discussion
of suits against ladder manufacturers, doctors, and hospitals. Priest, Modern Expansion,
supra note 93, at 38. Findings of negligence are of course rendered by juries. On this point,
see infra note 217.
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402A, a rule of strict liability that readily applies to cases involving
manufacturing defects.105 In his original article on enterprise liabil-
ity, Priest focused on the Restatement and the years between 1960
and 1965 as the period in which enterprise liability came to domi-
nate American tort law; also, he identified William Prosser as the
Restatement figure who was most effective in advocating enter-
prise liability ideas.'06 However, my own essay in the symposium
that included Priest's article offered a more moderate explanation
for this strict liability rule-and pointed out that Prosser himself
had supported that explanation.'0 7 This explanation relies on the
high correlation between manufacturer negligence and manufactur-
ing defects. By treating defect as a good enough proxy for negli-
gence, the strict liability doctrine streamlines litigation and re-
solves some doubts in favor of plaintiffs without dramatically
changing the pattern of litigation results that would ensue under a
negligence standard.
In his more recent work, Priest has been led to reconsider sec-
tion 402A, and has now explicitly abandoned his previous interpre-
tation of the American Law Institute's effort.'08 He now under-
stands section 402A as resting on a limited rationale similar to the
one I had set forth. What is more, he suggests that a rule of strict
liability for manufacturing defects makes good policy sense'0" and
that the theory of enterprise liability did not play a significant role
in the adoption of section 402A. Rather, the acceptance of enter-
prise liability-and the related judicial movement toward absolute
liability-were in fact "inconsistent" with the intent of Prosser
and most of his ALI advisers."10 Those developments, Priest re-
ports, occurred subsequent to 1965, as courts expanded on the doc-
trines of manufacturer liability for design defects and warning
105 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
" See Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra note 5, at 505-07.
Schwartz, Directions, supra note 91, at 768-69. My current views on this strict liability
rule are set forth infra at notes 187-188 and accompanying text.
'8 George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
2301 (1989) [hereinafter Priest, Original Intent]. Priest is gracious in acknowledging that
my essay encouraged him to look again at § 402A. Id. at 2301.
"I' See id. at 2316-17; Priest, Memoir, supra note 87, at 108-10, 113. But see Priest, Mod-
ern Tort Law, supra note 85, at 24-25, seemingly deploring this strict liability rule.
Priest, Original Intent, supra note 108, at 2304. In Priest's current view, Prosser and
these advisers (except for Fleming James) would have "vigorously opposed" the modern
applications of strict products liability. Id.
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defects."'
How close, then, does current design defect law come to absolute
liability?12 Within the law of design liability, the risk-benefit test
plays the primary role. 3 Priest further acknowledges that this test
contains a basic core of negligence reasoning. He goes on to sug-
gest, however, that this risk-benefit standard is frequently elabo-
rated on in ways that depart from a proper negligence analysis,
which would focus on the appropriateness of alternative designs.' 4
The problem that Priest refers to here certainly exists. Yet it does
not appear to be all that serious. First, many cases do apply a ver-
sion of the risk-benefit test that seems quite close to a negligence
approach.115 And while other courts rely on a mix of factors that
mId. at 2324-27.
112 Henderson and Twerski's new article reviews modern design defect law, and concludes
that courts have clearly rejected absolute liability. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D.
Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability
Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1263 (1991). The evaluation offered here supplements
their valuable review.
113 Here I agree with Priest's assessment. Priest, Modern Tort Law, supra note 85, at 26.
The consumer expectation standard currently plays a secondary role in design defect
cases. While noting this, Priest nevertheless suggests that this standard "approach[es] abso-
lute liability." George L. Priest, The Disappearance of the Consumer from Modem Prod-
ucts Liability Law, in THE FRONTIER OF RESEARCH IN THE CONSWUER INTE-sT 782 (E. Scott
Maynes ed., 1988) [hereinafter Priest, Disappearance of Consumer]. To confirm this, Priest
cites a case in which a California court affirmed a jury's apparent finding that the defend-
ant's product violated the consumer expectations standard even though the jury also found
that the product's overall benefits exceeded its overall risks. Curtis v. State ex rel. Dep't of
Transp., 180 Cal. Rptr. 843 (Ct. App. 1982). In Curtis, however, the jury also found that the
manufacturer was guilty of negligence. Id. at 846. The facts in Curtis are not set forth in a
way that would make it possible to ascertain the basis for the jury's various findings. Still,
the explicit finding of manufacturer negligence makes it obviously inappropriate to charac-
terize Curtis as reaching an absolute liability result.
As it happens, I am no admirer of the consumer expectations standard, finding it fre-
quently shaggy and uncertain. Yet whatever its area of uncertainty, that standard cannot
equal absolute liability, since on its face it accepts a liability limitation of consumer knowl-
edge-of assumption of risk. Given this limitation, the standard can easily produce dramatic
denials of liability. See, e.g., Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th
Cir. 1988) (cigarettes); Delvaux v. Ford Motor Co., 764 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1985) (auto con-
vertible without roll bar); Rosburg v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 226 Cal. Rptr. 299 (Ct.
App. 1986) (silicon breast prosthesis); Kutzlar v. AMF Harley-Davidson, 550 N.E.2d 1236
(I. Ct. App.) (motorcycle with extra-wide gas tank and no crash bars), appeal denied, 555
N.E. 2d 377 (Ill. 1990); Lamke v. Futorian Corp., 709 P.2d 684 (Okla. 1985) (cigarette that is
not self-extinguishing).
114 Priest, Modern Tort Law, supra note 85, at 26-30.
115 See, e.g., Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1981)
("[T]he issue is whether a manufacturer, knowing the risks inherent in his product, acted
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may be somewhat lacking in analytic rigor,""8 the typical mix re-
maining with the general vicinity of the negligence risk-benefit
standard.
As far as the manufacturer's modern obligation to warn is con-
cerned, it is often expressed in terms of an obligation to give a
"reasonable" warning; and many courts make clear that the manu-
facturer's warning obligation is essentially a negligence obligation.
Indeed, Priest himself suggests that the "doctrinal structure of
modern [warning] law requires little change. 1 17 One doctrine that
does offend Priest is that expressed in Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Products Corp.,1 s ruling that manufacturers can be held liable for
reasonably in putting it on the market."); Garst v. General Motors Corp., 484 P.2d 47, 61
(Kan. 1971) ("[The product-design duty of a manufacturer is that of reasonable care
.... "); St. Germain v. Husqvarna Corp., 544 A.2d 1283, 1285-1286 (Me. 1988) (endorsing
"danger utility" test for design defect that roughly equals negligence test); Prentis v. Yale
Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 186 (Mich. 1984) (adopting "a pure negligence, risk-utility test");
Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Or. 1978) (ruling that plaintiff must
show that "suggested alternatives are not only technically feasible but also practicable");
Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 683 (W. Va. 1979) (indicating that
defectiveness depends on the standards of the "reasonably prudent manufacturer").
116 Of these courts, the most important is the New York Court of Appeals. In Voss v.
Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., that court started out by reasoning that a product's
design is defective if it renders the product "not reasonably safe." 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y.
1983). In elaborating on this reasonableness concept, the court enumerated seven factors.
Three of these are the magnitude of the product's risk, "the availability of a safer design,"
and "the potential for designing and manufacturing the product so that it is safer but re-
mains functional and reasonably priced." Id. at 208-09. These factors are essential to a
proper negligence analysis. Other factors mentioned by the court include "the ability of the
plaintiff to have avoided injury by careful use of the product," the consumer's "degree of
awareness of the potential danger of the product," and the overall utility of the product. Id.
Two of these factors relate to notions of contributory negligence and assumption of risk that
are certainly germane to a negligence evaluation; and all three factors can serve in many
cases to contract the scope of the manufacturer's liability. Only the seventh factor-"the
manufacturer's ability to spread any cost related to improving the safety of the de-
sign"--suggests any interest in enterprise liability.
Having set forth these various factors in the abstract, the court then discussed how the
jury should analyze the design defect claim in the immediate case. And here the court sug-
gested that the key question concerned the extent to which the product's design danger
could be reduced by modifying that design in a "feasible" way that would entail no more
than a "reasonable cost." Id. at 209. Hence: as the court rendered operational its list of
factors, the risk-benefit theme became dominant.
Later New York cases, relying on Voss, have rejected the design defect claims of plaintiffs
who fail to establish a safer and feasible design alternative. E.g., Burgos v. Lutz, 512
N.Y.S.2d 424 (App. Div. 1987).
"17 Priest, Modern Tort Law, supra note 85, at 31.
I's 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
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failures to warn even if the manufacturer at the time of the prod-
uct sale neither knew nor had reason to know of the product haz-
ard in question. Priest indicates that Beshada lies on "the leading
edge of modern warning law."119 Yet Beshada was all but over-
ruled-limited to its asbestos facts-by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories only two years later.12 0
While other failure-to-warn opinions sometimes employ the rheto-
ric of hindsight, this usually is little more than rhetoric; as James
Henderson and Aaron Twerski point out, "no jurisdiction except
New Jersey has [endorsed hindsight liability] in a case where it
mattered on the facts. '1 21 There are no cases, for example, in
which drug manufacturers have been held liable for their failure to
warn of "unknowable risks."
Thus a review of the basic categories of products liability doc-
trine thus does not confirm Priest's claim that modern products
liability approaches absolute liability. At times, however, Priest's
claim seems to concern how the formal categories of doctrine are
explained or worked out in typical judicial opinions. To consider
this version of the Priest claim, I have selected one category of
products-power saws and mechanical saws-and have read all the
appellate opinions dealing with the liability of their manufactur-
ers. 1 2 Of the forty-eight opinions I was able to find, in twenty-one
the court ruled roughly in favor of plaintiffs, in twenty-five in favor
of defendants. (Two cases contained a mix of holdings.) Several
opinions, in denying or defining liability, expressly rejected abso-
119 Priest, Modern Tdrt Law, supra note 85, at 31. Beshada is a case on which Priest
heavily relies. His article cites it four times, for four related (but distinct) propositions. Id.
at 3 n.20, 9 n.40, 12 n.52, 31.
12. 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984). Priest's article does not mention Feldman. Indeed, the arti-
cle suggests that modem courts characteristically adopt a "retrospective" or "hindsight"
approach to liability that rejects defendants' "state-of-the-art" arguments. Priest, Modem
Tort Law, supra note 85, at 8, 12, 28, 31.
It should be noted that in asbestos cases the issue of liability for unknowable harms is not
very relevant. Plaintiffs are in fact generally able to show that manufacturers knew or
should have known of the hazards of asbestos. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods.,
493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); MoLLY SELVM & LARRY
Picus. THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE: OBSERVATIONs FROM A REcENT AsBssS CASE
21 (1987).
121 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, PRODUCTS LAnum PROBLEbS & PRO-
cEss 612 (2d ed. 1992); see infra text accompanying notes 265-273.
" The cases are collected in Michael G. Walsh, Annotation, Products Liability: Mechan-
ical or Chain Saw or Components Thereof, 22 A.LR 4TH 206 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
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lute liability;123 only one opinion contained rhetoric in any way
sympathetic to enterprise liability;124 and none of the opinions re-
lied on reasoning at all suggestive of any practice of absolute liabil-
ity. In the seven cases involving apparent claims of manufacturing
defects, plaintiffs prevailed in four, as courts tried to figure out the
extent to which various forms of circumstantial evidence can be
probative of manufacturing defects. 25 Almost all of the thirty-two
design defect cases dealt with the issue of the appropriateness of
safety devices: a chain brake for a chain saw, a blade guard for a
table saw, or a riving knife for a circular saw. In two of these cases,
courts ruling for plaintiffs were satisfied with less evidence than an
analyst like me would regard as satisfactory. 26 Still, the two courts
seemed genuine in their belief that an improper design had been
adequately established.
Moreover, as the breakdown of results itself suggests, these two
cases did not set the general pattern. In other design defect cases,
courts denied liability for a variety of reasons: for example, be-
cause they regarded jury verdicts rejecting such claims as sup-
ported by the evidence;12 7 because they found that "victim fault,
rather than any alleged design defect, was the cause of the acci-
dent"; 28 and because they perceived that the safety device identi-
fied by the plaintiff would have impaired the utility of the saw.12
There were nine cases involving claims of the saw manufacturer's
failure to warn. In these nine, plaintiffs prevailed in only two.
123 E.g., Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 667 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Kysor Indus.
Corp. v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908, 911 (Colo. 1982); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co.,
253 S.E.2d 666, 677 (W. Va. 1979);
'2 This was the New York opinion in Voss v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., 450
N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983), discussed supra note 116. On its facts, Voss concerned a power saw.
,25 Compare Skil Corp. v. Lugsdin, 309 S.E.2d 921 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming liability)
with Duncan v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 567 P.2d 936 (Mont. 1977) (denying liability).
226 See Lynd v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 554 P.2d 1000 (Or. 1976); Peterson v. Lebanon Mach.
Works, 641 P.2d 1165 (Or. Ct. App. 1982). I am troubled by the absence of expert testimony
in Lynd, 554 P.2d at 1002, and by the court's perception in Peterson that it is "self-evident"
that the jump chain of an edger's in-feed table could have been wired through the control
panel. 641 P.2d at 1167.
127 E.g., Elliott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 527 N.E.2d 574, 579 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
"2' Nevils v. Singer Co., 533 So. 2d 157, 160 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
2 9 See Wood v. Stihl, Inc., 705 F.2d 1101, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1983); Hagans v. Oliver Mach.
Co., 576 F.2d 97, 101 (5th Cir. 1978); St. Germain v, Husqvarna Corp., 544 A.2d 1283, 1285-
86 (Me. 1988).
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Courts denied liability because the hazard was obvious,130 because
the defendant's warning was legally adequate, 31 because the plain-
tiff was an experienced user,13 2 and because there was no showing
of causation between the allegedly inadequate warning and the
plaintiff's injury. 13
On balance, the evidence afforded by this set of products liabil-
ity opinions does not support any claim of near absolute liability.
In particular, the results reached in the warning cases reject
Priest's indication that legal doctrines have "led warning law close
to absolute liability."13 What all these opinions do strongly sug-
gest is that a liability-delimiting standard of "defect" has been ap-
plied by courts with some integrity.135
To be sure, it may be that Priest's general position relates not so
much to judicial opinions as to the pattern of underlying tort
claims. A major new report by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice
has gathered data on the situation of accident victims. 10 The Rand
data show that of every 100 victims who suffer "on-the-job prod-
uct-associated injuries" only 7 take any action by way of pursuing
a tort claim; of those suffering "nonwork, product-associated inju-
ries" only 2 of every 100 take any action.13 7 The Rand study cer-
tainly shows that no practice resembling absolute liability is in ef-
fect in products cases generally.
To flesh out the implications of Rand's aggregate data, let me
s See Hagans, 576 F.2d at 102-03.
' See Scott v. Black & Decker, Inc., 717 F.2d 251, 254 (5th Cir. 1983); Gross v. Black &
Decker (U.S.), Inc., 695 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1983); Ducote v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 451 So. 2d
1211, 1215 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
"2 See Poland v. Beaird-Poulan, 483 F. Supp. 1256, 1264-65 (W.D. La. 1980); Ducote, 451
So. 2d at 1215.
133 Hagan v. EZ Mfg. Co., 674 F.2d 1047, 1052-53 (5th Cir. 1982); Kysor Industrial Corp.
v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908, 912 (Colo. 1982).
1" Priest, Modern Expansion, supra note 93, at 41. "Except where intentionally self-in-
flicted," all product-related injuries result, in legal principle, from inadequate warnings,
though consumers do not "always" recover. Id.
M Granted, the process by which cases get selected for appeal makes any set of appellate
opinions something less than conclusive as evidence.
138 DEBORAH R HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNTrED
STATES 124 (1991). According to this report, in no single category of accidents do even 40
percent of all victims assert tort claims. Indeed, the highest level of claiming is about 33
percent-by the victims of auto accidents. Yet, as Priest acknowledges, claims between mo-
torists remain covered by a rule and practice of negligence liability. See Priest, Modern
Expansion, supra note 93, at 42.
,1 HENSLER ET AL, supra note 136, at 124.
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now look at particular categories of dangerous products. Some-
times, television sets catch fire in homes. When they do, my sense
is that products liability claims frequently ensue. Such a result is
quite explainable in terms of a meaningful defect doctrine. A tele-
vision set would certainly not catch fire unless the set then con-
tained some defect, and given the way in which most television sets
sit stationary in a corner of the consumer's room (not even requir-
ing periodic maintenance), many juries could permissibly find that
the defect in the set was present when the set itself was first pur-
chased by the consumer."' 8
Television sets can here be compared to other household prod-
ucts ranked as dangerous by the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission. According to the Commission's data, there are over
417,000 knife injuries each year that are treated in the emergency
rooms of American hospitals."' 9 One hears, however, of almost no
lawsuits brought against knife manufacturers. The obvious expla-
nation is that the defect requirement in products liability law
means business-and does not mean absolute liability. Knife inju-
ries plainly result from the inherent hazards of the products them-
selves, in conjunction with their careless handling by consumers.
Knives rarely include manufacturing defects; because their func-
138 Priest states that "[i]t is barely exaggeration that today pharmaceutical manufacturers
are absolutely liable for adverse reactions to drugs." Priest, Modern Tort Law, supra note
85, at 36. This statement seems to refer to claims and settlements. Yet Priest offers no
supporting data. I have recently reviewed JAMES W. LONG, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO PRE-
SCRIPTION DRUGS (1991), a 1000-page book discussing hundreds of drugs and hundreds of
their serious side effects. From what I know, very few of these serious side effects have
resulted in litigation. For observations that support my own understanding, see Judith P.
Swazey, Prescription Drugs Safety in Product Liability, in THE LIABILITY MAZE. THE IM-
PACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 291, 297, 328 (Peter W. Huber & Robert
E. Litan eds., 1991).
Priest has also emphasized the liability burden of general aviation manufacturers. See
George L. Priest, Can Absolute Manufacturer Liability be Defended?, 9 YALE J. ON REG.
237, 259-62 (1992). This burden is indeed substantial. See infra notes 214-216 and accompa-
nying text. Still, I am advised by experienced defense counsel that only about 25% of all
victims of general aviation crashes actually file products liability claims. Interview with Wil-
liam V. O'Connor (March 14, 1992); Interview with Frank Silane (April 10, 1992). The re-
maining victims evidently perceive that pilot error was the exclusive cause of the crash, or
they are dissuaded from claiming by all the difficulties involved in proving a product defect.
M' Also, these emergency rooms annually treat over 250,000 injuries resulting from nails,
screws, carpet tacks, and thumbtacks. These data are drawn from an untitled document I
have received from the Commission. NATIONAL ELECTRONIC INJURY SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
DATA (1990) [hereinafter NEISS DATA].
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tion requires their dangerous design feature, their designs are
hardly defective; and because consumers appreciate their hazards,
no warnings are required, nor do these products defeat ordinary
consumer expectations. No practice of near absolute liability
prevails, and under the defect requirement there is very little lia-
bility in fact.
To be sure, because products such as knives seem innately dan-.
gerous, they might be thought to provide an awkward test for en-
terprise liability theory, given the way in which that theory incor-
porates the .idea of providing manufacturers with incentives for
improved product safety. Yet enterprise liability theory, as ex-
plained by Priest, includes loss distribution as well as loss preven-
tion. Indeed, loss distribution is at times identified as the primary
point behind enterprise liability; 40 and the larger the number of
foreseeable injuries, the more important products liability's sup-
posed loss distribution function becomes.
Still, to be more thorough in this review of the absolute liability
rhetoric, consideration will now be given to two additional catego-
ries of danger-producing products. Look first at bicycles. Bi-
cycles-unlike knives-are complex products that incorporate a
range of design choices. The National Commission's Final Report
in 1970 spent two pages discussing apparent design deficiencies in
bicycles."'4 The Consumer Product Safety Commission subse-
quently adopted an extensive (though nonpreemptive) standard
covering bicycle design. 42 Certainly, bicycle manufacturers are vul-
nerable to suit under theories of defective design and failure to
warn. Furthermore, bicycles can also include a wide variety of
manufacturing defects. Nevertheless, most bicycle accidents
plainly result from user error. Even though many of these users are
young and inexperienced, their inadequate management of their
bicycles provides an explanation for their injuries that renders un-
likely any plausible claim of defect. As of 1970, bicycle injuries
constituted 1 out of every 15 injuries associated with consumer
products. 4" By 1990, over 580,000 bicycle injuries required treat-
140 See Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 84, at 1525.
'" FINAL REPORT, supra note 45, at 18-20.
142 16 C.F.R. §§ 1512.1 to 1512.20 (1992); see Forester v. Consumer Product Safety
Comm'n, 559 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (affirming standard).
I FiNAL REPORT, supra note 45, at 10-11.
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ment in American emergency rooms.' Yet in all the years since
1967 there have been only fourteen appellate opinions dealing with
the products liability of bicycle manufacturers. 4 5 Such a small
number of appeals strongly suggests that the number of actual
claims against bicycle manufacturers is no more than a very small
fraction of the total number of persons injured on account of their
use of bicycles.
Finally, I have considered the liability exposure of the manufac-
turers of automobiles, and in doing so have been able to develop
data that goes beyond appellate opinions. Car manufacturers loom
large in the jurisprudence of products liability: consider, for exam-
ple, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,'" Vandermark v.
Ford Motor Co.,' 47 Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,'48 Daly v.
General Motors Corp., 49 Dawson v. Chrysler Corp.,150 and any
number of other leading products liability cases. How often, then,
are auto manufacturers sued and subjected to liability? In the late
1980s, about 650 products liability actions for personal injury were
filed in federal courts each year against auto manufacturers. 15' As
far as state court actions are concerned, the data show that the
percentage of all products liability cases (not just auto) filed in
federal court varies from twenty-three percent (in Iowa) to sixty-
six percent (in Massachusetts). 2 To err perhaps on the conserva-
tive side, assume here that only twenty percent of all personal in-
jury products liability actions filed against auto manufacturers are
commenced in federal court. Given the 650 federal court number,
the total number of formal filings thus equals about 3,250.
Of course, possible tort claims are often settled before any for-
"4 NEISS DATA, supra note 139.
"' See Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Products Liability: Bicycles and Accessories, 76 A.LR.
4TH 117 (1990 & Supp. 1991). Courts ruled in favor of plaintiffs in eight of these cases.
'" 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
"' 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964).
"s 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
149 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978).
150 630 F.2d 950 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
"I DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 180 (1989) (Table C-2A).
" U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY: EXTENT OF "LITIGATION EXPLOSION"
IN FEDERAL COURTS QUESTIONED 39 (1988). Twenty-three percent of all products claims
brought against the members of National Machine Tool Builders Association were filed in
federal court. Id. at 40.
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mal lawsuits are filed."' s Based on data I have (confidentially) re-
ceived from two auto companies on the number of claims and the
ratio of claims to lawsuits, I can extrapolate that there are about
2,000 instances each year in which personal-injury claims against
auto companies are settled by some payment before the filing of
suit. Combine, then, the number of formal personal-injury lawsuits
and the number of pre-lawsuit settlements, and regard this combi-
nation as suggesting the total annual number of "serious claims"
against auto manufacturers for personal injury. The two numbers
add up to about 5,250 serious claims each year. Now admittedly
5,250 is quite a large number. The liability these claims can pro-
duce is a cause of legitimate and serious concern to auto makers.
The number of claims has risen very dramatically over a forty-year
period, and the level of liability that companies currently bear in
the United States is many times the level they encounter in foreign
legal systems. 1" Nevertheless, the number of serious claims looks
quite modest when it is compared to the number of serious auto
injuries. According to the National Safety Council, 1,700,000
Americans suffer disabling injuries each year in motor vehicle acci-
dents. ' 55 Evidently, only 1 out of every 320 victims of disabling
auto accidents pursues a serious claim against the auto manufac-
turer. Clearly, then, the defect requirement has not been trivialized
in auto cases; rather, that requirement importantly confines vic-
tims' opportunities to bring suit against auto manufacturers.
In all, the analysis and evidence presented in this Part provides
general support for the conclusion that modern tort liability de-
pends in form-and to a large extent in fact-on a showing of neg-
ligence (or defect) and not on some practice of near absolute liabil-
ity. However, while the claims Priest sometimes makes on behalf of
153 In tort fields such as auto and malpractice, these settlements are often initiated by
insurance companies on the basis of information they receive from their own insureds about
the circumstances of particular accidents. In products cases, by contrast, the manufacturer
typically knows nothing about the accident until it is notified by the victim; and often this
notification takes the form of a formal lawsuit. By initiating such a lawsuit, the victim not
only notifies the manufacturer of his claim but also communicates to the manufacturer that
he is serious about pursuing the claim. In some situations, however, the victim's lawyer,
before filing suit, submits a demand letter to the manufacturer.
154 See Gary T. Schwartz, Product Liability and Medical Malpractice in Comparative
Context, in THE LABILrry MAZE THE ImpACT OF LIuLmr LAw ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION.
supra note 138, at 47-51 [hereinafter Schwartz, Comparative Context].
155 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNciL. AcciDmam FACTS 1 (1990).
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this practice should be rejected, it does not follow that the theory
of enterprise liability he describes has been irrelevant in the devel-
opment of modern tort doctrine. The possible forms of its rele-
vance are discussed in Part IV below.
IV. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
As described by Priest, the first tenet of the theory of enterprise
liability is that tort law should strive to provide victims with insur-
ance against the risk of accidents. The theory's second tenet is that
liability rules should secure safety by internalizing accident costs
on the organizations that create accident risks or by placing liabil-
ity on the person or organization in the best position to control
risks.1 6 Its third tenet is that contract is not an appropriate way to
allocate liability. Priest indicates that by the late 1950s tort schol-
ars were almost unanimous in their support of this enterprise lia-
bility theory.157
According to Priest, the chief architects of enterprise liability
were Fritz Kessler and Fleming James. Kessler is included in the
Priest account because of his article on adhesion contracts,6 8
which contributed to the delegitimation of contract reasoning in
personal injury cases. Kessler was certainly relied on by the New
Jersey court in Henningsen 59 as it invalidated a disclaimer of war-
ranty liability. Even so, this invalidation was not due to Kessler
alone. Long before 1960, American courts had been somewhat
skeptical of efforts by corporate defendants to disclaim by contract
their liability for personal injury.160 Moreover, the more general
ideas about public policy emerging in the 1960s would have made
it especially difficult to uphold disclaimers of this sort. 61 In any
event, Kessler is relevant only to the third tenet in enterprise lia-
156 The "internalization" theme is stressed in Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra note 5.
The "best position" theme is stressed in Priest, Risk Control, supra note 88. The two are
not quite the same. In malpractice cases, for example, the second theme may apply in ways
in which the first does not.
M7 Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra note 5, at 463.
"' Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943).
19 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1960).
160 See K.A. Drechsler, Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provision by One Other
Than Carrier or Employer for Exemption from Liability, or Indemnification, for Conse-
quences of Own Negligence, 175 A.L.R. 8 (1948).
"I' See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
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bility theory.
As for Fleming James, he was vigorous and effective in support-
ing loss distribution as an important social policy and in espousing
the view that tort liability rules should be extended so as to do a
better job .of achieving loss distribution. Still, James' ultimate pro-
posal was that tort law should be abolished in favor of a more gen-
eral system of social insurance (combined with improved programs
in safety regulation).' 62 His approval of the broadening of tort lia-
bility rules was hence no more than an interim recommendation, to
be accepted only until society is willing to adopt an appropriate
program of social insurance.
Other tort scholars who took the loss-distribution objective seri-
ously in the 1950s include Charles Gregory, Albert EBhrenzweig,
Leon Green, and Clarence Morris. In a charming 1951 essay, Greg-
ory relied on loss-distribution considerations by way of recom-
mending a doctrine of the absolute liability of enterprise.l
3
Ehrenzweig's 1951 book reached a similar conclusion.'" In 1953,
both Green"6 5 and Ehrenzweig,168 endorsing loss distribution, urged
the repudiation of the tort system and the adoption of social insur-
ance; indeed, Ehrenzweig dismissed the tort system as a neurotic
mess. A primary point of Morris's 1951 essay was that on some
occasions the better loss distributor is the plaintiff rather than the
defendant;16 7 for Morris, then, the loss-distribution norm could ei-
ther support or oppose tort liability. Morris, furthermore, was cer-
tainly appreciative of more traditional tort values. Consider, for
example, his sympathetic reference to the idea of fault-based lia-
bility as being "deeply rooted in our culture." 168
162 2 HA"FEa & JAmIES, supra note 27, at 762-63.
18 Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. Rzv. 359
(1951).
18 See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG. NEGLIGENCE WrrHotrr FAULT (1951), reprinted in 54 CA-
LIP. L RE V. 1422, 1476-77 (1966).
165 See Leon Green, The Individual's Protection Under Negligence Law: Risk Sharing,
47 Nw. U L. Rav. 751, 770-77 (1953). Actually, Green's final proposal includes a somewhat
incoherent mix of social insurance and other features.
188 See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence, 47 Nw. U. L. Ray. 855, 871
J1953). In this article, Ehrenzweig recommends expanded tort liability only as a form of
"partial relief" in the event that legislatures decline to adopt social insurance programs. Id.
at 872.
167 Clarence Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk-Bearing Capacity, 61 YAM J..
1172, 1179 (1952).
I Clarence Morris, Duty, Negligence and Causation, 101 U. PA. L Ray. 189, 221 (1952).
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Other tort scholars in the 1950s displayed little concern for loss
distribution and other broad issues of public policy; rather, they
remained primarily interested in the internal coherence of tort
doctrine as supplemented by limited common-sense notions of
right and wrong.169 Moreover, a loss-distribution rationale for tort
law was actually opposed by leading scholars such as William Pros-
ser, Robert Keeton, and Harry Kalven. Over the years, Prosser was
at times almost derisive in discussing loss distribution as an expla-
nation for tort doctrine. 17 0 The whole point of Keeton's 1959 arti-
cle on modern rules of strict liability was to show that those rules
did not rest on loss-distribution ideas but rather on a proper sense
of the moral responsibility of the individual defendant.17' As late
as 1964, Kalven relied on the criterion of fairness in opposing auto
no-fault compensation plans.17 2 Despite their possible insurance
advantages, Kalven found these plans unjust in the way they im-
posed the burden of insurance premiums on motorists who were
without fault.
This reference to auto no-fault not only brings our discussion
into the 1960s but also takes that discussion into the larger na-
tional discourse on public policy. The Keeton-O'Connell auto com-
pensation plan, presented to the public in 1965, " highlighted the
The most extensive statement of Morris's views is CLARENCE MORRIS, TORTS (1953).
" This is a fair characterization of Page Keeton, Trespass, Nuisance, and Strict Liabil-
ity, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 457, 461-62, 466-67 (1959). Priest cites this article as evidence of a
scholarly consensus on behalf of enterprise liability. Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra note
5, at 504 & n.279. The Keeton article contains a single terse reference to loss distribution as
one of many relevant factors to be taken into account in deciding one category of cases.
Keeton, supra, at 473.
170 Prosser's views are discussed in G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA, 171-72
(1980); Schwartz, Directions, supra note 91, at 768-69. Elements of ambivalence in Prosser
are noted in id. at 768.
M Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARv. L. REv. 401 (1959).
This article is likewise cited by Priest as evidence of a consensus for enterprise liability.
Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra note 5, at 504 & n.279. Keeton does acknowledge that
"risk-spreading capacity" may have some bearing on the community's understanding of
moral fault. But he then points out that the growth of first-party accident insurance means
that plaintiffs themselves are acquiring a capacity for effective risk-spreading. Keeton,
supra, at 436-38.
72 Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Prob-
lem-Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. CHL L. REv. 641 (1964).
173ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM
(1965). Keeton's disapproval of a loss-distribution rationale for tort law has been described
above. See supra text accompanying note 171. But while Keeton taught torts at Harvard, he
also taught insurance; and his work on no-fault evidently came from the insurance side of
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benefits of affording compensation to accident victims. That plan
met with a very favorable political response. The new federal De-
partment of Transportation launched, as one of its first projects, a
major study of auto compensation plans;174 at the state level, legis-
lative consideration of these plans began almost immediately. Be-
tween 1970 and 1974, twenty-four states adopted some version of
no-fault. Moreover, by the mid-1960s the general theme of afford-
ing public insurance to the victims of injury and disease was re-
ceiving a large play on the stage of national policymaking. 75 As the
welfare state expanded, a new program was added to Social Secur-
ity, affording public compensation to a new category of disabled
persons.7 6 Medicare and Medicaid were also adopted, socializing
the health costs of the aged and many of the poor.
To recap, it is wrong to say that almost all tort scholars by the
1950s were relying on the loss-distribution idea in recommending
broad rules of institutional liability. Many scholars were simply ig-
noring the loss-distribution concept; several others rejected it; and
a further group regarded it as a reason for rejecting tort rather
than expanding tort. Still, it would be right to say that by the
1960s a significant number of tort scholars had sympathetically de-
veloped the loss-distribution theme. 7 7 Furthermore, that theme
his interests. Even while as an insurance expert Keeton was working on auto no-fault, as a
torts expert he was preparing a book on the analytic intricacies of the tort doctrines of
actual cause and proximate cause. ROBERT F. KEETON. LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF ToRTs
(1963).
174 This study eventually yielded twenty-four publications, the last of which was JoHN A.
VOLPE, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LossEs AD THEIR COMPENSATION IN THm UNITED STATES
(1971).
'" For a previous discussion of this point, see David G. Owen, The Intellectual Develop-
ment of Modern Products Liability Law: A Comment on Priest's View of the Cathedral's
Foundations, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 529, 533 (1985).
2" The new program is described in Lance M. Leibman, The Definition of Disability in
Social Security and Supplemental Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare
Estates, 89 HAv. L REv. 833 (1976).
177 To what extent, however, did loss-prevention concepts join with loss-distribution con-
cepts in a larger theory of enterprise liability? A scholar like Gregory, in supporting absolute
liability, relied solely on its loss-distribution advantages, making no mention of its possible
safety benefits. Gregory, supra note 163, at 382-85, 393-97. And Ehrenzweig's support of
social insurance as a satisfactory alternative to absolute liability, see supra note 166 and
accompanying text, shows that loss distribution was the only criterion on which he was rely-
ing. As for Fleming James, in his view the safety advantages of institutional liability were no
more than moderate. Moreover, his explanation of how tort liability might achieve safety
was rather quirky. Most accidents, he thought, are caused by a limited number of people
who are innately "accident prone" and who cannot themselves be deterred by liability rules.
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was then being amplified by the public-policy discourse of the
1960s.
By the mid-1960s, then, a theory of loss distribution was at least
becoming available to American tort judges. Those judges engaged
in the process of expanding tort liability by relying on the standard
of negligence/defect. As suggested above, broad rules of liability for
negligence or unreasonableness could be expected to afford com-
pensation to significant numbers of accident victims. Judges hence
were willing to endorse those rules at least partly because of their
loss-distribution potential. 178
Yet if this is how the loss-distribution rationale entered into ju-
dicial decisionmaking, then that rationale is not really problematic.
For one thing, this account does not claim that the tort system has
in fact adopted any rule or practice of near absolute liability; hence
there is no need to worry about the range of adverse social conse-
quences that such a practice might bring about. A second and re-
2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 27, at 734-40. Somewhat helpful results can be achieved,
however, by shifting liability to their employers, who can then provide therapy to such per-
sons or alternatively remove them from the particular positions in which they are capable of
iiflicting harm. Id. at 740-41.
Consider now, however, two other figures. The first was Roger Traynor, the author of a
1944 concurring opinion that contained broad language on the safety advantages of products
liability. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944). Technically, this
language was limited to the goal of discouraging "defects" in products; still, the language
was susceptible to being interpreted in a broader absolute liability way. A second figure was
a young scholar, Guido Calabresi. Calabresi elaborated on the loss-distribution rationale for
tort law in his 1961 and 1965 articles and his 1970 book. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts
on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Guido Calabresi, The
Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARv. L. REV. 713
(1965); Guvo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). Those writings also stressed how
broad rules of liability can achieve the safety goals of resource allocation. Moreover, Cala-
bresi's co-authored article in 1972 developed a theory of strict liability that rests on identi-
fying those parties who are in the best position to prevent the creation of risks. Calabresi &
Hirschoff, supra note 15, at 1060. It thus is Calabresi who rounds out the development of
enterprise liability theory, inasmuch as his writings highlighted the safety advantages of
broad rules of institutional liability and additionally showed how those rules can provide
both safety and risk distribution.
To be sure, while Calabresi suggested that in most instances the defendant is in the best
position to reduce risks, he also acknowledged that in some instances plaintiffs are the best
risk-avoiders, and therefore should be denied tort recoveries. Id. at 1056, 1062. To this ex-
tent, Calabresi's analysis lacks the dogmatism that Priest attributes to enterprise liability
advocates.
18 See supra text accompanying note 22. For somewhat similar views, see E. Donald Elli-
ott, Re-Inventing Defenses/Enforcing Standards: The Next Stage of the Tort Revolution?,
43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1069, 1070-75 (1991); Trebilcock, supra note 4, at 949.
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lated point is that in a sense the motives of judges might not be all
that relevant. Take comparative negligence, which was adopted
throughout the United States in the modern era. According to
Priest, judges endorsed comparative negligence because of its abil-
ity to advance the program of enterprise liability. 79 Even if this
claim is descriptively accurate, it may well be normatively irrele-
vant. Comparative negligence can easily be justified by considera-
tions of interpersonal fairness and corrective justice. 80 Moreover,
most economists, in evaluating liability rules, have concluded that
comparative negligence can be commended as efficient. 81 If con-
ventional tort reasoning is able to endorse comparative negligence
as both fair and efficient, then it really does not matter that the
judges who adopted comparative negligence may have been taking
enterprise liability ideas into account.
Priest's position, of course, is that the minds of modem judges
have been essentially dominated by enterprise liability theory.
Moreover, as he points out, absolute liability is that theory's "una-
voidable implication.' ' 182 Given Priest's position, how might it hap-
pen that judges have managed to avoid the unavoidable? Those
judges have not supported rules of absolute liability;18 3 rather, they
have largely limited themselves to endorsing rules of negligence
and defect liability, even though those rules necessarily leave huge
numbers of accident victims uncompensated. Priest himself sug-
gests that judges after 1960 "sought to achieve [the goals of enter-
prise liability] largely through the structure of the law in place,
179 See Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 84, at 1536. This allegation of motive does
seem doubtful, since by 1960 comparative negligence had been adopted in most countries'
legal systems, which apparently had not been infected by the virus of enterprise liability.
See supra text accompanying note 26.
"' See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 699.
18, E.g., Daniel Orr, The Superiority of Comparative Negligence: Another Vote, 20 J.
LEGAL STUD. 119 (1991).
18 Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra note 5, at 527.
M For example, modern courts have simply ignored Justice Tobriner's 1967 recommen-
dation that courts adopt a rule rendering doctors strictly liable for the unanticipated harm-
ful consequences of medical treatment. See Clark v. Gibbons, 426 P.2d 525, 535 (Cal. 1967)
(Tobriner, J., concurring). Similarly, with the possible excepion of some of the recent self-
service cases, courts have ignored one scholar's recommendation, explicitly derived from en-
terprise liability theory, that commercial landowners be held strictly liable for injuries re-
sulting from hazards on their premises. Edmund Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Busi-
ness Premises-One Step Beyond Rowland and Greenman, 22 UCLA L. Ray. 820 (1975).
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with minimum adjustment to then-existing legal doctrine."' 84 He
does not explain, however, why enterprise-liability judges were
willing to accept an existing "structure of the law" that was so
likely to fall so far short of full enterprise liability goals. 185
The analyst who tends to sympathize with Priest's emphasis on
enterprise liability might be able to offer several explanations. One
explanation would be that judges, as judges, have felt constrained
as a practical matter by the tradition of American tort law-a tra-
dition that emphasizes the negligence standard. A second explana-
tion could be that judges may have accepted the jurisprudence of
negligence not simply because of the constraints of precedent but
also because the judges themselves, whether realizing this or not,
have internalized or assimilated the values that contribute to that
jurisprudence.8 6 A third explanation-a variation, no doubt, of the
first and second-is that judges have intuited the fact that loss dis-
tribution standing alone does not provide an acceptable or legiti-
mate basis for tort liability. Such a basis is provided, however, by a
finding of negligence or unreasonableness.
Yet if any of these explanations is correct, enterprise liability is
not nearly as dominant as Priest's account suggests; for each of
them concede that modern judges-even though swayed by enter-
prise liability-have been concurrently operating, in one way or
another, under the influence of negligence liability and its related
ideas and values. In my view, however, these various explana-
tions-even though they all do acknowledge the relevance of negli-
gence-are still too begrudging. As Part II of this Article has sug-
gested, tort judges in the 1960s and 1970s were genuinely respond-
ing to the appeal of the concept of liability for negligence or unrea-
sonableness. That is, those judges did want car manufacturers to
make proper decisions relating to crashworthiness; they did hope
that design defect rules could induce the proper design of con-
"' Priest, Modern Tort Law, supra note 85, at 10. Priest also refers to a "judicial reluc-
tance" t6 adopt formal rules of absolute liability. Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra note 5,
at 527. But he does not explain the bases for this reluctance.
"' For that matter, the "structure of the law" in the 1960s and early 1970s included the
doctrine of strict liability for ultrahazardous activities. Yet modem judges did not bestow
attention on this doctrine and did not give it a range of ambitious applications. Priest him-
self does not discuss this doctrine.
"' This explanation is consistent with Priest's suggestion that "the legal heritage of cor-
rective justice . . . has influenced the forms of modern law." Priest, Modern Tort Law,
supra note 85, at 9 n.38.
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sumer and industrial products; they did believe that when govern-
ment is negligent it should compensate its victims; they did recog-
nize that the locality rule is no longer helpful in identifying actual
malpractice; they did perceive that the landowner who is negligent
should generally bear liability; they did regard the traditional con-
tributory negligence rule as unfair; and they did believe that ther-
apists should give warnings when their patients become distinctly
dangerous.
Admittedly, those judges approved broad rules of unreasonable-
ness liability in part because of their perception that those rules
could achieve at least a substantial measure of loss distribution. In
this way, they were able to blend traditional negligence ideas with
modem loss-spreading ideas. Also, as noted above, in the 1960s
and early 1970s those judges endorsed a new rule of strict liability
for manufacturing defects. This rule achieved a somewhat different
blend of negligence and loss spreading. The rule was officially justi-
fied, at least in part, in loss-distribution terms. Hence modem
judges in adopting the rule could gratify themselves by displaying
their approval of the loss-distribution idea-an idea which was
then being supported both by certain leading scholars and also by
the public-policy discourse of the era. At the same time, these
judges could appreciate that this rule actually extended liability
only in a limited way. Prosser himself, in reviewing the legal prac-
tices of the 1950s, observed that plaintiffs, having identified some
defect in the manufacturer's product, could then secure findings of
manufacturer negligence from juries in ninety-nine percent of all
cases.8 7 As it happens, this figure is probably too high;1 s8 eighty-
five percent might be a more accurate estimate. Still, a number as
high as this suggests that modern judges, in adopting strict liabil-
ity for manufacturing defects, could share in the excitement of the
process of public-policy innovation even while reassuring them-
selves that they were not straying that far beyond the baseline of
results already provided by the contemporary version of the negli-
I" William J. Prosser, The Assault On the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 70
YALE L.J. 1099, 1114 (1960). This is Prosser's "honest estimate." Id.
I" Consider, for example, the trial judge's rejection of the plaintiff's negligence claim in
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 73 (N.J. 1960). The basis for the judge's
ruling is unclear. The New Jersey Supreme Court's endorsement of implied warranty strict
liability mooted the plaintiff's argument that the judge had erred in finding no possible
negligence. Id. at 102.
1992]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
gence rule.
In a variety of ways, then, modern judges could combine negli-
gence ideas and loss-distribution ideas in a manner that produced
results that could apparently make adequate social sense.189 Yet
despite this favorable tendency, there were at least two ways in
which the process could go wrong. First of all, modern judges, in
becoming enthusiastic about imposing liability on institutions
whose conduct is found to be unreasonable, could end up under-
rating a range of factors that might suggest the unwisdom of a
broad deployment of liability. Several of these factors-described
above' 9 0-relate to contract considerations that might well justify
restrictions on liability. Other factors-considered further be-
low'e9-concern the high monetary costs entailed by the aggressive
application of a negligence idea. A third set of factors relate to all
the problems involved in the administration of a broadly defined
negligence standard; these problems include, for example, the un-
certain competence of judges and juries in rendering the sophisti-
cated judgments that a broad negligence standard frequently
requires.11
2
A second disturbing possibility is that modern judges, motivated
by notions of loss distribution, may have simply manipulated the
rhetoric of negligence doctrine to achieve results that cannot be
plausibly defended in any genuine negligence-like way. One opin-
ion that is frequently cited as involving such a process is Bigbee v.'
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,1 93 decided by the California
Supreme Court in 1983. In Bigbee, the plaintiff was in a public
telephone booth next to a liquor store when he was struck by a car
driven by a drunk driver who had veered off the street into the
parking lot where the telephone booth was located."", The plaintiff
sued the defendants who had manufactured the telephone booth
and placed it near the liquor store.'95 The trial judge's motion of
'8' For further discussion, see infra note 483.
'go See supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
,9 See infra text accompanying notes 455-459.
192 As will be shown below, the stabilization of tort doctrine during the post-modern era
has resulted in considerable part from a greater judicial appreciation of these various fac-
tors. See infra text accompanying notes 464-477.
,93 665 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1983).
,9, Id. at 948.
195 Id.
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summary judgment in favor of the defendants was reversed by the
California Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rose
Bird.198
That opinion relied in part on the court's suggestion that the
telephone booth was defective. 19 7 Utilizing the Bigbee opinion as a
vehicle for its critique of the court's chief justice, The Wall Street
Journal editorialized that "[p]hone booths would have to be made
of reinforced concrete to withstand such accidents."' 9 8 In fact,
however, nothing in Bigbee concerned the issue of a crashworthy
phone booth.'9 9 Rather, the plaintiff's allegation was that the
phone booth's defective door had jammed, trapping the plaintiff
inside the booth as the plaintiff attempted to escape the approach-
ing car.20 0 Authorizing liability in such a situation does not seem
particularly disingenuous. The Journal editorial also cites language
in the Bigbee opinion about liability insurance and characterizes
that language as showing an intent by the court to redistribute
wealth by relying on the defendant's insurance policy as a device
for securing compensation for plaintiffs.20 ' In fact, the court's opin-
ion considered whether the "imposition of liability would ... be
unduly burdensome to defendants" and relied on the "probable
availability" of liability insurance for low-frequency events as a
way of reducing the likelihood of such a burden.0 2 The court's
analysis-suggesting how liability insurance can protect defend-
ants against the harsh fortuities of risk-is both appropriate and
conventional; on its own, it shows no distortion in the judicial ap-
preciation of the significance of liability insurance.
Certain claims as to the disingenuousness of the Bigbee court
should thus be rejected. What is troublesome in the court's opin-
ion, however, is its additional holding that the telephone company
can be found negligent merely for its location of a telephone booth
fifteen feet from a major highway on which "[s]wift traffic... late
19 Id. at 953.
", See id. at 953.
199 The Case Against Rose Bird, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 26.
19 A New York court recently found no merit in one plaintiff's claim that a manufacturer
should bear liability when its telephone booth proves not to be bulletproof. Perez v. New
York TeL Co., 554 N.Y.S.2d 576 (App. Div. 1990).
1o Bigbee, 665 P.2d at 948.
201 The Case Against Rose Bird, supra note 199, at 26.
2*2 Bigbee, 665 P.2d at 953 n.14.
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at night is to be expected," and on which drunk drivers are fore-
seeable as well.203 Taken at face value, this holding has an amazing
analytic sweep: it would expose to claims of negligence those per-
sons and firms that engage in a wide variety of activities that take
place on sidewalks or within fifteen feet of a well-traveled highway
(for example, locating a newspaper rack on a sidewalk, or even pro-
posing to a friend that she meet you on the sidewalk).20 '
Given all these excesses, it is at least plausible to interpret this
Bigbee holding as indicating a judicial willingness to manipulate
the negligence concept in order to reach a corporate deep pocket
capable of risk distribution. For that matter, if certain applications
of the negligence standard seem disingenuous, there may also be
loss-distribution disingenuity in the creation of entire negligence
causes of action. Take the abolition of interspousal immunity.
That immunity may originally have rested on the conception of the
husband and wife as a single jural entity. By 1960, this conception
was not only archaic but indeed offensive. The inappropriateness
of the original conception certainly made it appropriate for courts
to reconsider the immunity doctrine. The issue of jural unity to
one side, however, in the modern world husband and wife typically
operate as a single economic unit, administering a single household
budget. Given the functional reality of the economic unity of hus-
band and wife,205 no spouse would think of suing the other spouse
for personal injury unless the other were covered by a liability in-
surance policy. Absent such a policy, collecting a tort judgment
would merely take money out of one of the household's pockets in
order to return it to another pocket. The judicial recognition of the
cause of action becomes understandable, then, mainly if it is as-
sumed that judges themselves were assuming and relying on the
existence of such insurance policies. It hence is appropriate to be-
lieve that the judges who abolished interspousal immunity did so
213 Id. at 952. This highway is in Inglewood, and I have driven on it recently. The highway
is quite straight. The car that hit Bigbee would have encountered a traffic signal two-tenths
of a mile before the liquor store; another signal is about a hundred feet beyond the accident
site.
204 Notice that the person in a phone booth is at least protected by the structure of the
phone booth itself. I myself shop at a grocery store on San Vicente Blvd. In the grocery
store parking lot ten feet from the street, there are two pay telephones, unenclosed by any
booths. On the sidewalk in front of the grocery store is a thriving newsstand that encourages
passers-by to browse through its collection of magazines.
200 In several states this reality is fortified by the law of community property.
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not for genuine negligence-oriented reasons but instead in order to
give one member of the family access to the other member's liabil-
ity insurance policy. °0
It seems proper to conclude, then, that judges, guided by the
loss-distribution idea, have on some occasions "cheated" in the
ways in which they have applied and deployed the negligence doc-
trine (and the related doctrine of product defect). The interesting
question concerns how frequently such cheating occurs. Many ac-
cusations of disingenuity leveled at courts turn out to be unjusti-
fied, as my initial comments on Bigbee suggest.20 7 For example, the
California Supreme Court's affirmation of liability in Weirum v.
RKO General, Inc. 0 has been frequently mocked.20 9 Yet the
court's finding of negligence in that case seems to me sound; the
promotion engaged in by the defendant radio station was not only
unusual and tawdry but also potentially quite dangerous. In prod-
ucts liability, there clearly are some cases in which judges' findings
of inadequate warnings seem far-fetched;210 yet when Part II of
this Article reviewed all the modern cases involving power saws
and mechanical saws, that review was unable to identify any
cases-let alone any pattern of cases-in which judges have ad-
ministered the defect requirement in a clearly manipulative man-
ner.211 In his study of the swine-flu vaccine litigation, Ed Kitch
identifies two appellate opinions that seem to him disingenuous in
a way that points toward absolute liability;212 still, Kitch acknowl-
208 This interpretation is not, however, beyond dispute. Courts have abolished immunity
in cases involving torts of intent as well as torts of negligence. See Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d
70, 73 (Cal. 1962) (affirming husband's liability for negligence); Self v. Self, 376 P.2d 65, 70
(Cal. 1962) (affirming husband's liability for intentional torts). And liability insurance poli-
cies typically exclude coverage of intentional harms. In Self, the wife who was suing the
husband was also in the process of divorcing him. 376 P.2d at 65. Their impending divorce
explains her lawsuit in a way that is consistent with the concerns expressed in my text.
207 See supra notes 193-202 and accompanying text.
z8 539 P.2d 36, 40 (Cal. 1975). Here a radio station sponsored a contest offering a prize to
the first listener to reach a disk jockey who was driving on Los Angeles streets and freeways.
209 Lawyers' lines include: "On a clear judicial day you can foresee forever"; "The Califor-
nia Supreme Court has never met a plaintiff it doesn't like."
210 See, e.g., MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 71 (Mass.) (find-
ing an oral-contraceptive warning inadequate because it did not specifically mention disa-
bling strokes, even though it did refer to life-threatening blood clots), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
920 (1985).
211 See supra notes 122-135 and accompanying text.
212 Edmund W. Kitch, Vaccine and Product Liability: A Case of Contagious Litigation,
REGULATON, May/June 1985, at 11, 13-14, (citing Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428,
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edges that the federal government ultimately prevailed in almost
every case in which it originally denied liability.213 In the mid-
1980s, there were over 200 claims pending against one leading gen-
eral aviation company, even though (according to that company)
the federal investigations of the underlying aviation crashes had
identified none that were due to vehicle defects. 2 14 Yet I am ad-
vised that these federal investigations are structured in ways that
reduce the likelihood of the uncovering of defects; 21 5 moreover,
during a five-year period in the 1970s, general aviation manufac-
turers secured defense verdicts in more than eighty percent of all
cases that actually went to trial.2 16
In all, it seems fair to assume that there has been some problem
of disingenuity in the judicial application of the standards of negli-
gence and defect.21" 7 The available evidence, however, does not sup-
1437, 1441 (8th Cir. 1984); Unthank v. United States, 732 F.2d 1517, 1523 (10th Cir. 1984)).
Both cases, in finding warnings inadequate, relied on reasoning that can be questioned.
213 Out of 1600 flu vaccine cases, only 6 claimants who would not have recovered under
the Department of Justice settlement policy eventually secured recoveries. Kitch, supra
note 213, at 13. To be sure, the Department's settlement standards were themselves gener-
ous. Id.
2'! See Robert Martin, General Aviation Manufacturing: An Industry under Siege, in
THE Li AmLrrY MAZE. THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION, supra note
138, at 478, 485. Note, however, that the federal agency's most recent report shows that
problems with the "aircraft" are a "broad cause or factor" in 27% of all general aviation
fatalities. NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., ANNUAL REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA: U.S, GEN-
ERAL AVIATION CALENDAR YEAR 1988, at 38 (1991). Of course, many or most "aircraft"
problems are the result of inadequate maintenance.
5 Telephone Interview with Professor Andrew Craig (January 7, 1992). Craig is the au-
thor of Product Liability and Safety in General Aviation, in THE LIABILITY MAZE. ThE
IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION, supra note 138, at 456. 1 should note
that National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) spokesmen dispute Professor Craig's
evaluation. They acknowledge, hovever, that NTSB reports are only intermittently con-
cerned with problems of uncrashworthiness (for example, the absence of shoulder har-
nesses). Yet these are problems that frequently give rise to plausible design defect claims.
210 See Martin, supra note 214, at 483.
"" What about the biases of jurors as they apply modern tort standards in individual
cases? Priest sometimes assumes that juries generally favor plaintiffs. E.g., Priest, Disap-
pearance of Consumer, supra note 113, at 780-82. But he does not advance the claim that
the attitudes of jurors have themselves shifted in any basic way between 1950 and now. My
own assessment is that in certain categories of cases juries do resolve doubts in favor of
sympathetic victims. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1013, 1061-62 (1991). But my sense is that there is nothing new in this practice. The
available evidence on jury performance is usefully considered in Kevin M. Clermont & The-
odore Eisenberg, Trial by Judge or Jury: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1124 (1992). Admittedly, one quite relevant point is that modern tort law's broad deploy.
ment of "reasonableness" standards of liability increases the number of cases in which juries
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port any claim that disingenuous applications have become sys-
tematic. A further point is that even if the evidence did show that
judges manipulate the concepts of negligence and defect with some
frequency, that evidence would not imply the absolute liability of
injurers. So long as plaintiffs need to present their claims within
the framework of the doctrine of negligence/defect, liability can in
fact extend beyond genuine negligence/defect in only a limited
way. That is, the requirement of negligence/defect operates as a
"filter" that drastically reduces the number of claims that victims
are able to bring.21 8 That ifiter, for example, necessarily eliminates
the vast majority of claims that children who fall off bicycles might
be able to bring against the manufacturers of bicycles; for almost
all the time, no claim of product defect would be respectable or
tenable.219 Similarly, the abolition of spousal immunity means that
a wife can sue her husband if she slips on an icy sidewalk that the
husband was expected to shovel.220 But she has no possible claim
against her husband if she simply slips and falls on the stairs in
the family's house. In fact, falls on stairs in homes result in 600,000
hospitalizations each year.2"' Yet it is rare for such falls to result in
tort claims-against the victim's spouse or, for that matter, against
any other category of tort defendant.
V. POST-MODERN TORT LAW
This Article until now has dealt with the rise in modern tort law,
which occurred between 1960 and the early 1980s for reasons dis-
cussed in Parts H and IV. The Article now °turns, as promised by
its Introduction, to more recent years which have witnessed the
end of that expansion. These years can perhaps be understood as
constituting tort law's post-modern era.222 To be sure, courts in
many cases have routinely applied the strong liability rules devel-
oped in the earlier period. Yet only a limited number of cases have
are in a position to render discretionary judgments.
218 See Schwartz, supra note 217, at 1065-66.
219 See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text (discussing bicycle injuries).
220 Brown v. Brown, 409 N.E.2d 717 (Mass. 1980).
221 See NEISS DATA, supra note 139.
11 In this context, a "post-modern era" is merely a time that comes immediately after a
distinctive and powerful "modern era." Given this context, my use of the "post-modern"
term seems just about inevitable. Still, I employ it with some reluctance, in light of the
pretentiousness--or at least the elaborateness-of many of its utilizations.
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actually served to broaden liability. Meanwhile, at least a few cases
have overruled pro-liability precedents; and a number of major de-
cisions have rejected proposals for new liability, resolved open legal
questions in a manner unsympathetic to liability, or conservatively
interpreted previous opinions which themselves had expanded lia-
bility.223 Taking all these cases into account, one can fairly say that
in recent years tort doctrine has stabilized.
Having set forth this characterization of the recent period, let
me immediately acknowledge certain elements of shagginess in its
operative terms. The relevant time frames are concededly some-
what ambiguous; the early 1980s mark both the end of the modern
era and the beginning of the post-modern era. This ambiguity
gives me some discretion in classifying cases that are decided, say,
in 1982. The lack of firm dates in the periodization presented here
is certainly less than ideal. Still, it is rendered understandable by
the discussion in Part VI, which offers several different explana-
tions for the apparent change in direction of tort doctrine. Some of
these explanations were already in effect by 1980; others did not
take effect until perhaps 1984. A measure of irresolution in the
time frames is thus consistent with the number of possible expla-
nations for that directional change.
Also, the terminology of "stabilization" is far from ideal. Such a
term might well imply a degree of placidity in the consideration of
tort doctrine. In fact, however, appellate tort litigation has been in
obvious turbulence during much of the period in question. Plain-
tiffs have vigorously pressed new arguments on courts, and courts
on some occasions have accepted these proposals. A further prob-
lem is that my characterization depends on a variety of judgment
calls on my part,224 judgment calls that certainly can be contested.
Yet even if these various caveats and problems are recognized, it
still makes sense to advance a characterization of stabilization to
223 This pattern may not be unique to the United States. A "retreat" of Anglo-Canadian
tort law since 1985 is described in Lewis N. Klar, Recent Developments in Canadian Law:
Tort Law, 23 OTTAWA L. REv. 177 (1991). Professor Kar regards this retreat as "an impor-
tant development in the history of tort." Id. at 183.
224 Is an appellate ruling on doctrine major or minor? Is the ruling new, or not so new?
Does the ruling create new doctrine, or does it merely apply current doctrine to new facts?
In considering whether an appellate ruling is major and new, one certainly takes into ac-
count both the status of the court itself and the ambitiousness of the court's opinion.
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describe the recent period.2 5
As noted, the characterization does acknowledge that recent
courts have very frequently affirmed and applied the broad pro-
liability positions taken by courts in earlier years.2 6 Moreover,
during recent years there have been several areas in which liability
has expanded. These areas can be brought together here. One con-
cerns loss of a chance. A well-crafted law review article, published
in 1981, recommended that medical malpractice recoveries be al-
lowed when a doctor's negligence in diagnosis deprives the patient
of a less-than-50-percent chance of recovery from his disease.2 7 In
subsequent years, proportionate recovery for loss of a chance has
been affirmed by at least nine states' courts.228
In 1970, Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment
Corp.229 approved the liability of landlords for their failure to
adopt reasonable security measures against the contingency of
foreseeable criminal assaults on their tenants. Since 1980, this doc-
trine of liability for inadequate security against crime has been ex-
tended beyond landlords to a significant range of other landown-
ers,230 including high schools, 2 1 colleges,23 2 shopping centers,
233
225 It is worth noting that this characterization is supported, either explicitly or implicitly,
by the 1990 edition of the Epstein coursebook and the 1992 edition of the Franklin-Rabin
coursebook. RiCHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS xxix (5th ed. 1990); MARC
FRANKLIN & ROBERT RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES (5th ed. 1992). A book that focuses
on 1980s cases is TERRENCE F. KIELY, MODERN ToRT LIABIIrrY: RECOVERY IN Tnm 1990s
(1990): Professor Kiely seems to favor (and to spend more time on) those opinions that
broaden liability. Still, the bulk of the judicial evidence set forth in his book supports my
own characterization.
226 For example, in Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1987), the Colo-
rado Supreme Court affirmed the doctrine of crashworthiness liability, confirmed that this
doctrine applies to motorcycles (citing a line of cases that dates back to 1978), and ruled
that the doctrine does not exempt from liability design features that are open and obvious.
Its combination of holdings makes this case a stand-out.
2'7 Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts In-
volving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE LJ. 1353, 1397 (1981).
228 E.g., Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 56 (Mich. 1990); WoUen v. DePaul
Health Center, 828 S.W.2d 681, 684-85 (Mo. 1992); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664
P.2d 474,476-77 (Wash. 1983). But there have also been rejections. E.g., Fennell v. Southern
Maryland Hosp., 580 A.2d 206 (Md. 1990).
229 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Granted, landowner liability in circumstances of this sort had seemingly been antici-
pated by the Second Restatement. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF Tomrs § 344 (1965).
23 Fazzolari v. Portland School Dist. No. 1J, 734 P.2d 1326 (Or. 1987). The court's opin-
ion relies not so much on the school's status as landowner as on the school's obligation to
supervise its students. Id. at 1337.
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and hospitals.34 Also, during this period victims of criminal at-
tacks have become increasingly able to sue public agencies for their
failure to prevent crime. These cases have dealt with negligence
relating to the escape of detainees from correctional institutions,238
the negligent supervision of people on probation23 6 and in half-way
houses, 2 7 the negligent failure to respond to a 911 emergency
call,2 8 and the negligent failure to intervene to protect a woman
who had secured protective orders against her violent ex-
husband.39
In several cases, the crime in question has been drunk driving;
cities have been held liable when their police officers, having
stopped a drunk driver, improperly failed to detain him.2 40 Deriva-
tive liability for drunk drivers has extended in other directions as
well. 241 Commercial bars-"dram shops"-have long been liable,
under either statutory or common-law principles, for serving
drinks to underage or to obviously intoxicated patrons. In the
1980s, there was extensive litigation on the common-law liability of
the mere social host who serves drinks to an underage or plainly
intoxicated guest. A majority of cases have in fact rejected this lia-
bility proposal, and cases that have endorsed liability have some-
times been abrogated by statute.242 Even so, at least in cases in-
212 Mulins v. Pine Manor College, 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983).
23 Galloway v. Bankers Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437 (Iowa 1988).
234 Small v. McKennan Hosp., 403 N.W.2d 410 (S.D. 1987).
231 Emig v. State Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 456 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
238 A.L. v. Commonwealth, 521 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1988).
237 Dudley v. Offender Aid & Restoration, Inc., 401 S.E.2d 878 (Va. 1991).
23 De Long v. County of Erie, 457 N.E.2d 717 (N.Y. 1983).
229 Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70 (1985).
20 E.g., Weldy v. Town of Kingston, 514 A.2d 1257 (N.H. 1986). In Weldy, the driver was
not yet drunk but was illegally drinking in the car.
",1 The doctrine of negligent entrustment has been dramatically applied by some courts
to cover the borrower of a car who returns that car to its inebriated owner, Lombardo v.
Hoag, 566 A.2d 1185 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989), and the gas station that sells gas to a
drunk driver, O'Toole v. Carlsbad Shell Serv. Station, 247 Cal. Rptr. 663 (Ct. App. 1988),
but not the restaurant bartender who gives the keys to the drunk customer reclaiming his
car, Williams v. Saga Enters., 274 Cal. Rptr. 901 (Ct. App. 1990). In Vince v. Wilson, 561
A.2d 103 (Vt. 1989), an older woman lent money to her grandson so that he could buy a car.
The grandmother knew that the grandson had repeatedly failed his driver's test and also
that he had a drinking problem. The court affirmed the grandmother's liability, and likewise
the potential liability of the car dealer, who allegedly knew that the buyer had flunked the
driving tests.
22 The cases and statutes are collected in JOSEPH A. PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMIsEs LIABIL-
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volving underage drinkers, there now is a minority position in
favor of social host liability-a position that did not exist a decade
ago. Likewise, a few courts have innovated by way of imposing lia-
bility on employers who serve drinks to employees who later drive
home while under the influence.248
Consortium rights is another area in which a substantial minor-
ity position has emerged. By 1980, the right of either spouse to
recover loss-of-consortium damages when the other spouse is in-
jured had been well recognized. Only one court, however, had af-
firmed a parent's right to recover consortium damages when a
child is injured,2 " and no court had allowed a child to recover for
the loss of a parent's consortium.245 Since then, probably the ma-
jority of courts have continued to deny consortium recoveries in
these cases; 246 but a significant number of courts have granted con-
sortium rights to the parent (in the event of an injury to the
child)24 7 or to the child (in the event of injury to the parent).248
During the last decade, landowner liability has also witnessed
one area of apparent growth. In many landowner cases, the plain-
tiff stumbles on litter (a banana peel, a candy-bar wrapper) left by
a previous customer. Under traditional law, to prevail in such a
case the plaintiff must show that the landowner had actual or con-
structive notice of the litter. Most courts in recent years have ap-
plied this notice requirement in a conventional way, which has fre-
quently resulted in the denial of liability.24 ' But in one line of
rry § 12.21 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991). The New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling in Kelly v.
Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984), has been modified by N.J. STAr. ANN. § 2A.15-5.7
(Supp. 1991).
2'3 See PAGE, supra note 242, § 12.23. Sections 12.21, on social host liability, and 12.23, on
employer liability, did not even exist in the original 1976 edition of this treatise.
24 Shockley v. Prier, 225 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1975).
145 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TiE LAW OF ToRs 935-36 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KETON ON ToRTS].
"46 E.g., Zorzos v. Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1985) (denying claim by child); Dralle v.
Ruder, 529 N.E.2d 209 (IMI. 1988) (denying claim by parent).
247, E.g., Reben v. Ely, 705 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
248 E.g., Pence v. Fox, 813 P.2d 429 (Mont. 1991).
249 Cases denying liability are collected in PAGE, supra note 242, at 29 & n.221 (Supp.
1991). In Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History, 492 N.E.2d 774 (N.Y. 1986), the
New York Court of Appeals emphasized that the evidence must show the defendant's notice
of the particular condition that results in the plaintiff's injury; it is not enough that the
landowner knows of a related danger, or is clearly aware of the possible presence of litter.
Id. at 775.
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cases that has acquired prominence since the early 1980s, courts
have perceived that self-service retail stores involve a "mode of op-
eration" that is especially likely to generate litter. Responding to
this perception, one court has shifted to the defendant the burden
of proving its non-negligence, 5 o while other courts have found ac-
tual negligence in the precise method by which the defendant dis-
played its goods.251 Three further opinions252 seem genuinely am-
biguous, but can permissibly be read as imposing something close
to strict liability.
In the various areas described above, modern tort law has con-
tinued to expand.25  Nevertheless, the bulk of the recent opinions
suggest that this expansion has now ended. As noted, Eisenberg
and Henderson made this point two years ago in the context of
products liability,254 and products liability rulings since then tend
to confirm their point. My own assessment, moreover, is that the
point, valid as it is in products liability, can be generalized to
much of tort law. Recent cases that in substance reject strict liabil-
ity will be considered first. After that, discussion will turn to cases
declining to create negligence-based causes of action, cases that
recognize no-duty limitations, cases that narrowly interpret the
negligence concept itself, cases that broadly define affirmative de-
250 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Smith, 658 P.2d 255 (Colo. 1983). This approach was antici-
pated in Wollerman v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 221 A.2d 513 (N.J. 1966).
251 E.g., Lingerfelt v. Winn-Dixie Texas, Inc., 645 P.2d 485, 486 (Okla. 1982) (strawberries
"heaped high in uncovered containers"); Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 296
(Tex. 1983) (grapes displayed in an open, slanted bin, with no covering on the floor).
211 Chiara v. Fry's Food Stores of Arizona, Inc., 733 P.2d 283 (Ariz. 1987); Sheil v. T. G. &
Y. Stores Co., 781 S.W.2d 778 (Mo. 1989); Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 666 P.2d 888 (Wash.
1983)..
113 Further possibilities can be mentioned here: (a) According to Judge Posner in Justice
v. CFX Transp. Inc., 908 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1990), a landowner has a reasonable-care "duty"
to avoid locating objects on its own property that unsafely block the view of drivers on
adjacent highways. (b) On the confirmation of a minority view favoring recovery for the
negligent infliction of economic loss, see infra notes 289-290. (c) For consideration of a
"separate law of asbestos" that allegedly developed in some states in the 1980s, see Lester
Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an Administrative Alterna-
tive, 13 CARD. L. REv. 1819, 1840-61 (1992). (d) Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2608 (1992), preempts certain claims by cigarette smokers, but finds other claims non-
preempted; Cipollone is discussed infra notes 358-360. (e) In cases involving plaintiffs ex-
posed to toxic substances, many courts have become willing to approve awards for medical
monitoring. See infra note 406.
"' See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. This Article's discussion will revisit sev-
eral of the examples which they mention. See infra notes 262-263, 268-270, 277-282, 339-
341, 351, 357, 365-372 and accompanying text.
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fenses limiting liability, cases that concern the headings and mea-
sure of damages in tort actions, and cases that bear on the exclu-
sivity of workers' compensation in the context of workers' injuries.
Consideration will then be given to the tort reform statutes of the
mid-1980s.
A. REJECTING STRICT LIABILITY
This Article's discussion of modern products liability has sug-
gested that a defect in a product typically suggests some negligence
on the manufacturer's assembly line. In actions against that manu-
facturer, then, products liability doctrine is much less strict in fact
than it is in form. However, in cases involving "natural" impurities
in food, the correlation between product defect and assembly-line
negligence breaks down in a way that attaches special importance
to the strict liability issue. In Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court,2 55
the California Supreme Court has recently ruled that in natural
impurity cases the consumer can recover if he can prove the food
preparer's negligence, but cannot invoke the doctrine of strict
liability.256
Despite the general correlation between product defect and man-
ufacturer negligence, the strict liability doctrine can also become
meaningfully strict whenever it is applied to defendants other than
the manufacturers themselves. One issue that has recently been lit-
igated concerns the liability of pharmacies. In recent years, the Su-
preme Courts of California and Pennsylvania have ruled that phar-
macies which sell defective prescription drugs are not subject to
strict liability,257 notwithstanding the general language in the Re-
statement imposing strict liability on all product sellers.25 8 While
pharmacies undoubtedly provide some range of services, it remains
undeniable that they do sell the products that eventually result in
55 822 P.2d 1292 (Cal. 1992).
2" The case involved a one-inch chicken bone in a chicken enchilada which the defendant
restaurant served to the plaintiff diner. Early California cases could be read as suggesting
that the food preparer is free of liability even if it is negligent. In ruling that preparers can
be sued in negligence but not in strict liability, Clark nicely demonstrates the continuing
vitality of negligence. In Clark, even Justice Mosk's dissent did not advocate full strict lia-
bility. Rather, Mosk recommended that the jury consider whether the presence of a chicken
bone was consistent with reasonable consumer expectations. Id. at 1309.10.
"' Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 710 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1985); Coyle v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383 (Pa. 1991).
I" RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965).
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consumer injuries. Accordingly, the courts' opinions, as Justice
Kaus's California dissent points out,2"' serve to cast doubt on the
general notion of retailer strict liability, which had been accepted
in classic products liability opinions such as Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co. 26 0 As for the Pennsylvania opinion, it not only denies
the pharmacy's strict liability as a retailer but also rules that a
pharmacy is not under an independent duty to give warnings to
consumers as they purchase their medications.2 6 '
The liability of successor corporations for the defective products
distributed by their predecessors raises another possibility of im-
posing liability on a company that-is itself free of all fault. Modern
courts, endorsing new doctrines, had become increasingly willing to
subject successor corporations to liability for injuries resulting
from products sold by their predecessors. 6 2 Since 1983, however,
these broader versions of successor liability have been repeatedly
rejected.6 3 What makes these rejections especially interesting is
that the 1970s -idea of broad successor liability can be persuasively
justified by a basic economic analysis.264
In suits against the actual manufacturer, products liability most
resembles negligence liability when the plaintiff is complaining of a
design defect or a failure to warn. Even in these cases, however,
products liability would be distinctively strict if it allowed recov-
eries against manufacturers for hazards in products that were "un-
knowable" at the time of original product sale. The issue of "hind-
sight" in products liability remained uncertain through the
1970s. 6 5 In 1980, however, the Texas Supreme Court recognized a
259 Murphy, 710 P.2d at 267.
260 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964).
,' Coyle, 584 A.2d at 1386. The pharmacy's duty to warn has likewise been rejected by
recent opinions in Washington and other states. See McKee v. American Home Prods.
Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1051 (Wash. 1989) (citing cases).
262 A leading case is Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977). As of 1960, the general rule
was that successor corporations did not bear liability. There were, however, several excep-
tions to this rule. The modern cases added two new exceptions: a "product line" exception,
and a "continuity of enterprise" exception. For discussion, see KIELY, supra note 225, at
341.
262 The most recent rejection is Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564 (Md. 1991). Other
recent cases are cited in id. at 573-74.
26' See Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic
Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689 (1985).
20I See Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV.
435, 482-88 (1979).
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"state of the art" limitation on liability with respect to safety de-
vices that become available between the time of the product's sale
and the time of the plaintiff's suit,2 8 6 and the Illinois Supreme
Court ruled that a manufacturer cannot be held liable for failure to
warn unless the hazard in question was reasonably knowable at the
time of the product's sale.287 Two years later, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court, in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,s in-
novated by holding that a manufacturer can be held liable for fail-
ing to warn even of unknowable product hazards. Yet in 1984, the
New Jersey court essentially overruled Beshada in Feldman v.
Lederle Laboratories89 holding that in all but asbestos cases man-
ufacturers can escape warning liability by showing that the hazards
in question were not reasonably knowable. In 1988, the California
Supreme Court, in Brown v. Superior Court,27 0 held that "hind-
sight" strict liability is not appropriate in actions against drug
manufacturers alleging design defect or a failure to warn; that is,
the drug manufacturer cannot be held responsible for hazards not
foreseeable at the time of product sale.27 '1 The Brown opinion, dis-
cussed above, is ambiguous as to whether its rejection of hindsight
applies in all products cases or only cases brought against drug
manufacturers. In its later decision in Anderson v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp.,72 the California court resolved this ambiguity by
ruling that all failure-to-warn actions, even those involving asbes-
tos, require a showing that the manufacturer knew or could have
known of the product's hazard. 7
A related problem of unknowability arises in suits by AIDS vic-
tims against blood banks and commercial blood-product manufac-
turers on account of the AIDS virus in donated blood. The typical
2" Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
2'7 Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194 (IML 1980).
28 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
289 479 2A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984).
270 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
271 Eisenberg and Henderson read Brown as indicating that manufacturer's choices in for-
mulating drugs are free from tort review. Eisenberg & Henderson, The Quiet Revolution,
supra note 8, at 490-91. Yet the Brown opinion seems to say that drug companies' design
decisions can be considered under negligence standards. See 751 P.2d at 482 n.12.
2 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991).
27 The most recent affirmation of a "knowledge component" in failure-to-warn cases is
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 641 (Md. 1992). However, courts in a handful
of states continue to support a "hindsight" approach. E.g., Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson
Baby Prods. Co., 818 P.2d 1337, 1347 (1991).
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suit concerns the supply of blood or a blood product in 1983-a
year in which the blood community was beginning to learn of its
AIDS problem. To escape the burden of establishing negligence,
plaintiffs have tried to invoke the doctrine of strict liability. In the
1960s and 1970s, strict liability claims against blood banks for the
transmission of hepatitis had met with a mixed response under the
common law;27 4 but in most states these claims were defeated by
the legislatures' adoption of blood shield statutes. In recent years,
plaintiffs in AIDS cases have been clever in advancing arguments
as to why these statutes should not be read as preventing strict
liability. Courts, however, have been firm in rejecting these argu-
ments.2 5 To be sure, New Jersey and the District of Columbia do
not have blood shield statutes; the original Maryland statute was
limited to hepatitis; the original Washington statute, to hepatitis
and malaria. Therefore, in recent AIDS cases in these four jurisdic-
tions, courts have been able to address the underlying common law
issue. The conclusion that these courts have all come to is that
blood and blood derivatives are unavoidably unsafe products which
hence are not subject to strict liability.2 76
B. REJECTING NEGLIGENCE-BASED CAUSES OF ACTION
Discussion can now turn to cases in which strict liability is not
an issue, but in which the question is how broadly to define the
liabilities that notions of negligence or reasonableness might im-
274 Compare Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 266 N.E.2d 897 (Ill. 1970) (sup-
porting strict liability) with Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 317 A.2d 392 (N.J. Sup. Ct.), afl'd,
332 A.2d 596 (N.J. 1975) (denying strict liability).
275 For example, in Coffee v. Cutter Biological, 809 F.2d 191, 192 (2nd Cir. 1987), the
plaintiff argued that the statute, drafted to protect "blood banks," should not be applied to
the commercial manufacturers of blood-derivatives products. The court rejected this argu.
ment. Id. at 194. In Cutler v. Graduate Hosp., 717 F. Supp. 338, 339-40 (E.D. Penn. 1989),
the plaintiff argued that since the statute was drafted with hepatitis in mind, it sAould not
be applied to a new disease like AIDS; the plaintiff further argued that the statute, in
shielding "persons" from liability, was designed to protect donors rather than corporate hos-
pitals and blood banks. The court rejected both arguments. Id.
276 See Doe v. Miles Labs., Inc., 927 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying Maryland law);
Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1987) aff'd in relevant part, 851
F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Miles Labs. v. Doe, 556 A.2d 1107 (Md. 1989); Snyder v. Mekh-
jian, 582 A.2d 307 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1990), aff'd, 593 A.2d 318 (N.J. 1991); Rogers v. Miles
Labs., Inc., 802 P.2d 1346 (Wash. 1991); Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank,
785 P.2d 815 (Wash. 1990). On the negligence issue that remains once strict liability is re-
jected, see infra notes 333-337 and accompanying text.
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pose on defendants. One of these questions concerns the reach of
the risk-benefit test. Manufacturers have long been liable if partic-
ular design features in their products are found not risk-beneficial.
In 1983, the New Jersey Supreme Court endorsed a so-called ge-
neric risk-benefit test for liability, 7 7 which holds a manufacturer
liable if at the generic level all the hazards associated with his
product exceed all that product's benefits, even if all of the design
choices that go into that product are intelligently made. (In such
cases, the manufacturer's marketing of its product can itself be re-
garded as unreasonable.) This idea of generic risk-benefit liability
has since been repudiated by statute in New Jersey,27 8 and has
been rejected as a common-law matter in other states; those courts
have refused to entertain plaintiffs' arguments that such products
as handguns,27 9 cigarettes,280 trail bikes, 281 and auto convertibles2 82
should entail liability in accordance with generic risk-benefit
reasoning.
In what other contexts might a showing of negligence not suffice
for purposes of establishing liability? In Dillon v. Legg2 83 in 1968,
the California Supreme Court affirmed the potential liability of a
negligent party to bystanders who suffer emotional distress by
watching a serious injury. The general doctrine of bystander liabil-
ity set forth in Dillon gained adherents among additional states in
the 1980s.2"8 According to Dillon, a flexible set of guidelines should
govern the eventual extent of bystander liability.29 5 This flexibility
was gutted, however, by Thing v. La Chusa,5 6 in which the Cali-
fornia court essentially limited the Dillon liability theory to the
Dillon facts. Under Thing, a Dillon recovery is appropriate only if
the bystander is member of the victim's immediate family; more-
277 O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983).
278 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3 (1987).
279 Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
280 Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1225-26 (1st Cir. 1990).
21" Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655, 660-61 (Wash. 1986).
282 Delvaux v. Ford Motor Co., 764 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1985). Generic hazards in products
are likely to be appreciated by consumers. In Delvaux, the court applied the consumer ex-
pectations test in order to defeat the plaintiff's claim that convertibles without roll bars are
unreasonably dangerous. Id. at 474.
283 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
E.g., Ramirez v. Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822 (N.M. 1983).
2 Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920-21.
29 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
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over, the bystander needs to be an actual eye-witness, rather than
someone who arrives on the scene in the aftermath of the
accident.28 7
In 1979, the California Supreme Court's opinion in J'Aire Corp.
v. Gregory seemingly created a new tort for the negligent infliction
of mere economic harm.288 The J'Aire approach has been followed
in New Jersey289 and a limited number of other states.290 A major-
ity of jurisdictions, however, have rejected it. 29 1 Indeed, given the
breadth of Illinois' version of the no-recovery rule, the Illinois Su-
preme Court recently abolished the long-standing tort of attorney
malpractice.292 The court has now granted a rehearing in this case
and may well end up withdrawing its original ruling. Still, this is a
ruling that would have been inconceivable twenty years ago.
As far as products liability is concerned, in East River Steam-
ship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc. 2e3 the United States Su-
preme Court aligned federal admiralty law with the majority view
that economic losses are not recoverable in a products liability ac-
tion; rather, the commercial plaintiff is limited to its contract (or
UCC) remedies. 294 Prior to East River, some states had allowed a
recovery for economic loss upon a showing of the manufacturer's
27 Id. at 829-30.
288 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979).
299 People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985).
20 E.g., Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College, 743 P.2d 356 (Alaska 1987); Hawthorne v.
Kober Constr. Co., 640 P.2d 467 (Mont. 1982). The support which these cases provide to the
J'Aire approach does mean that one can now speak of a "minority view" in favor of liability.
292 Rardin v. T. & D. Mach. Handling, Inc., 890 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) (ap-
plying and also explaining Illinois law); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d
1019 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Stern,
651 P.2d 637 (Nev. 1982); Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 468 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1984), cert.
denied 469 U.S. 1210 (1985); Aikens v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 501 A.2d 277 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985). United Textile Workers of America v. Lear Siegler Seating Corp., 825 S.W.2d 83
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). J'Aire itself is ignored in I.J. Weinrot & Son, Inc. v. Jackson, 708
P.2d 682 (Cal. 1985) (holding that corporation cannot sue motorist who negligently disabled
corporation's president).
292 Collins v. Reynard, 60 U.S.L.W. 2318 (Ill. Oct. 31, 1991). The Collins court remanded
for trial the client's contract claim against his lawyer. Id. at 2319. The scope of this contract
claim is unclear.
2.2 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
"' The minority position-allowing a products liability recovery for economic loss-had
originally been staked out by Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J.
1965). However, in 1985, the year before East River, the New Jersey Supreme Court over-
ruled Santor in its application to commercial buyers. Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985).
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negligence,295 and other courts approved such a recovery if the
plaintiff's economic loss was due to a "sudden and calamitous
event" that could easily have produced a personal injury.296 In
East River, however, the Supreme Court seemingly rejected each
of these lines of analysis.97 Subsequently, in expositing state law,
courts have tended to regard the East River reasoning as persua-
sive (even while acknowledging that its holding is limited to admi-
ralty).2 '9  Therefore they have since repudiated the idea that either
manufacturer negligence 29 or a calamitous event 3o warrants al-
lowing a plaintiff to sue in products liability for economic loss. 0 1
C. "NO DUTY" DENIALS OF LIABILITY
Prior to the modern era, the tort concept of "duty" had fre-
quently been deployed by courts in ways that denied the liability
even of negligent defendants. After 1960, many of these duty limi-
tations receded. Yet in the post-modem era, the duty concept has
made a comeback.
Traditional tort law had employed the duty concept, for exam-
ple, to limit the liability of landowners. These traditional rules
were, however, repudiated by Rowland v. Christian30 2 in 1968, re-
placing a system of entrants' classification with a general doctrine
of negligence liability. The Rowland revolution was very much in
evidence through the 1970s. At about 1980, however, this revolu-
I'l City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs., Inc., 240 lJ.W.2d 124 (Wis. 1976).
29 Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981)
(guessing at Pennsylvania law).
" East River, 476 U.S. at 866-76.
295 See American Universal Ins. Group v. General Motors Corp., 578 So. 2d 451,453 (Fla.
Dist Ct. App. 1991).
299 Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 213 (Wis.
1989).
1o Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 110 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 US. 853
(1987). On this issue, however, some courts have resisted the influence of East River. E.g.,
Washington Water Power Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 774 P.2d 1199 (Wash. 1989).
I"9 Also, one court has relied on East River in changing its mind and disallowing a tort
recovery for damage to "other property." Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 68648
(Minn. 1990). Under one theory or another several courts have allowed school districts and
certain other building owners to recover for the economic costs of removing asbestos. Eg.
City of Greenville v. W.l& Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987); Kershaw County Bd. of
Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 396 S.E.2d 369 (S.C. 1990). Yet other courts have de-
nied recovery. E.g., Adams-Arapahoe Sch. Dist. No. 28-J v. United States Gypsum Co., 959
F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1992).
302 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
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tion "came to a screeching halt. 3 0 3 Since then, there has been a
steady stream of state court decisions either explicitly rejecting
Rowland3 04 or implicitly rejecting it by continuing to apply the
traditional system of classification. Indeed, in recent years courts
have frequently applied the traditional rules of limited liability
even in cases involving commercial and institutional property.30 5
What makes all these post-1980 cases especially interesting is that
Rowland had been specifically relied on both by myself in docu-
menting the vitality of negligence306 and by Priest in showing the
influence of enterprise liability.30 7
Another variation on the duty theme was relied on by the Illi-
nois Supreme Court in 1989 in denying the liability of a railroad
whose train was struck by the plaintiff's car when the train was
stopped at a crossroad. The court ruled that in arranging their
conduct railroads (and evidently other defendants) have no duty
"to anticipate and guard against the negligence of others"; to im-
pose such a duty, the court thought, would place "an intolerable
burden on society."30 8 This ruling stands in interesting contrast to
earlier products liability holdings rendering manufacturers liable
in cases involving the foreseeable misuses of their products. A year
yater, the same court held that the builders and renovators of
apartment buildings do not have a duty-not even, apparently,
under negligence law-to install child-proof screens in rental
units.0 While affirming the foreseeability of injury, the court nev-
ertheless concluded that recognition of a duty would engender a
variety of unfortunate "social and economic consequences. '" 310
Back in 1989, the Sixth Circuit held that under negligence law the
supplier of an otherwise nondefective component part is under no
duty to concern itself with the unsafe way in which that part is
303 PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 245, at 433.
304 See, e.g., Lohrenz v. Lane, 787 P.2d 1274 (Okla. 1990); Younce v. Ferguson, 724 P.2d
991 (Wash. 1986). See generally PAGE, supra note 242, § 6.7 (describing "[r]esistance to
Rowland").
305 See, e.g., Mech v. Hearst Corp., 496 A.2d 1099 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985); Adams v.
Fred's Dollar Store, 497 So. 2d 1097 (Miss. 1986).
3o1 Schwartz, Vitality, supra note 1, at 966-67.
'" Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 84, at 1535-36.
308 Dunn v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 537 N.E.2d 738, 745 (Ill. 1989).
1o1 Lamkin v. Towner, 563 N.E.2d 449 (Ill. 1990).
0 Id. at 455.
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being incorporated into the design of the final product.3 11 Even
more recently, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that the man-
ufacturer of one product (a tire) designed exclusively for use with a
latently dangerous comipanion product (a multi-piece tire rim) has
no duty to warn consumers of those dangers. 12
DES cases like Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,3 3 dealing with
the issue of market-share liability, had assumed that DES, while
harmless to the mother, subjects daughters to considerable risks of
adenosis and vaginal cancer. Later medical studies have suggested
that DES can harm grandchildren as well, who can be born with
cerebral palsy as a result of DES-induced defects in their mother's
reproductive system. Yet in Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co.,3 14 the New
York court held in essence that products manufacturers owe no
duty to third-generation victims. The court noted that while new
drugs may contain hazards, public policy nevertheless favors their
distribution. The court also reasoned that the regulatory presence
of the FDA somewhat reduces the need for strong liability rules. -1
In its desire to place reasonable limits on liability, Enright can be
regarded as a late twentieth-century counterpart to the New York
court's nineteenth-century ruling in Ryan v. New York Central
Railroad;16 drug companies have now replaced railroads as the de-
fendants that should not be burdened with excessive liability.
3,, Childress v. Gresen Mfg. Co., 888 F.2d 45 (6th Cir. 1989). Childress is one of several
recent cases which defense lawyers see as providing "liability relief" for the suppliers of
components. See Thomas G. Cardelli & Cheryl A. Cardelli, Product Liability Relief for
Component Manufacturers, FOR THE DEF., May 1990, at 20, 20. One recent case, on extreme
facts, imposed liability. Estate of Carey v. Hy-Temp Mfg. Co., 929 F.2d 1229, 1234 (7th Cir.
1991).
"' Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 591 N.E.2d 222 (N.Y. 1992). The court also
rejected the plaintiff's claim that there was a concert of action between the manufacturers of
these companion products that could render the tire manufacturer liable for the tire rim's
hazards. Id. at 224-25. The court's opinion suggests that liability properly belongs exclu-
sively with the manufacturer of the tire rim. The problem is that, as in Rastelli itself, the
consumer is often unable to identify that manufacturer. See infra note 371.
33 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
31 570 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 197 (1991). Enright has recently been
followed by the Ohio Supreme Court. Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E.2d 696 (Ohio 1992).
315 Id. at 204.
6 35 N.Y. 210 (1866). Ryan held that a railroad whose negligent spark causes a spread-
ing fire is liable only for the first building destroyed. Because their losses are too "remote,"
the owners of other structures should be denied recoveries. Id. at 213. In fact, the Ryan
doctrine was rejected by most nineteenth-century courts. 1 THomss G. SHEAR.-4m & A mAA
A. REDFIELD. A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF NEGLIGENCE § 33-34 (5th ed. 1898).
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Enright relied upon Albala v. City of New York, a 1981 New
York malpractice case that held a doctor not liable for pre-concep-
tion harms.""7 In 1991 Albala itself was relied on by a California
court in holding that a negligent motorist has no "duty of care"
with respect to pre-conception harms. 18 One of the innovations of
modern tort law concerned the willingness of courts to impose lia-
bility on a variety of defendants whose negligence resulted in pre-
natal injuries. Since 1980, however, courts have proved reluctant to
take the next step and afford recoveries for pre-conception injuries.
Enright has here been interpreted both as a prescription drug
case and as a case involving pre-conception harms. It can further
be seen as one of a line of cases in which the New York Court of
Appeals has sought to control the breadth of liability. In one 1985
case, the court reaffirmed the privity rule in suits against negligent
accountants.3 19 In another case,3 20 a power failure caused by Con
Edison's negligence placed most of New York City in darkness. Be-
cause Con Edison did not deliver power to the plaintiff's landlord
in accordance with its contract with that landlord, the tenant-
plaintiff suffered a personal injury in the darkened basement of
the apartment building; the court ruled that Con Edison's liability,
even for personal injury, was limited by the doctrine of privity.321
In late 1980s opinions, moreover, the New York court called a halt
to the growth in a line of cases that had rendered local govern-
ments increasingly liable for the failure of police to intervene in
order to prevent crimes. The facts of a 1989 case supported a plau-
317 429 N.E.2d 786 (N.Y. 1981).
32, Hegyes v. Unjian Enters., Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85 (Ct. App. 1991). The case law prior to
Hegyes is reviewed in id. at 94-100. The first round of cases, in the 1970s, had tended to
affirm liability.
"' Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985). This case
was the New York court's response to a 1983 New Jersey case that had affirmed liability, H.
Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983). The state of the law is now somewhat
confused, though the Restatement's intermediate position may be gaining adherents. See
Brooke Wunnikke, Accountants' Liability to Third Parties, FOR THE DEF., Sept. 1990, at 16.
320 Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y. 1985).
32, Privity was also invoked to deny liability in Eaves Brooks Costume Co. v. Y.B.H. Re-
alty Corp., 556 N.E.2d 1093 (N.Y. 1990). In this case the defendant was under contract to
inspect the sprinkler system in a building in which the plaintiff was a tenant. The defend-
ant's negligence led to a malfunction in the sprinkler system, which in turn resulted in water
damage to the plaintiff's property. The New York court, relying on "policy considerations,"
denied the plaintiff a recovery. Id. at 1096-97.
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sible claim of a special relationship. 22 In rejecting that claim, the
court was explicit that its concern was "to place controllable limits
on the scope of" municipal liability.32 3 In a 1987 case,3 2' the plain-
tiffs were being threatened by a tenant in their duplex. The police
promised the plaintiffs they would arrest the tenant the next
morning. However, they failed to do so, and that evening the ten-
ant attacked and injured the plaintiffs. Though acknowledging
that the promise created a special relationship between the police
and the plaintiffs, the court found that by the evening the plain-
tiffs were no longer relying on that promise, since they knew the
arrest had not been effectuated that morning; hence the special re-
lationship could not serve to justify liability.32 2
D. CONSERVATIVELY CHARACTERIZING WHAT CONDUCT IS NEGLIGENT
OR UNREASONABLE
' In many cases, it is conceded that something like negligence or
reasonableness operates as the standard of liability; the key ques-
tion concerns how properly to characterize that negligence stan-
dard. In medical malpractice, liability has always depended on a
showing of professional negligence. Malpractice has always been a
conservative corner of substantive tort law, and its conservatism
has largely survived the 1980s. In malpractice actions, the doctor's
performance has traditionally been assessed by comparing it to the
normal practices of the medical community. This "professional"
322 In Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 543 N.E.2d 443 (N.Y. 1989), two persons, having
witnessed the abduction of the plaintiff (their friend), reported it to a policeman on the
beat, who assured them that he would "call it in." He failed to do so, and the witnesses,
relying on his assurance, made no further efforts to report the crime. Id. at 444. The plain-
tiff ended up undergoing a twelve-hour ordeal of rape and brutalization. Id.
323 Id. at 447-48. In recent years, the New York court has also conservatively interpreted
the "duty" of hospitals, doctors, and landlords. See Muniz v. Flohern, Inc., 570 N.E.2d 1074
(N.Y. 1991); Purdy v. Public Adm'r, 526 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1988). As it happens, as early as
1976 the court had narrowly defined those circumstances in which one party has a duty to
intervene so as to restrain another party from tortiously injuring the plaintiff. See Pulka v.
Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1021-23 (N.Y. 1976). Conservative opinions such as Pulka
tended to get little attention in the 1970s, since they seemed out of line with what was then
the dominant movement in tort opinions. With that movement now having receded, it be-
comes easier to appreciate the significance of cases like Pulka.
3" Cuffy v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 1987).
11 Id. at 941-42. The Ohio Supreme Court has denied liability in a law enforcement case
whose facts may well be even more "egregious" than those in Cufty. See Sawicki v. Village
of Ottawa Hills, 525 N.E.2d 468 (Ohio 1988), discussed in KiELY, supra note 225, at 185.87.
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standard of care means that the doctor's compliance with medical
custom serves as firm proof of the reasonableness of his own con-
duct. After 1960, however, this gloss on reasonableness was re-
jected by dicta 28 and holdings 27 in several states. The most fa-
mous of these holdings was in Helling v. Carey,2 8 in which the
Washington Supreme Court, conducting its own risk-benefit analy-
sis, found an ophthalmologist guilty of malpractice as a matter of
law, even though he had apparently complied with a pertinent cus-
tom. By the early 1980s, it was possible to assume that the minor-
ity position dramatized by Helling was in the process of acquiring
majority status. During the intervening decade, however, it cannot
be said that the balance has really shifted; in suits against doctors,
the issue of the status of custom has not been frequently
litigated.3 29
Yet put to one side questions of actual doctor customs. On many
matters the medical community is divided as to the preferred
method of therapy or treatment. Traditional malpractice law has
long limited the ability of the jury to resolve such disagreements
among doctors; when intelligent doctors can disagree, the defend-
ant cannot be found guilty of malpractice. A 1977 Texas opinion,
while somewhat ambiguous, could be read as moving away from
this limitation on liability and allowing the jury to itself decide
which course of conduct is best.33 0 But the traditional limitation on
liability has been reaffirmed by several courts in the 1980s.s33 "The
32 E.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ill.
1965).
32' Favalora v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 144 So.2d 544, 550-51 (La. Ct. App. 1962);
Toth v. Community Hospital at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368, 372-73 (N.Y. 1968); Morgan v.
Sheppard, 188 N.E.2d 808, 816-17 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963); Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206,
216-18 (Pa. 1971); Vassos v. Roussales, 625 P.2d 768, 772 (Wyo. 1981). In Toth, the court
subordinated the custom criterion to the doctor's obligation to employ his own "best judg-
ment." 239 N.E.2d at 373.
. 519 P.2d 981, 982-83 (Wash. 1974).
"' The traditional doctrine was applied in Smith v. Menet, 530 N.E.2d 277, 279-80 (I1.
Ct. App. 1988), app. den., 535 N.E. 2d 921 (1989). It was denied, however, by dictum in
Kalsbeck v. Westview Clinic, 375 N.W.2d 861, 868 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). Writing in 1991,
Clark Havighurst regarded Helling v. Carey as one "exception" to the "law's continuing use
of customary practice as its benchmark for evaluating the performance of individual profes-
sionals." Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing Physician
Liability, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 86, 99 n.37 (1991).
330 Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1977).
"I Indeed, some courts (though not others) continue to hold that juries should be in-
structed "an honest error of judgment" is not malpractice. Compare Marquis v. Nuss, 451
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rule is that, where competent medical authority is divided, a physi-
cian will not be liable if in the exercise of his judgment he followed
a course of treatment supported by reputable, respectable, and
reasonable medical experts. '33 2
Turn now from the traditional tort of malpractice to the contem-
porary problem of AIDS-infected blood. As a tort defendant, an
institutional blood bank seems quite different from an individual
doctor.33 Still, in cases in California, Colorado, and Georgia blood
banks have persuaded courts that they deliver professional services
and hence should be covered by malpractice liability rules. The
California and Georgia courts have gone on to hold that compli-
ance with custom by a doctor or blood bank is complete proof of
non-negligence. 34 The Colorado Supreme Court has ruled that a
blood bank or professional's custom compliance establishes a "pre-
sumption" of due care, which can be rebutted by expert testimony
identifying "readily available" practices that are "substantially
more protective" than the customary standards.33 5 In several other
cases against blood banks and blood-product suppliers, courts have
considered plaintiffs' claims of negligence without explicitly relying
on the malpractice analogy. Even so, courts have typically granted
summary judgment to the defendants.3 3 6 In doing so, they have re-
lied on defendants' compliance with customs and regulations; they
have noted that not until 1984 was a "consensus" reached that
blood products can transmit the AIDS virus; and they have dis-
N.W.2d 833 (Iowa 1990) (approving instruction) with Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810
(Minn. 1986) (finding instruction unduly subjective). The "error of judgment" doctrine was
rejected in England by the House of Lords in 1981. Whitehouse v. Jordan, 1 W.L.R. 246
(1981).
3n Furey v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 472 A.2d 1083, 1089 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). For
similar reasoning, see Kroll v. United States, 708 F.Supp. 117, 118-19 (D.C. Md. 1989), aff'd,
900 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1990); Borja v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., Inc., 727 P.2d 355, 357 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1986); Ouellette, 391 N.W.2d at 815; Trent v. Trotman, 508 A.2d 580, 583-84 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986).
" See the discussion of the strict liability issue in supra notes 274-276 and accompany-
ing text.
3-1 Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Ct. App. 1992); Doe v.
American Red Cross Blod Servs., 377 S.E.2d 323 (S.C. 1989).
m- United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 521 (Colo. 1992). On the subsequent
trial in Quintana, see infra note 338.
-' Doe v. Miles Labs., Inc., 927 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1991); McKee v. Cutter Labs., Inc., 866
F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1989); Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1987), af)d
in relevant part, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
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missed as "hindsight opinions" the expert testimony offered by
plaintiffs as to the donor screening precautions that were appropri-
ate in the early 1980s.1s 1
At least one of these blood product cases involved a claim that
the manufacturer had failed to warn; the Fourth Circuit held that
a drug manufacturers have no duty to warn of an alleged side ef-
fect that is "merely a possibility" rather than a confirmed cer-
tainty at the time of original product sale. s 8 It is time now to con-
sider other recent developments relating to the scope of
manufacturers' warning obligation. In failure-to-warn cases, the
manufacturer's liability is frequently expressed in terms of the rea-
sonableness of its warning. Prior to the early 1980s, courts had typ-
ically expressed the idea that adding new items to warnings was a
process that was essentially costless; therefore, a warning could
easily be found unreasonable or inadequate if it failed to incidtde
any item that might be useful. 3 Since the early 1980s, some
courts have persevered in this approach and hence have second-
guessed actual warnings in doubtful ways.340 But an important
counter-trend has emerged. Other courts have begun to recognize
the problems of information overload and consumer "information
costs '341 that are incurred as warnings become more prolix, and
have therefore declined to fault warnings which leave out some
particular item highlighted by the plaintiff.3 42  Since 1980, courts
337 See, e.g., Doe v. Miles Labs., Inc., 927 F.2d at 193-94.
In the recent Quintana trial, the plaintiff's expert (a former doctor at the Centers for
Disease Control) provided a quite new account. He testified that CDC officials did recom-
mend donor screening in early 1983-and that the blood industry rejected this recommen-
dation. Based on his testimony, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Woman Dies of
AIDS Just Before Victory in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1992, at 12 (nat'l ed.).
"I Miles Labs, 927 F.2d at 194.
339 This idea is set forth, for example, in 1 M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILiTY 376
(2d ed. 1988) (citing 1970s cases).
340 E.g., MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 920 (1985) (discussed supra note 210).
341 Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
3'2 See Doe v. Miles Labs., 927 F.2d 187, 194 (4th Cir. 1991); Thomas v. Hoffman-La-
Roche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 816 n.40 (5th Cir. 1992); Scott v. Black & Decker, Inc., 717 F.2d
251, 254 (5th Cir. 1983); Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147, 1153 (Cal. 1984); Brous-
sard v. Continental Oil Co., 433 So.2d 354, 358 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 440 So. 2d 726
(La. 1983); Dunn v. Lederle Lab., 328 N.W.2d 576, 580-81 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
Even courts that have found particular warnings inadequate have felt required to narrow
their holdings so as to take into account the information overload problem. See, e.g., Ayers
v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 818 P.2d 1337, 1343 (Wash. 1991) (limiting its hold-
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have placed other limiting glosses on the manufacturer's obligation
to give a reasonable warning. If the plaintiff-generally an em-
ployee-is deemed an "experienced" or "sophisticated user" of the
product, courts have become much more willing to find that the
plaintiff's experience renders a warning unnecessary.3 4 3 Courts in
recent years have also become more inclined to deny the manufac-
turer's warning liability by finding in essence that the employer is
a knowledgeable intermediary. 3 4 Hence the manufacturer needs to
warn only the employer, rather than the employees themselves; for
that matter, if the employer already knows of the product's hazard,
no warning at all is needed.34 5 This recent development comes
close to contradicting one of the key holdings in Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,4 6 the Magna Carta of asbestos
litigation.
In concluding this discussion of modern assessments of the con-
cept of reasonable behavior, I can now move from the high drama
of doctors, AIDS, and manufacturers to the ordinary drama of
landowners and recreational activities. In Keetch v. Kroger Co.,3
a shopper allegedly fell on a slippery spot created by the negli-
gence of a grocery store's employee in overspraying plants in the
store's plant area. According to the Texas Supreme Court, the
store could not be held liable for the employee's negligent act as
ing to products "for use on babies").
3" "After years of expanding liability... the pendulum is beginning to swing back...
New defenses to a products liability action are emerging. One of (them] is the sophisticated
user defense." Robert E. Powell et al., The Sophisticated User Defense and Liability for
Defective Design: The Twain Must Meet, 13 J. PROD. LLA. 113, 113 (1991).
1" See id. at 117 (citing cases).
-4 In In re Asbestos Litigation (Mergenthaler), 542 A.2d 1205 (DeL Super. CL 1986), the
court held that a manufacturer can rely on the knowledgable employer to provide its em-
ployees with proper warnings, unless the manufacturer has specific reason to believe that
the employer will not do so. A concern for the practical problems a manufacturer would
encounter in trying to provide a direct warning to employees is expressed in Goodbar v.
Whitehead Brothers, 591 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Va. 1984), afl'd sub nom. Beale v. Hardy, 769
F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985).
3, 493 F.2d 1076, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). The Borel
court conceptualized the warning obligation as running directly from the manufacturer to
the "ultimate consumer or user." Id. at 1091. That court did not consider at all how practi-
cal it would have been for the manufacturer to have provided these direct warnings. The
court did acknowledge a limited defense if the manufacturer can prove that the employer
has "deliberately" withheld information from employees. Id. Even this defense would not
apply if the product is "extremely dangerous." Id. at 1092 n.29.
-1 No. D-0671, 1992 Tex. LEXIS 65 (June 3, 1992).
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such, since this act at worst created a "condition" that half-an-
hour later resulted in injury. Rather, to recover for a dangerous
condition, the plaintiff must show the owner's actual or construc-
tive knowledge of that danger; and in the court's view the fact that
the condition is created by the conduct of the owner's employee is
no more than some evidence of the owner's knowledge. In Rinaldo
v. McGovern,348 a golfer "mis-hit" a golf ball, slicing it badly. The
ball, having soared over the screen of trees that bounded the golf
cburse, landed on the windshield of a car being driven on the adja-
cent public road, shattering that windshield and thereby injuring
the plaintiff, who was riding in the car. The New York Court of
Appeals found that "the risk of a mis-hit golf ball is [not] a fully
preventable occurrence"; 349 on the basis of this finding, the court
ruled-as a matter of law-that the golfer was not negligent.
Moreover, the court did not express any interest in the possibility
of imposing strict liability on the golfer on account of his causation
of harm. 5° I had long wondered about how a court would handle
the negligence issue presented by Rinaldo. The golfer who badly
slices his ball is not at all equivalent to the baseball batter who
merely fouls off a pitch; for the batter, unlike the golfer, is facing
an opponent who is vigorously attempting to frustrate his
performance.
E. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND OTHER LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY
Affirmative defenses can, of course, limit the liability even of
those defendants whose conduct can be assessed as negligent or
unreasonable. In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. in 1988, the
Supreme Court affirmed a government- contractor defense in prod-
ucts liability design defect cases that can be invoked by manufac-
turers when they design their products in compliance with federal
specifications.3 51 Another possible defense is that the manufacturer
has complied with federal regulations. The traditional unwilling-
ness to find that federal regulatory programs do not preempt state
tort actions was dramatized in 1984 by Ferebee v. Chevron Chemi-
348 587 N.E.2d 264 (N.Y. 1991).
349 Id. at 267.
31 See also Bolton v. Stone, 1951 App. Cas. 850 (holding cricket club not liable to pedes-
trian hit by ball outside fence).
351 487 U.S. 500, 512-13 (1988).
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cal Co.,352 in which the D.C. Circuit ruled that a failure-to-warn
claim was not preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).3 53 During the last two years, how-
ever, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, explicitly rejecting Ferebee,
have ruled that FIFRA does preempt tort claims for alleged fail-
ures to warn. 3" Recent courts have also held that federal law
preempts plaintiffs from arguing that tampons lack adequate
warnings'", and that the absence of air bags in cars is a design
defect.35 6 Beginning in the mid-1980s, most courts ruled that ciga-
rette warnings on packs and in ads that comply with the Federal
Labeling Act cannot be faulted as "inadequate" under the common
law.35 7 That important ruling has now been essentially affirmed by
the Supreme Court.358 That Court also ruled preempted smokers'
claims that the images in cigarette advertisements improperly neu-
tralize warnings that would otherwise be deemed legally adequate.
Yet the Court found nonpreempted possible claims of express war-
ranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and an odd category of inten-
tional concealments.5 9 Of course, the preemption defense fits
252 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
"' For the defendant to have given the warning recommended by the plaintiff would ap-
parently have violated the Act. Id. at 1541.
3" Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158 (10th
Cir. 1992); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019 (11th Cir. 1991).
u' See, e.g., Moore v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1989). Design defect
claims are, however, not preempted.
'"Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065
(1990).
The preemption defense remains ineffective in many cases. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle
Labs., 592 A.2d 1176 (N.J. 1991); see generally Kt-LY, supra note 225, at 380-82 (discussing
cases). But the Tenth Circuit, rejecting precedent, has recently interpreted the Federal Rail-
road Safety Act as broadly preempting tort claims against railroads for not installing safety
devices at grade crossings. Hatfield v. Burlington N.R.R., 958 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1992). And
the Seventh Circuit, rejecting precedent, has recently found preemption in a design defect
suit brought against the manufacturer of an "intraoculair lens" that had been awarded an
investigational devise exemption by the FDA. Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d
1330 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.).
-7 E.g., Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
3sCipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992). My assumption here-evi-
dently shared by the plurality opinion-is that the material on the package can be regarded
as part of the product's "advertising and promotion."
359The example the plurality opinion gives of a nonpreempted express warranty is a ciga-
rette company advertisement that promises to pay the medical expenses of any smoker who
gets emphysema. Id. at 2622. The example that opinion gives of a nonpreempted intentional
concealment is a state law that both obliges cigarette companies to disclose hazard informa-
tion to a state administrative agency and gives the smoker a private cause-of-action for
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somewhat awkwardly within this Part's discussion; the conserva-
tive judge who might be interested in limiting tort claims might
also be wary about the casual extension, through preemption rul-
ings, of federal hegemony.360
Doctrines of causation also influence the extent of manufactur-
ers' liability. Back in 1973, the Fifth Circuit ruled in Reyes v. Wy-
eth Laboratories"6' that a finding of an inadequate warning calls
into play a rebuttable presumption that a fuller warning of the
product's inherent risks would have dissuaded the consumer from
purchasing the product. Critics of modem tort law have tended to
identify Reyes as a prime example of a case that points toward
absolute liability.32 2 In early 1992, however, Reyes was essentially
overruled by the Fifth Circuit in Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche,
Inc."'s The Thomas court assumed that the warning accompanying
Accutane (an anti-acne drug) was legally inadequate; even so, hav-
ing rejected the presumption of causation and considered the lim-
harms caused by the companies' failure so to disclose. Id. at 2623.
31 Modern tort opinions, such as Ferebee, had relied on an explicit pro-plaintiff prefer-
ence-the idea that it is especially wrong to preempt personal injury claims. That idea can
be found in Justice Blackmun's separate opinion in Cipollone, id. at 2630, but is interest-
ingly absent from the plurality opinion. Relying on principles of statutory interpretation,
the plurality opinion reasons that when a statute contains an explicit preemption section, an
implied preemption analysis is inappropriate. Id. at 2618. Relying on principles of federal-
ism, the opinion further reasons that express preemption sections should be "fairly but...
narrowly" construed. Id. at 2621. Yet this latter reasoning the opinion honors in the breach:
it broadly interprets a preemption section that focuses on additional "requirement[s] or
prohibition[s] ... imposed under State law" as including liabilities affirmed by juries rely-
ing on state common-law standards. Id. at 2619-21.
Cipollone may undermine the implied preemption arguments relied on in the FIFRA and
tampon cases discussed above. At the same time, Cipollone strengthens the explicit preemp-
tion arguments in these cases: for the relevant federal statutes explicitly preempt any fur-
ther "requirements" imposed by state law.
'6' 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
32 See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 212, at 12; Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra note 5, at
524 (discussing presumption of causation in failure-to-warn cases.)
36- 949 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1992). The status of Reyes after Thomas is discussed in id. at
814 nn.30, 32.
In fact, Thomas is one of several failure-to-warn cases in recent years that seemingly have
taken the causation requirement more seriously as a limitation on liability. See, e.g., Hurt v.
Coyne Cylinder Co., 956 F.2d 1319, 1329 (6th Cir. 1992); Plummer v. Lederle Lab., 819 F.2d
349, 358-59 (2d Cir. 1987); Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 743 F.2d 195, 198-99 (3rd Cir. 1984);
Gosewisch v. American Honda Motor Co., 737 P.2d 376, 379-80 (Ariz. 1987); Staymates v.
ITT Holub Industries, 527 A.2d 140, 147-48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). In some cases, the lack of
causation can be tied to the plaintiff's status as an experienced user. E.g., Lussier v. Louis-
ville Ladder Co., 938 F.2d 299, 301-02 (1st Cir. 1991).
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ited evidence of actual causation, the court denied the drug com-
pany's Iability.3 4 In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories6 5 in 1980, the
California Supreme Court had announced a bold new rule of pro-
portionate liability for the harms caused by DES. In the following
years, Sindell-or at least some variation on the Sindell
theme-has been accepted by several courts, including, most re-
cently, Florida.6 6 It has been rejected outright, however, by several
others, including most recently Illinois and Rhode Island.367 In any
event, courts have almost uniformly declined to extend the Sindell
rule beyond its DES setting. In refusing to apply Sindell in asbes-
tos cases, courts have noted that prescription drugs are fungible in
a way that asbestos products are not.36 8 Courts have also refused,
for various reasons, to extend Siizdell to such products as DPT
vaccines, 6 " lead paint,3 71 multi-piece tire rims3 71  and breast
implants. 37 2
The liability of a broad range of negligent defendants can be
limited by affirmative defenses such as assumption of risk. By
1980, however, that defense seemed just about extinct: courts dis-
approved of explicit contractual disclaimers of liability,3 73 and
courts were inclined to "merge" implied assumption of risk into
comparative negligence. 7 In the past decade, many courts have
continued to approve this merger.375 Even so, headlines in legal
I Thomas, 949 F.2d at 814.
361 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
3 Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 281 (FI. 1991).
3'7 Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 344-45 (Ill. 1990); Gorman v. Abbott Lab.,
599 A.2d 1364 (R.I. 1991). In Gorman, the Rhode Island Supreme Court indeed dismissed
Sindell in one summary paragraph. Id. at 1364.
Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691, 700 (Ohio 1987).
Shackil v. Lederle Lab., 561 A.2d 511 (Ill. 1989).
3-o Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 782 F. Supp. 186 (D. Mass. 1992).
" E.g., Tirey v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 513 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio C.P. Montgomery
County 1986); Cummins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber, 495 A.2d 963 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
32 Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89 (D. Md. 1989), oafld, 898 F.2d 146
(4th Cir. 1990).
Courts are divided, however, as to whether Sindell can be relied on in cases involving
contaminated blood products. The application was approved in Smith v. Cutter Biological
Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1991). But it was disapproved in Kellar v. Cutter Laboratories, 60
U.S.L.W. 2620 (S.D. Fla. February 24, 1992) and Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 696 F.
Supp. 351, 353-54 (N.D. IM. 1988).
371 E.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of CaL, 383 P.2d 441, 447 (Cal. 1963).
31' Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1241 (Cal. 1975).
-5 E.g., Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123, 1132 (La. 1988).
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journals now talk about a "revival" of the assumption-of-risk doc-
trine.37 e Mainly in cases involving recreational activities, courts in
New York and California have invoked the concept of assumption
of risk to completely deny the defendant's liability.37 7 In some ju-
risdictions, plaintiffs who previously would have lost because of
their assumption of risk continue to lose because of the courts' as-
sessment that defendants, though possibly negligent, violated no
"duty. 37 8 Also, recent cases in several states have affirmed the le-
gality of contractual disclaimers of liability accepted by plaintiffs
as they sign up for a range of recreational activities.379 For that
matter, in states such as Indiana the assumption of risk defense
continues to operate in a rather general way; a prisoner suing
prison authorities for negligent supervision was recently found to
have assumed the risk of being homosexually raped.380
By 1980, the fireman's rule, an apparent manifestation of the as-
3' Gail Diane Cox, Assuming Risks: An Old Concept Has a Revival, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28,
1991, at 24; see also Susan S. Faerber, Note, The Reemergence of Implied Assumption of
Risk in Florida, 10 NovA L.J. 1343 (1986).
37 See Ordway v. Superior Court, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536 (Ct. App. 1988) (jockey suing an-
other jockey); Cuesta v. Immaculate Conception Roman Catholic Church, 562 N.Y.S.2d 537
(App. Div. 1990) (volunteer umpire suing sponsor of Little League baseball game); Marlowe
v. Rush-Henrietta Cent. School Dist., 561 N.Y.S.2d 934 (App. Div. 1990) (student in gym
class suing school and another student). Ordway is one of many recent California appellate
cases supporting the doctrine of "reasonable implied assumption of risk." The state supreme
court has now both recognized this doctrine as a partial defense and approved a significant
rule of no duty. Knight v. Jewett, No. 5019021, 1992 WL 203943 (Cal. Aug. 24, 1992).
3" See, e.g., Arnold v. City of Cedar Rapids, 443 N.W.2d 332, 333 (Iowa 1989) (spectator
hit by thrown ball suing owner of softball field); Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94 (Mass.
1989) (college hockey player suing opposing player); Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964 (N.Y.
1986) (jockey suing another jockey and owner of racetrack); Ridge v. Kladnick, 713 P.2d
1131 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (skater suing owner of skating rink).
371 E.g., Guido v. Koopman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437 (Ct. App. 1991) (horseback riding school);
Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1989) (horse rental); Harris v.
Walker, 519 N.E.2d 917 (Ill. 1988) (same). But see Wagenblast v. Odessa School Dist., 758
P.2d 968 (Wash. 1988) (invalidating disclaimer required by school district as precondition
for student's participation in interscholastic athletics).
380 McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1265 (1992). In McGill, the prisoner took a shower at a time when he knew that
prison guards were absent and his likely predator nearby. Id. at 346. See also Wassell v.
Adams, 865 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989), affirming a jury verdict finding that a rape victim, who
sued a motel for negligent security, was herself 97% at fault for her own rape. (Among other
things, she had let a stranger into her room at night and had allowed him to remain even
after his behavior became disturbing.) Judge Posner's opinion, while suggesting that the
jury's 97% finding was "probably wrong," still developed an "interpretation" of the evi-
dence that rendered that finding legally acceptable. Id. at 856.
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sumption-of-risk doctrine, was evidently on the defensive.3 1 In-
deed, the Oregon Supreme Court abolished the rule in 1984.82
However, in other decisions dating from the early 1980s, a large
number of jurisdictions have either reaffirmed the rule 3as or
adopted it for the first time.38" In doing so, these courts have relied
on the strength of the assumption-of-risk doctrine and also on
other considerations of public policy. While certain limitations on
the reach of the rule have been implemented,38 5 its application to
policemen 8' and volunteer firemen"' as well as professional fire
fighters has been confirmed. Also, many courts have moved the
rule beyond the setting of landowner liability by allowing it to be
invoked by manufacturers whose defective products result in the
fires that attract firemen. 88
If the doctrine of joint-and-several liability serves to broaden a
defendant's liability, then the rejection of that doctrine can prop-
erly be regarded as a limitation on liability. In 1978, the Supreme
Courts of California and Washington were invited to rule that their
states' previous adoptions of comparative negligence called for the
abrogation of the joint-and-several rule in favor of proportionate
liability.8 9 Both courts resisted the invitation and reaffirmed the
joint-and-several doctrine, concluding that broad contribution
rights did an adequate job of providing equity among defendants.
In 1992, the Tennessee Supreme Court moved into the modem era
by finally adopting comparative negligence.3 90 At the same time,
8 To be sure, as early as 1977 the firemen's rule had been supported in Walters v. Sloan.
571 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1977), an opinion that -urprised California court-watchers.
I Christensen v. Murphy, 678 P.2d 1210, 1218 (Or. 1984). The rule has been abolished
by statute in Minnesota. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.06 (West Supp. 1992).
1 E.g., Chapman v. Craig, 431 N.W.2d 770, 771-72 (Iowa 1988); Rosa v. Dunkin' Donuts,
583 A.2d 1129, 1133 (N.J. 1991).
3" Kreski v. Modem Wholesale Elec. Supply Co., 415 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Mich. 1987); Eng-
land v. Tasker, 529 A.2d 938, 940 (N.H. 1987).
35 On the application of the rule in cases involving willful and wanton negligence, com-
pare Young v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 569 A.2d 1173 (D.C. 1990) (affirming rule) with Maho-
ney v. Carus Chemical Co., 510 A.2d 4 (N.J. 1986) (finding rule inapplicable).
Berko v. Freda, 459 A.2d 663 (N.J. 1983); Santangelo v. State, 521 N.E.2d 770 (N.Y.
1988).
Carpenter v. O'Day, 562 A.2d 595 (Del. Sup. Ct.), afld, 553 A.2d 638 (Del. 1988).
" The cases are collected in John P. Ludington, Annotation, Products Liability: "Fire-
man's Rule" as Defense, 62 A.LR 4TH 727, 730-31 (1988).
3" American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1978); Seattle First
Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete, 588 P.2d 1308 (Wash. 1978).
. 310 McIntyre v. Balentine, No. 1, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 336 (May 4, 1992).
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the court jumped into the post-modern era. Declaring that com-
parative negligence is "inconsistent" with the joint-and-several
doctrine, the court ruled that this doctrine was "obsolete" and
hence no longer in effect. Because the court chose to adopt com-
parative negligence in its "modified" form, in many future cases
the plaintiff's fault will continue to completely bar his recovery.
Yet the court evidently adopted a "pure" version of proportionate
liability; no matter what the degree of the defendant's fault, the
defendant is relieved of the .burden of joint-and-several liability.
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the federal government,
even if found negligent, can claim the protection of certain immu-
nities. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.3 9' is the products liabil-
ity case in which the Supreme Court conferred on manufacturers a
government contractor defense. The Court's analysis in Boyle be-
gan with the premise that the government's choice of the design
for a military product it wants to acquire is a "discretionary func-
tion" that would entail immunity if the government were itself
sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act.3 92 This reasoning pro-
vides a broad interpretation of the "discretionary" immunity that
lies at the core of the Act.3 9 3 That immunity had been originally
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Dalehite v. United States.9
The Dalehite Court, though denying liability on that case's facts,
set forth what has become a standard interpretation of the discre-
tionary immunity: the immunity covers decisions rendered at the
"planning" level, but not actions undertaken by public employees
487 U.S. 500 (1988).
9Z In the Court's view, recognition of the manufacturer's defense was thus necessary in
order to preserve the integrity of the government's own immunity. Id. at 511.
In discussing that immunity, the Court emphasized the extent to which the government's
choice of product design would be based on some tradeoff between product effectiveness and
product safety. Id. Given this analysis, it is hard to see how the government's Boyle immu-
nity can be limited to the government's choice of designs for military products.
. "I The Court had previously interpreted the discretionary function immunity in United
States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984),
and Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988). Each of these opiqions is difficult to
parse. Moreover, while the general mood in Varig Airlines is opposed to liability in cases
'involving regulatory failure, the mood in Berkovitz seems favorable to liability in cases of
this sort. The meaning of the two cases in the aggregrate is unclear. In DeShaney v. Winne-
bago County Department of Social Services 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989), the Court declined to
constitutionalize the idea of the government's affirmative duties.
.", 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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in an "operational" way.38 5 This is an interpretation that can easily
justify liability in large numbers of cases. This test was explicitly
discarded, however, by the Court in 1991 in a decision involving
the alleged negligence of federal bank regulators."' 6 According to
that opinion, even operational actions call for immunity if they in-
corporate any real element of "choice or judgment."39 7 Further-
more, the "discretionary function" immunity was not the only im-
munity in the Act that has fared well during recent years. The
doctrine in Feres v. United States creates an implied immunity for
injuries that are "incident to military service."3 8 In 1987, the Su-
preme Court not only reaffirmed Feres but extended it so as to
provide the government with immunity even when the federal em-
ployee whose negligence injures the serviceman is himself a
civilian.3 99
F. THE ITEMS AND MEASURE OF DAMAGES
Having by now considered standards of liability and affirmative
defenses in both conventional negligence actions and products lia-
bility, let me turn to issues relating to the range of harms that
modern courts regard as compensable. By the early 1980s, the lia-
bility of medical professionals in wrongful-birth and wrongful-life
cases was being extensively litigated. In wrongful birth, the most
interesting issue concerns whether the parents of a healthy but un-
wanted child can recover for the economic costs of rearing that
child. Invoking public policy, most courts in the last decade have
rejected the parents' claim for compensation.0 0 In disabled chil-
3"' Id. at 42.
United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. 1267, 1275 (1991).
Id. Admittedly, the judgment, to be immune, must be in some sense "based on policy."
Id. Yet there is no requirement that it be rendered at the "policymaking" level. Id.
In a recent case of first impression, the Tenth Circuit has ruled that the discretionary
immunity bars the suit brought on behalf of a hiker killed while climbing in a national park.
The suit alleged the National Park Service's negligent failure to adequately regulate recrea-
tional climbing; its failure to warn hikers of approaching hazards; its delay in initiating a
rescue effort after first hearing of possible trouble; and its failure to conduct the eventual
rescue effort in a reasonable way. Johnson v. United States, 949 F.2d 332, 335 (10th Cir.
1991). According to a spokesman for the American Alpine Club, "[i]t's hard to grasp how
important this case was." Bill Stall, Court Limits Suits on Backcountry Perils, L.A. Tis,
Dec. 14, 1991 at A32. (Interestingly, the Club supported the government's defense.)
39 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950).
3" United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 692 (1987).
,0 Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Recoverability of Cost of Raising Normal, Healthy
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dren's wrongful-life claims, the pattern of judicial results has been
even more noteworthy. All but three states have rejected the
child's claim even for his own extraordinary medical expenses, and
all courts have rejected the child's claim for general dam-
ages-damages for the emotional distress associated with his
disability. 0 '
As noted above, courts have recently allowed malpractice plain-
tiffs to recover for the loss of a chance of a recovery. The other side
of this analytic coin is the right of a plaintiff who has been exposed
to a toxic substance to recover now for the prospect of a disease
that he might suffer in the future. Recovery for the tortious inflic-
tion of "risks" of this sort was sympathetically considered in 1980s
articles by leading scholars. 0 2 However, the argument has been
turned down by the huge majority of courts that have recently con-
sidered it. 403 In its own opinion rejecting the argument, the New
Jersey Supreme Court complained that the argument entailed a
"significant departure from traditional, prevailing legal principles"
and that the argument, if accepted, would add to the complexity of
litigation.0 4 That court indicated that it would respond to the eq-
uities of risk exposure by allowing the plaintiff to recover for the
expenses of medical surveillance, and also by relaxing the rules on
res judicata and the limitation period so that the victim can even-
tually bring suit when and if the disease finally strikes.0 5 More-
over, so long as the plaintiff has already suffered some physical
injury on account of the exposure (for example, asbestosis), courts
have also ruled that these plaintiffs can recover now for their emo-
Child Born as a Result of Physician's Negligence or Breach of Contract or Warranty, 89
A.L.R. 4TH 632, 637 (1991). Claims for child-rearing costs have been rejected outright in 29
states. Two states allow full recoveries; five others allow recoveries but with an offset to take
into account the satisfactions of parenting. The vast majority of cases-including the cases
rejecting liability-have come since 1980. And the minority position supporting liability is
not new; there were holdings in favor of liability prior to 1980.
"' See Michael B. Kelly, The Rightful Position in "Wrongful Life" Actions, 42 HAST. L.J.
505, 507 (1991).
402 E.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for
Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEG.AL STUD. 417, 425-26 (1984).
403 See Mauro v. Raymark Industries, 561 A.2d 257, 264-65 (N.J. 1989), and cases cited
therein.
'4 Id. at 260, 266.
405 Id. at 267. Some courts, however, have rejected medical monitoring awards in the ab-
sence of actual injury. E.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 885 (Ct.
App. 1990), hearing granted, 806 P.2d 308 (Cal. 1991).
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tional distress as they anticipate a possible future disease (for ex-
ample, lung cancer).06 Yet absent such a current injury, most
courts have been reluctant to approve recoveries for the fear of fu-
ture diseases. They have either denied such recoveries alto-
gether,0 7 or they have required proof of something like fraud on
the part of the defendant.0 8
Discussion can now center on the formal rules of damages in per-
sonal-injury cases. The plaintiffs' bar has long complained about
the unavailability of prejudgment interest in personal injury cases.
In 1987, the Supreme Court ruled that an FELA plaintiff is not
entitled to prejudgment interest.409 A contrary ruling, especially if
supported by a strong judicial opinion, might well have sparked a
law-reform effort to rendbr prejudgment interest compensable
under state tort law.410 In recent years there has been much con-
406 This is one of the Mauro holdings. Id. at 263. While the right to recover for anxiety in
cases of this sort has become more prominent in recent years, that right had been affirmed
by cases decided well before 1960. See David C. Minneman, Annotation, Future Disease or
Condition, or Anxiety Relating Thereto, as Element of Recouery, 50 A.LR. 4Tm 13, 49-63
(1984).
11 E.g., Ball v. Joy Technologies Inc., 958 F.2d 36, 38-39 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. CL 876 (1992); In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563 (D. Haw. 1990);
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
"I Khan v. Shiley Inc., 266 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). This case involved a
defective heart valve that could fracture at any time, causing the nearly immediate death of
the patient in whom the valve is implanted. (Yet the fatality risk involved in surgically
replacing the valve exceeds the risk entailed by allowing it to remain.) According to Khan,
neither proof of a defective product nor a showing of manufacturer negligence suffices to
allow the patient to recover for emotional distress. Such a recovery is allowable only if the
plaintiff proves that the manufacturer is guilty of fraud. On balance, the Khan rules seem
restrictive, calling to mind Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). Even so,
California is the only state that currently allows these heart-value emotional distress claims
to proceed. Summary judgments have been granted against plaintiffs in Alabama, Indiana,
Maryland, Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wis-
consin. Telephone interview with Bruce Finzen (member of Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi,
a national law firm specializing in catastrophic tort litigation) (May 11, 1992). For appellate
affirmances, see Pryor v. Shiley, Inc., 916 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Sill v.
Shiley, Inc., 909 F.2d 508 (8th Cir. 1990); Hagepanos v. Shiley, Inc., 846 F.2d 71 (4th Cir.
1988) (per curiam); Spuhl v. Shiley, Inc., 795 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
409 Monessen SW. Ry. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330 (1988).
410 As early as 1980, the Supreme Court ruled that FELA awards should be after-tax, and
that juries should be instructed on their nontaxability. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444
U.S. 490, 498 (1980). During the 1980s, courts in certain other states, including New Jersey,
approved this new approach. Ruff v. Weintraub, 519 A.2d 1384, 1388-89 (N.J. 1987); Bussell
v. De Walt Products Corp., 519 A.2d 1379, 1382 (N.J. 1987). Liepelt still represents, how-
ever, no more than a minority position. See John E. Theuman, Annotation, Propriety of
Taking Income Tax Into Consideration in Fixing Damages in Personal Injury or Death
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sideration of "hedonic damages." In 1989, however, the New York
Court of Appeals ruled that a plaintiff cannot secure a separate
recovery for the lost enjoyments of life; rather, lost enjoyments are
compensable only as a subcategory of pain and suffering.411 Given
that evaluation, the court also ruled that there can be no recovery
for lost enjoyment in actions brought by comatose plaintiffs; be-
cause these plaintiffs are unaware of the enjoyments they have
been deprived of, they can secure no recovery for their loss of en-
joymeits.412 By the early 1980s, emerging trends in punitive dam-
age practices were troubling scholars, but their criticisms generally
stopped short of any suggestions that these practices could be re-
garded as unconstitutional.4 " During the 1980s, however, the idea
gained currency that punitive damage arrangements might contain
elements of unconstitutionality. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip4 4 in early 1991, the Supreme Court declined to rule
that punitive damage practices are at a generic level unconstitu-
tional. Yet the Court stressed the due process need for meaningful
standards in the jury's calculation of punitive damage awards and
in the judicial review of jury decisions. It will take a long time for
the legal community to figure out what Haslip really "means." Al-
ready, however, at least twelve appellate courts have reversed or
Action, 16 A.L.R. 4TH 589 (1982 & Supp. 1991) (collecting cases). In New York, a compro-
mise has been reached: while damages are awarded pre-tax, see Johnson v. Manhattan &
Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority, 519 N.E.2d 326, 330 (N.Y. 1988), juries are
instructed on their nontaxability, Lanzano v. City of New York, 519 N.E.2d 331, 332-33
(N.Y. 1988).
42 McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375-77 (N.Y. 1989).
The few cases denying that "lost enjoyments" are relevant to personal injury awards were
decided prior to 1940. Pamela J. Hermes, Loss of Enjoyment of Life-Duplication of Dam-
ages Versus Full Compensation, 63 N. DAK. L. REV. 561, 565-68 (1984). Most cases prior to
1940, and essentially all cases since then, have agreed that lost enjoyments can be consid-
ered in assessing damages. Annotation, Loss of Enjoyment as a Distinct Element or Factor
in Awarding Damages, 34 A.L.R. 4TH 293, 297 (1984). The key issue, then, is whether lost
enjoyments count as a separate heading of damages. On this issue, the case law has been
and remains divided; but McDougald has emerged as the leading contemporary opinion.
See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 225, at 733, FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 225, at 694.
1I This reasoning necessarily implies the rejection of the argument advanced by leading
law-and-economics scholars that wrongful-death damage rules should be expanded so as to
allow recovery for the personal value of life to the victim himself. See, e.g., WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 314 (1987).
423 See Symposium, Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982) (debating propriety of
punitive damages).
414 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
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remanded punitive damage verdicts because of apparent depar-
tures from the Haslip standards.415 The Maryland Court of Ap-
peals, encouraged by Haslip, has exercised its common law powers
by way of narrowing the substantive standards for the allowance of
punitive damages and raising the procedural burden of proof to
clear and convincing evidence. 16 Similarly encouraged, the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court has called for bifurcated trials in punitive
damage cases, so that the amount of punitive damages can be
given separate and careful consideration.'1
G. TORT ACTIONS FOR WORKERS' INJURIES
This review can now turn to questions of the tort claims of in-
jured workers. My 1981 article discussed the extent to which re-
cent developments had eroded the exclusivity idea in workers'
compensation-the idea that those programs provide the exclusive
remedy for the victim injured on the job.42 8 This erosion had oc-
curred in each of three ways. First, employees' rights to bring
third-party tort actions against product manufacturers had ex-
panded. Second, some courts were allowing third-party defendants
to bring contribution actions against negligent employers. Third,
courts were increasingly identifying situations that allowed em-
ployees to bring actual tort actions against their own employers.
All three forms of erosion have been countered during recent
years. As noted above, courts have become somewhat more willing
to reject workers' claims of manufacturers' failures to warn by em-
phasizing that the employee is an experienced user or that the em-
ployer is a sophisticated intermediary.41 9 By 1980, the manufac-
turer's right of contribution from the negligent employer had been
approved in New York and Illinois, 420 and looked like it might be
'15 See, e.g., Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 105-07 (4th Cir. 1991). The
cases are identified in Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Haslip May Alter Tort-Claim
Strategies, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 17, 1992, at 23. It should be noted that many other courts have
found that their own states' punitive damage procedures do not violate the Haslip version
of due process. E.g., Hospital Authority v. Jones, 409 S.E.2d 501, 504 (Ga. 1991).
4'6 Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633 (Md. 1992). Overruling its own prece-
dents, the court rejected "implied malice" (at least in the sense of "gross negligence") as an
acceptable basis for punitive damages. Id. at 651-52.
47 Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 60 U.S.L.W. 2679 (Tenn. Apr. 20, 1992).
418 See Schwartz, Vitality, supra note 1, at 974-75.
419 See supra notes 343-346 and accompanying text.
412 Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437 (I1. 1977), cert.
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an emerging trend. Since then, however, that trend has not
emerged; no other states have adopted the contribution idea, and
many have rejected it. 421 Moreover, in 1991 the Illinois Supreme
Court cut back sharply on its own precedent by ruling that the
employer's contribution obligation cannot exceed the amount of
the employer's potential liability under workers' compensation.422
The exclusivity of workers' compensation was even more directly
challenged in the 1970s by cases holding that "intentional risks"
created by the employer are tantamount to "intentional torts,"
thereby enabling the employee to sue the employer for full tort
damages.423 Subsequent to the early 1980s, however, the doctrine
equating intentional risks and intentional torts has been rejected
by almost all courts that have considered it.424 In the 1970s, some
courts nurtured the idea that the employee could sue the employer
in tort if the employee's injury resulted from the employer's "dual
capacity." The high-water mark of the dual-capacity doctrine was
the California Supreme Court's 1981 opinion in Bell v. Industrial
Vangas, Inc..42 5 The broad Bell version of this doctrine was
promptly abrogated, however, by the California legislature;42 and
subsequent to Bell it has been rejected by all courts that have con-
sidered it. 427 In reviewing the recent rulings on intentional em-
ployer risks and dual employer capacities, the author of the pre-
eminent workers' compensation treatise announces that the previ-
ous "trend" away from the exclusivity of workers' compensation
has now been "not only halted but reversed. 428
denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972).
421 See 2B ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, §§ 76.20, 76.30 to
76.39, 76.91(a) (1989 & Supp. 1991).
412 Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp., 585 N.E.2d 1023 (111. 1991).
423 Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., 433 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1982); Mandolidis
v. Elkins Indus., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
424 See 2A LARSON, supra note 421, §§ 68.13, 68.15. Moreover, the pro-tort doctrine in
West Virginia has been largely repealed by statute. See id. § 68.15. An intermediate position
suggested in one Michigan case has also been abrogated by statute. Id.
45 637 P.2d 266 (Cal. 1981).
121 CAL. LABOR CODE § 3602 (West 1989).
417 See 2A LARSON, supra note 421, §§ 72.81(c) to 72.83.
"' Arthur Larson, Tensions in the Last Decade, in NEW PERSPECTIVES IN WORKERS' COM-
PENSATION 21, 23 (John F. Burton, Jr. ed., 1988). Another exclusivity issue concerns the
worker who tries to directly sue the fellow employee whose negligence has caused his injury.
In the late 1970s, most states allowed these suits; by the late 1980s, most states disallowed
them. Id. at 23.
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H. TORT-REFORM STATUTES
In discussing the restoration of the exclusivity doctrine in work-
ers' compensation, this Article has taken into account not only ju-
dicial opinions but also various legislative enactments that have
limited certain categories of tort claims. To round out my review of
liability-limiting tendencies of post-modern tort law, I should cer-
tainly refer here to the legislative tort-reform movement of the
mid-1980s. Tort-reform statutes have placed caps on pain-and-suf-
fering damages, have modified or abrogated the rule of joint and
several liability and the collateral source rule, and have revised pu-
nitive damage practices. Reform statutes have less frequently dealt
with actual standards of liability, but certain statutes have placed
limits on the liabilities of manufacturers, municipalities, and dram
shops.
These tort-reform statutes are certainly of keen importance; as a
practical matter, they can be at least as significant as the judicial
rulings described above. 29 Most of those judicial rulings have
merely prevented the expansion of tort or have interpreted previ-
ous expansions in somewhat conservative ways. The tort-reform
statutes, by contrast, have frequently been in a position to repeal
or roll back particular tort doctrines-even doctrines, like the col-
lateral source rule, that have been part of the American tort sys-
tem since the nineteenth century.
The operational significance of these statutes is hence obvious.
They loom quite large in any account of liability-reducing and lia-
bility-restraining developments in the last half of the 1980s. For a
variety of related reasons, however, it might not be wrong to some-
what slight these statutes in an article such as this one, which con-
siders tort as an ongoing legal and intellectual enterprise. As far as
legal effects are concerned, a judicial opinion provides a holding
that later courts might be willing to expand; moreover, that opin-
ion typically sets forth reasoning that later cases will regard as au-
thoritative. A tort-reform statute, by contrast, is a legal measure
that later courts could be justified in regarding as an isolated
event.4 0
421 On their impact, see Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Reform: As-
sessing Our Control of Risks, in ToRT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST CoMPrrON. INNOVA-
TION. AND CONSUMER WELFARE 272 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991).
"' For a related evaluation in the constitutional context, see Frank Michelman, Saving
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Furthermore, the reasoning set forth in judicial opinions contrib-
utes to the intellectual development of tort law. Tort-reform stat-
utes, by contrast, are typically lacking in afty such effort at rea-
soned explanation. As far as judicial decision making is concerned,
even when the judges' opinions do not candidly set forth the
judges' full reasons, one can still believe that judges generally de-
cide cases on the basis of their perceptions of the public interest.48 1
Yet if judicial decisions are public-interest oriented, legislative ac-
tion frequently entails a response to special interests. This is the
observation that Ralph Nader would insist on; it is likewise the
observation approved by public-choice economists, who see the po-
litical process as a forum in which legislative advantages are
bought and sold.43 2 For Nader, special-interest legislation is a cyni-
cal but frequent departure from the theoretical norm of legisla-
tures striving to achieve public interest goals. For public-choice
economists, special-interest legislation makes excellent sense at the
level of theory; it is precisely what their theory predicts.
To be sure, many scholars who take seriously the public-choice
literature still conclude that not all statutes are special-interest
measures; they acknowledge that some number of enactments are
designed to further the public interest.433 The analyst who adopts
such an intermediate position subjects himself, however, to the dif-
ficult task of determining into which category a particular statute
fits. Indeed, it may well be that many statutes result from some
combination of special-interest and public-interest impulses. Sepa-
rating out the various origins of such statutes can obviously be a
daunting task. As for the tort-reform statutes of the mid-1980s, no
literature has yet emerged that describes and assesses the political
processes that generated their enactment.43 4 As a result, what these
Old Glory: On Constitutional Iconography, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1337 (1990).
43' Admittedly, judicial perceptions of the public interest can be quite divergent. Some
judges might feel that accident victims in general do not receive enough compensation;
other judges might sense that manufacturers in general are burdened with an excess of
liability.
43' The literature is discussed in DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-37 (1991).
413 See, e.g.,'Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Stat-
utory Interpretation: An Interest-Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 232 (1986).
131 One version of the story behind the Texas statute is told in Joseph Sanders & Craig
Joyce, "Off to the Races:" The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L.
REV. 207, 276-79 (1990). The story in California is odd, but still instructive. In 1987, the trial
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statutes do or do not signify about the ideas or theory surrounding
tort law cannot now be meaningfully ascertained. 35
VI. EXPLAINING THE POSSIBLE END OF THE RISE
Part H began by noting that American tort law had remained
generally stable between 1900 and 1960. Parts II and IV then ex-
plored the explanations for the rise of modern American tort law
after 1960. Part V described the end of that rise. The task of this
Part is to explain why tort law seems to have recently leveled
off.436 One explanation is that modern American tort law had set
for itself a certain agenda, and by the early 1980s had completed at
least particular items on that agenda; with these agenda items sat-
isfied, further expansions of liability were no longer needed. By
way of modernizing tort law, there was a job to do; but the courts
at some point had done that job, and could therefore reduce their
efforts.
One goal of modern tort law, for example, was to eliminate a
number of tort doctrines that were perceived as obsolete; once
those doctrines were eliminated, modern tort law had essentially
completed that mission. A broad rule of government immunity was
lawyers and the tort reform lobby privately negotiated an agreement. This agreement set
forth a limited tort reform proposal that both sides agreed to support. (This proposal then
sailed through the legislature.) The agreement further provided for a five-year moratorium
on proposing any initiatives to the voters (either tort reform initiatives, or insurance-regu-
lating initiatives).
" How hrve courts responded to tort reform statutes? A strong contingent of state
courts-perhaps, indeed, a majority-have relied on state constitutional principles (due pro-
cess, equal protection, jury trial, or open courts) to invalidate key features of these statutes.
See the helpful table in Marco de Sa e Silva, Comment, Constitutional Challenges to Wash-
ington's Limit on Noneconomic Damages in Cases of Personal Injury and Death, 63 WASIL
L. Ray. 653, 675 (1988). Especially noteworthy is a 1989 Washington decision rejecting a
sophisticated cap on pain and, suffering damages, Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp.. 771 P.2d 711
(Wash. 1989). State court decisions of this sort are difficult to characterize. On the one
hand, they reveal a hostile and aggressive judicial attitude toward conservative legislative
enactments. On the other hand, these judicial decisions are themselves conservative, insofar
as they essentially serve to restore the tort status quo ante. That is, they display a high
degree of judicial self-confidence that the tort system, in its pre-tort-reform condition, is
quite all right.
436 One possible explanation might be that tort law goes through cycles of liability expan-
sions and liability stabilizations, and that we are merely now at one stage in that cycle. But
in considering American tort history since the early nineteenth century, I find an absence of
evidence that might support such a cyclical account. Hence, the explanation that builds on
this account will not be further pursued (except to the extent that it relates to the judicial
appointments explanation, to be discussed later).
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one of those doctrines. Still, the 1960s law-reforming courts that
abrogated that rule acknowledged that the government should re-
main immune for its discretionary acts;437 judicial efforts in the
late 1980s to give a proper definition to this discretionary immu-
nity are thus quite harmonious with the earlier rulings eliminating
the more general immunity doctrine. Consider, as well, the risk-
benefit criterion in product design cases. Ambitious judges in the
1960s and 1970s evidently concluded that it made good sense to
subject manufacturers' specific design decisions to negligence-like
risk-benefit review by jury. Those same judges, however, might
well have believed that it would extend the risk-benefit idea well
beyond its institutional breaking-point to allow individual juries to
consider whether entire genres of products-cigarettes, handguns,
auto convertibles-should be regarded as deficient under risk-ben-
efit reasoning. Those judges would hence find no incompatibility
between their approval, in the 1970s, of the extensive use of the
risk-benefit test to review particular design decisions and their un-
willingness, in the 1980s, to endorse the use of that test to censor
entire genres of products.
Examples such as these show that agenda completion can pro-
vide some assistance in explaining the recent stabilization of tort
doctrine. For at least two reasons, however, its explanatory power
is no more than partial. First of all, only some fraction of the lia-
bility-expanding opinions of the 1960s and 1970s can plausibly be
characterized as agenda-completing; many other opinions seemed
to anticipate future expansions of liability. 38 Secondly, even when
judges do engage in the process of solving certain problems, they
might well be led, in a pragmatic fashion, to identify and define
new problems.43 "
117 See Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary Sch. Dist., 359 P.2d 465, 467 (Cal. 1961).
"3 See, for example, Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal.
1976), in which the court noted the existence of an "expanding. . . list of special relation-
ships which will justify" imposing affirmative duties. Id. at 343 n.5.
119 Of course, while this might happen, it also might not. Moreover, when new problems
are recognized by way of this pragmatic process, those problems might or might not turn
out to be susceptible to appropriate court-devised solutions. Consider the Supreme Court's
experience with reapportionment. As the Court undertook the process of solving reappor-
tionment by implementing a rule of one person, one vote (see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964)), the Court was led to recognize the problem of gerrymandering or redistricting.
Problems of districting, however, turn out to be quite different from problems of malappor-
tionment in their amenability to principled judicial remedies. When the Supreme Court fi-
[Vol. 26:6061
AMERICAN TORT LAW
Explanations that go beyond agenda-completion hence must be
taken into account to more fully explain the apparent change in
tort directions. One such explanation concerns changes in the iden-
tity of those judges who declare tort doctrine. Replacing "liberal"
with "conservative" judges can make a difference for either of two
reasons, which are related yet distinct. First, conservative judges
are more likely to favor the outcome of less liability, as such. Sec-
ond, conservative judges are more likely to subscribe to ideas and
values which themselves tend to lead to holdings that limit liabil-
ity ," 0 As far as federal judges are concerned, they are designated
pursuant to an appointment process that emphasizes the preroga-
tives of the President. Democrats controlled the White House from
1961 to 1969 and 1977 to 1981, and the Republican Presidents dur-
ing the 1969-1977 period appointed a significant number of moder-
ates to the federal courts. Beginning in 1981, however, the White
House has been held by conservative Presidents who, quite mind-
ful of the discretionary powers that judges exercise, have been ea-
ger to select conservative candidates for lifetime positions on the
federal bench. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp."1 is the 1988
Supreme Court opinion establishing a government-contractor de-
fense for product manufacturers. The majority opinion in Boyle
was written by Justice Scalia, and was concurred in by Justices
Kennedy, O'Connor, and White, and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented. The
division of the Court was hence along conventional conservative-
liberal lines, and the three Justices appointed to the Court in the
1980s cast the deciding votes.
To be sure, Boyle is unusual as a tort case in that it raised an
issue of purely federal law. However, a significant percentage of
products. liability suits are brought in federal courts under diver-
sity jurisdiction. Given the uncertainties of state law on many is-
nally faced the issue of gerrymandering, it ruled that the jurisdiction of courts should be
quite limited. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (requiring a multi-factor showing that
alleged gerrymandering consistently degrades a group's electoral influence). The "conserva-
tive" quality of the Court's ruling in Davis should not be regarded as in conflict with the
"liberal" quality of its prior ruling in Reynolds.
40 These values can include a belief in contract, a concern for the costs that liability will
impose on defendants and on society, and a concern for the ability of courts to manage tort
litigation.
44' 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
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sues, federal judges enjoy considerable discretion in making Erie-
educated guesses as to what result a state court would reach.
Moreover, the sophisticated opinions that federal courts prepare in
these Erie cases often exert a significant influence on subsequent
state court opinions.442 In light of the discretion that federal courts
posses, the outlook of federal judges is an important determinant
of the opinions they write. Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Products Co. is
the recent case that stresses the need for caution in requiring ever
more elaborate product warnings.443 The opinion for the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Cotton was authored by Stephen Williams. Before joining
the bench, Williams had been a law professor doing distinguished
conservative scholarship. Williams is an appointee of the sort that
was characteristic of the Reagan Administration, but that would
have been unimaginable during the administration, say, of Jimmy
Carter.
Changes in judicial personnel also help explain the clear change
of directions in California's tort decisions. As of 1980, that state's
Supreme Court was dominated by liberal appointees of Governors
Pat Brown and Jerry Brown and moderate appointees of Governor
Reagan (who was far more "pragmatic" as a governor than he later
turned out to be as the nation's chief executive). In 1983, however,
George Deukmejian, a conservative Republican, began what turned
out to be the first of two four-year terms as governor. By the end
of 1991, the only holdover from the 1980 court was Justice Mosk.
Five of the court's seven members had been nominated by
Deukmejian; the final member was selected in 1991 by Pete Wil-
son, Deukmejian's Republican successor as governor. Deukmejian's
opportunity to make appointments was facilitated by the public's
rejection of three justices, all appointed by Jerry Brown, in a 1986
election;444 that rejection was itself due to the public's perception
of an excessive liberalism on the part of the Court majority.445 For
tort purposes, the California Supreme Court is of course an espe-
cially important court. This is partly because California now in-
442 For an early instance of this, look at Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495
(8th Cir. 1968).
", 840 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see supra note 341 and accompanying text.
"' A fourth judge resigned the year before, evidently to avoid the ordeal of the reelection
campaign.
"' To be sure, the public's chief complaint related to the position taken by liberal justices
in death penalty cases, not the views they had expressed on matters of tort liability.
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cludes more than one-ninth of the nation's population, and partly
because the California court's rulings played such a leadership role
in the expansion of tort liability between 1960 and the early 1980s.
The altered composition of the judiciary is thus clearly relevant
in explaining the recent change in tort directions. Still, its rele-
vance should not be overstated. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip, for example, Scalia and Kennedy were the two Jus-
tices who concluded that, in light of original intent, punitive dam-
ages should be largely free of constitutional scrutiny.4 6 In Califor-
nia, Justice Mosk, the one holdover from the liberal court of the
1970s, has assented to several of the new court's tort decisions.
Moreover, the change-in-judges explanation is of no relevance in
many states. Most judges are initially appointed, and during the
1980s the mix of state governors did not become significantly more
conservative. The justices of the New York Court of Appeals were
publicly elected until the mid-1980s, and the politics of the electo-
ral process in New York tended to favor judicial candidates with
liberal affiliations. In the mid-1980s, New York shifted to a system
that relies on gubernatorial appointments; and New York's gover-
nor since that time has been a liberal Democrat. The members of
the Illinois Supreme Court are themselves elected, and in recent
years the Court's liberal bloc has been able to maintain its slight
majority.
Changes in courts' compositions thus go only so far in explaining
the recent stabilization in doctrine. Another explanation refers to a
common process in the development of public policy. New pro-
grams, once implemented, turn out to have unexpected adverse
consequences that lead policymakers to recommend modifications.
Thus, at least according to one standard account, the Wagner Act
produced excesses and imbalances that explain the adoption of the
46 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1046 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Id. at 1054 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring); see supra note 414 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 499-502 and accompanying text. At times, however, Mosk has dis-
sented'from the new court's rulings. See, e.g., supra note 256.
Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1992), is the recent opinion that
overrules the presumption of causation in inherent-risk failure-to-warn cases. See supra
note 363 and .accompanying text. The opinion in Thomas was written by Judge Wisdom.
Appointed by President Eisenhower, Judge Wisdom became famous for his civil rights opin-
ions in the 1960s. In 1973, he was the author of Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,
493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), which has provided much of
the framework for modern asbestoa litigation.
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Taft-Hartly Act. Consider, in this regard, the 1970s idea that addi-
tional items in product warnings are essentially cost-free and
therefore should be readily insisted on by the judiciary. By the
mid-1980s, many consumers-were complaining of the problem of
warning clutter, and the problem was frequently being discussed in
the mass media.448 It is quite understandable, then, that some
judges began to acknowledge this problem in judicial opinions and
to become more cautious about insisting that warnings become
more prolix. Consider, as well, punitive damages. Punitive damage
awards in products liability cases were very rare until the mid-
1970s.449 In the intervening years, however, punitive damage
awards in products (and other) cases became considerably more
frequent.450 Given this new frequency, problems could be perceived
in the procedures by which punitive damages were
awarded-problems that invited the attention first of state tort-
reformers and then of the Supreme Court itself. Consider, as a fur-
ther example, Sindell. As discussed above,451 its possible problem
concerned the administrability of the market-share liability doc-
trine. The Sindell court apparently believed that this problem
would turn out to be manageable. Yet look at what has happened
to the DES litigation in the 12 years since Sindell. I have spoken
recently to plaintiffs' lawyers in both northern and southern Cali-
fornia who have been deeply involved in the DES litigation that
Sindell occasioned. They describe that litigation as "nightmarish."
These lawyers themselves, of course, bear much of the overhead of
litigation. And what they report is that the market-share remedy
afforded by Sindell has turned out not to be "viable." That is, for
plaintiffs and their lawyers the eventual verdicts available under
Sindell are not large enough to justify all the costs, uncertainties,
and delays in the Sindell litigation process. 452 From the plaintiffs'
perspective, then, the adventure in litigation launched by Sindell
448 See, e.g., Steven Waldman, Do Warnings Labels Work?, NEWSWEEK, July 18, 1988, at
40.
"I See David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability, Litigation, 74 MIcH. L.
REV. 1257, 1260-61 (1976).
" To be sure, even now they are awarded only in a small percentage of tort cases. Still,
over recent years that percentage has considerably increased.
"8 See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
" Here the lawyers point to the way in which several ambiguities in Sindell were re-
solved in Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
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has turned out to be a failure. My understanding, moreover, is that
this sense of Sindell-as-failure is shared rather generally by appel-
late judges, at least in California. It hence might be fair to say that
if the California Supreme Court knew then what it knows now, it
would never have approved Sindell. Alternatively stated, given the
sobering lessons of experience, it is understandable that some
courts in recent years have rejected Sindell even in the context of
DES itself,453 and that almost all courts have refused to extend
Sindell to products other than DES.454
The explanations above have referred to the unexpected conse-
quences of expanded liability. One particular consequence is the
cost burden that enhanced liability imposes on defendants. The
basic advantages of broad practice of negligence liability have been
referred to above.455 Yet one disadvantage of negligence liability is
that it can become quite expensive. Since there tend to be large
numbers of injuries that are at least arguably due to the negligence
of some defendants, the liability costs produced by a broad prac-
tice of negligence liability can be very substantial. Moreover, all
the uncertainties entailed by the negligence issue mean that a neg-
ligence regime results in high litigation costs as well.456
The financial costs of modern tort liability have thus been
driven up by changes in formal doctrine that have extended the
range of negligence-based liabilities. Yet those costs have also gone
up on account of factors that are unrelated to doctrine as such. In
medical malpractice, for example, the rules of liability have not ex-
panded in any fundamental way since 1960. Still, the number of
claims actually filed has increased on a per-doctor basis by some-
thing like a factor of nine. 57 Evidently, patients (and their law-
yers) have become much more willing to litigate;45 8 moreover, if the
"I In 1988 the D.C. Circuit ruled against a DES plaintiff; the court was unwilling to pre-
dict that Maryland and D.C. would accept Sindell. In considering whether Sindell is "un-
workable," the court took into account the plaintiff's concession that in California "Sindell
is still in litigation 'seven years after the California Supreme Court's decision.' " Tidier v.
Ely Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (D. Ginsburg, J.).
I" See supra notes 368-372 and accompanying text.
"5 See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
4 The fact that a claim of negligence (or product defect) involves an accusation about
the improper unsafety of the defendant's conduct or product introduces an element that can
add to the bitterness and expensiveness of litigation.
47 See Schwartz, Comparative Context, supra note 154, at 60.
4" Even so, the number of current claims remains well below the number of actual mal-
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number of claims is up (in malpractice and also in other tort
fields), so is the cost-per-claim. Though the formal rules on the
measure of damages have not undergone major change, the size of
the average tort award for personal injury has apparently tripled
since the early 1960s, even in after-inflation dollars.459
In all, the increased costs of modern tort liability have been
brought about by a combination of factors. Given that combina-
tion, this cost increase could have been foreseen by judges in
part-but only in part-as they expanded the scope of formal lia-
bility during the 1960s and 1970s. In any event; it seems clear
enough that those judges foresaw very little of the heavy cost bur-
den of modern tort liability. Rather, those judges were clearly as-
suming that even in its expanded form liability would not be espe-
cially expensive for individual or institutional defendants.60 In
cases, for example, which tested the immunity of charities and gov-
ernments, defendants typically argued that the elimination of im-
munity would subject them to serious financial burdens. Courts
clearly regarded such representations as self-serving and unpersua-
sive.461 In the products liability context, Justice Traynor's famous
concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co.4S2 -appropriated by courts in the 1960s-reasoned that "[t]he
cost of an injury . . . may be an overwhelming misfortune to the
person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be
insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as
the cost of doing business. '4 3 Traynor certainly seemed to be as-
suming that for manufacturers and consumers the aggregate ex-
penses of liability would be no more than moderate-substantial
enough to induce some safety efforts by the manufacturer, but not
practice incidents. See Localio, supra note 97.
4" See Schwartz, Comparative Context, supra note 154, at 47. The prospect of larger
awards may provide a partial explanation for the increase in the number of claims.
"0 Charles Gregory's 1951 essay suggested that the imposition of absolute liability on an
enterprise would raise the prices that enterprise charges only by a "tiny" amount. Gregory,
supra note 163, at 384.
461 In Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. 1959),
for example, the court abolished governmental immunity, relying on the view that "[t]ort
liability is in fact a very small item in the budget of any well organized enterprise." Id. at 95
(quoting Leon Green, Freedom of Litigation (III): Municipal Liability for Torts, 38 ILL, L.
REv. 355, 379 (1944)).
462 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
"I Id. at 441.
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so large as to seriously inflate the price of products, let alone to
occasion any significant economic dislocations. By the 1980s, how-
ever, it had become clear that at least for certain service providers
and product manufacturers, the costs of liability had become quite
high. Then, during the tort crisis that began in late 1984, liability
costs proceeded to soar. While the official mid-1980s tort crisis has
by now receded, the price of liability insurance remains high even
while the extent of its coverage has been considerably reduced.
We are hence left with a tort system that entails financial conse-
quences that were very poorly anticipated 30 years ago. To gain a
sense of the significance of the increased cost of liability, assume
that you are a judge who is asked to rule on the extent of liability
of a community health center serving a low-income community. In
1970, your understanding might well have been that the price of
liability insurance is typically low, and this understanding would
have enabled you to establish liability at the broad level that you
deemed otherwise appropriate. Assume now, however, that you to-
day read in a reliable journal that the high cost of liability insur-
ance is requiring these centers to give up on certain medical ser-
vices that the centers themselves regard as quite important to
patients' welfare.464 You may well suspect that these cost increases
are due to some malfunction in the liability insurance mecha-
nism. 465 Even so, faced with the reality of the clinics' new situa-
tion, you would be inhibited from issuing a ruling that might
broadly define these clinics' tort liability.
Turn now to tort liability of more ordinary commercial enter-
prises. In the corporate context, by the 1980s high tort costs
seemed to matter in quite a new way. Major American corpora-
tions-such as the Big Three automakers-which had appeared so
dominant in the 1960s were now being perceived as fragile, buf-
feted by consumer resistance and foreign competition. Moreover,
by the 1980s it had become clear that imposing liability on corpo-
rations could produce results that go beyond mere reductions in
corporate profits. Consider Brown v. Superior Court,4 6 6 the 1988
"" Robert Pear, Health Clinics Cut Services As Cost of Insurance Soars, N.Y. Timm,
Aug. 21, 1991, at Al. Absent the cost of liability insurance, these health centers could pro-
vide services to 500,000 additional patients nationwide. Id.
465 See id.
751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
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California case that remained with the negligence standard in cases
involving prescription drugs and declined to adopt hindsight strict
liability. Justice Mosk's opinion for the court expressed his aware-
ness that the application of products liability to drug companies
had already induced the tripling of the price of one drug, the deci-
sion by one company not to introduce at all another apparently
valuable new drug, the unwillingness (absent federal support) of
companies to supply a flu vaccine, the withdrawal from the market
of most of the producers of the DPT vaccine, and the increase in
the price of a dose of this vaccine from eleven cents to eleven dol-
lars. As Justice Mosk noted, these were consequences that had en-
sued merely because of other courts' application of the negligence
standard. 17 Faced with these social consequences, one can under-
stand why Mosk and his California colleagues would be quite un-
willing to extend liability, by virtue of the hindsight idea, well be-
yond the boundaries of negligence. Similarly, one can understand
why the New York Court of Appeals would worry about the over-
deterrence of drug companies in deciding to adopt its two-genera-
tion duty-like limitation on the scope of those companies' liabil-
ity.468 One can likewise appreciate that court's opinion in McDou-
gald v. Garber.4" 9 As noted above, the size of the average tort
award has increased dramatically during the modern era; more-
over, the portions of awards attributable to general damages such
as pain and suffering have apparently gone up even more sharply
than the portions due to out-of-pocket special damages. 470 The
New York court's undoubted awareness of these modern tenden-
cies in tort verdicts certainly helps explain its unwillingness in Mc-
Dougald to create a special heading of general damages for lost life
enjoyments.
It should be noted that modern tort law is not the only program
initiated or expanded in the 1960s that has turned out to pose a
167 How it happens that even a broad negligence standard leads to results such as these is
not all that easy to figure out. On the recent oral polio vaccine litigation, one commentator
has said: "So far as I can tell, the manufacturers have won a large number of cases. Yet the
filings increase every year." Edmund W. Kitch, Discussion of Paper by Richard Epstein,
University of Chicago, 10 CARDOZO L. R-V. 2227, 2259 (1989). For Kitch's earlier discussion
of vaccine liability problems, see Kitch, supra note 212.
468 See supra notes 314-316 and accompanying text.
469 536 N.E.2d 372 (N.Y. 1989).
470 See Schwartz, Comparative Context, supra note 154, at 73.
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problem of severe cost overruns. In 1967-the first full year in
which the Medicare progran was in effect-its overall cost was
over $4 billion. 1 Yet by 1992, Medicare's annual cost had grown
to over $116 billion.47 2 By the 1980s, Medicare policymakers were
engaged in efforts to develop techniques of cost containment. Cost-
containing strategies were also being applied to the Social Security
Disability Insurance program, the expense of which had increased
from $3 billion in 1970 to $12 billion in 1977.' s Such efforts at cost
control can be regarded in some ways as analogous to the process
of tort reform that took place during the 1980s.
474
A further explanation for the emergence of the post-modem tort
era can be developed by turning again to the example of Judge
Williams. When modern tort law began in the 1960s, almost all the
intellectual life within the United States-and within American
law schools-lay on the liberal left. There were an array of liberals,
some number of centrists who would at times agree with the liber-
als and at times disagree, but almost no conservatives. The ideas
relied on by modern tort judges as they expanded liability were
perhaps vulnerable to conservative criticism-but there really was
no one out there in academics in a conspicuous position to formu-
late such criticism. If any scholars in the 1960s had objected that
modern tort law unduly disparages contract or is excessively costly,
they would have been dismissed as old-fashioned and irrelevant.4 '
'7 See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE US. HISTORY OF THE RISING COSTS OF THE MED!-
CARE AND MEDICAID PROGRAMS AND ArTMTSbr TO CONTROL THESE COSTS. 1966-1975, at 4
(1976).
472 Fiscal 1992 Budget Resolution, CONG. Q., Apr. 27, 1991, at 1043 (chart). Of course, a
substantial fraction of this cost increase is the natural consequence of inflation and formal
expansions of program coverage.
"I Carolyn L. Weaver, Reassessing Federal Disability Insurance, Pun. INrTERE., Winter
1992, at 108, 108-112, 116-17. This amounted to a 150% increase in after-inflation dollars.
Id. at 112.
4 The analogy between the cost of Medicare and the cost of modern tort can be carried a
bit further. If the increasing expense of medical services has driven up the Medicare bill, it
has likewise increased the overall cost of tort liability. By providing first-dollar insurance
coverage for most medical expenses, Medicare has turned out to occasion a moral hazard
problem in terms of consumers' excessive utilization of medical services. Expanded rules of
tort liability are likewise capable of producing certain problems of consumer moral hazard.
475 In fact, in 1957, Marcus Plant argued against the strict products liability proposal
partly on grounds that the market provided manufacturers with adequate incentives for
safety. Marcus L. Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects
in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L Rv. 938 (1957). During the 1960s, there were
no scholars voicing such an argument, and even in 1957 Plant probably came across as an
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By the 1980s, however, much of the intellectual vitality in pub-
lic-policy analysis had switched to the neo-conservatives or to reju-
venated traditional conservatives.7 s Within legal education, the
law-and-economics movement began in earnest in the early 1970s,
and by the mid-1970s had become an important force in American
legal scholarship. As for Judge Williams, it is not just that he
would not have been appointed to the bench by President John-
son; the further point is that law professors like Williams, with
strong law-and-economics interests, did not exist in significant
numbers at the time of the Johnson Administration. No judge in
the 1960s, then, would have been in a covenient position to argue
that an expanded warning obligation might create a problem of
"information costs" for consumers; 477 that concept did not make
its way into legal scholarship until the 1970s. Once the law-and-
economics movement gathered force, it proved capable of provid-
ing criticisms of modern tort law (often relating to contract, ad-
ministratability, and liability costs) that simply had not been part
of the inventory of available and acceptable ideas in the 1960s.
All of this suggests a relevant further explanation for the end of
the tort-law rise. The process of innovating the law is facilitated
when judges are provided with positive reinforcement-for exam-
ple, a flow of scholarly articles commending their efforts or at least
suggesting that these efforts are on the right track.47 s Certainly,
the Warren Court in the 1960s received reinforcement of this sort;
indeed, the ideas endorsed and unleashed by the Warren Court
were so powerful as to lead directly or indirectly to the creation of
old fogey. (He also argued that stricter liability rules would increase the number of fraudu-
lent claims. Id. at 949-50.)
The Brookings Institution has long been known as a liberal think-tank. However, its
two recent volumes on tort liability tend to be conservatively oriented. See THE LIABILITY
MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION, supra note 139; LIABILITY
PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988).
"" See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
478 Indeed, George Priest's enterprise-liability explanation for modern tort law assumes
that ideas developed by legal academics were then accepted by judges in a way that explains
modern tort developments. According to Priest's early articles, the ALI's products liability
Restatement served as the vehicle by which scholars' ideas were transmitted to judges. E.g.,
Priest, supra note 5, at 465, 515. But Priest's more recent articles suggest that judges did
not begin adopting enterprise liability until the late 1960s, and did so in ways that if any-
thing involved the betrayal of the Restatement. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying
text. Given his current deprecation of the Restatement, it is not clear how Priest now un-
derstands the process by which tort ideas were transmitted from legal scholars to judges.
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whole new schools of legal scholarship. As far as tort law is con-
cerned, when courts expanded liability in the 1960s and early
1970s, most tort scholars seemed to respond with general apprecia-
tion.479 And this appreciation is easy enough to understand, given
the normative appeal of modern tort law as described in Part I.
What is noteworthy, then, about modern American tort law in
the 1980s is that despite its normative appeal, it has turned out to
be without a major constituency within the legal academy. As
noted, vocal elements in the law-and-economics movement are
harshly critical of modern American tort law. What is equally in-
teresting is that this law has failed to secure any major support
among academic liberals or centrists. Leading liberals such as Marc
Franklin, 80 John Fleming, 81 and Steve Sugarman 2 are as harsh
in their critique of modern tort law as any of the law-and-econom-
ics conservatives. Indeed, all of these writers seemingly favor the
abolition of tort law, so that it can be replaced by expanded sys-
tems of social insurance and safety regulation. They typically ac-
knowledge the fairness and deterrence objectives associated with
the negligence rule, but argue that for a variety of reasons-for
example, extensive liability insurance-tort law is poorly equipped
470 The early years of the modern era are praised in Robert E. Keeton, Judicial Law
Reform-A Perspective on the Performance of Appellate Courts, 44 Tax. L Ray. 1254
(1966). The Restatement sections on products liability were approved by a consensus of the
ALI (including its law-professor members). Priest, supra note 108, at 2317. The creativity of
the California Supreme Court was commended in John G. Fleming, Foreword: Comparative
Negligence at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CAL. L Rav. 239 (1976). Modem products lia-
bility was treated quite sympathetically in Marc A. Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis:
An Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN. L. REv. 439 (1972).
Still, my language in the text is somewhat guarded. The number of leading articles sup-
porting modem tort developments in the late 1960s and 1970s is smaller than one might
have supposed. Moreover, criticisms of modern tort were available as early as 1967. See
supra note 480 and accompanying text.
"' Marc A. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Re-
imbursement, 53 VA. L. REv. 774 (1967). Franklin proposes that the compensation fund be
given reimbursement rights against businesses whose activities result in injuries. Id. at 812.
48' John G. Fleming, Is There a Future for Tort Law?, 44 L. L. Rzv. 1193 (1984).
482 Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. Ra 555 (1985).
Robert Rabin has set forth his own serious doubts as to the soundness of the modem tort
regime. See Robert L. Rabin, Deterrence and the Tort System, in SAcnoNs AND REWARDS
IN THE LEGAL SYsr=M 79, 94 (M.L. Friedland ed., 1989). Jeffrey O'Connell, having advocated
auto no-fault as early as 1965, has remained hugely hostile to modem tort law and strongly
supportive of various compensation schemes. See, e.g., JEFFREY O'CONaELL. TE LAwsurT
LorrRY (1979).
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to achieve these objectives. 43 When they regard tort law from the
perspective of loss distribution, they likewise deem it a failure, in
light of the alternative of social insurance. Meanwhile, other liber-
als like Jon Hanson484 and Howard Latin 48 5 contend that modern
tort law has been hopelessly half-hearted in its pursuit of deter-
rence goals and therefore call for whole new regimes of expanded
liability. Since 1973, James Henderson, a centrist scholar, has been
complaining that modern tort law is formless in a way that threat-
ens the integrity of the judicial process.488 David Owen, as the co-
author of a leading products liability course book,4 7 a co-reviser of
the Prosser treatise,'48  and as author of a very influential 1976 arti-
cle urging the availability of punitive damages in products liabil-
ity,48 9 can easily be seen as a leading "insider" within American
tort law. Even so, in a 1985 article Owen revealed that he ulti-
mately opposes tort law, and would support Steve Sugarman's call
for its replacement by schemes of social insurance and expanded
regulation.9 ° Oscar Gray's revision of the Harper and James trea-
tise491 generally takes positions that trial lawyers are happy to cite.
41" The question of the strength of these various "realistic" objections to tort law's fair-
ness and deterrence rationales raises issues that are beyond the scope of this Article. The
Article thus makes no claims as to exactly how successful modern tort law is in actually
achieving fairness and deterrence. The specific issue of liability insurance is considered in
Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL
L. REV. 313 (1990).
"4 See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Eco-
nomic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 137 (1990) (recom-
mending absolute enterprise liability for personal injury).
"I" See Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73
CAL. L. REV. 677, 679-82 (1985) (recommending absolute liability in many categories of
cases).
"4 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the
Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976); James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufac-
turers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531
(1973).
487 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY (2d
ed. 1989) (co-authored by W. Page Keeton, David G. Owen, John E. Montgomery, and
Michael D. Green).
4U PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 245 (co-authored by W. Page Keeton, Dan
B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, and David G. Owen).
411 Owen, supra note 449.
" David G. Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort Law: A Comment, 73 CAL. L. REV. 665
(1985). However, Owen's current manuscript on products liability seems quite laudatory.
David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law-Toward First Princi-
ples (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Georgia Law Review).
"4' FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1986).
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Even so, in a 1987 article Gray revealed his ambivalences about the
modern tort regime and his sympathy for Sugarman's recommen-
dations.492 It is a useful exercise to consider here all the tort schol-
ars at the top ten law schools (or more precisely, the twenty law
schools that claim to rank in the top ten). Among those scholars,
only Marshall Shapo at Northwestern can be regarded as a strong
supporter of the modern tort regime.493
On the significance of feedback,94 consider the New Jersey Su-
preme Court, which had voted (unanimously) in favor of hindsight
liability in failure-to-warn cases in Beshada, and then voted (unan-
imously) against hindsight liability in Feldman two years later.4 9 5
In explaining this turnabout in Feldman, the court acknowledged
4'2 Oscar Gray, On Sugarman on Tort-Chopping, 24 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 851.851 (1987). It
is uncertain whether modern tort judges would be gratified from the support that might be
provided by academic radicals. But even this support has not been forthcoming. Among
CLS scholars, the one who has focused most on modern tort law is my colleague Richard
Abel; and his attitude toward the tort system is extremely negative. Richard L. Abel, A
Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. Rav. 785 (1990). Actually, many of the criticisms of modem
tort law that Abel advances resemble the criticisms set forth by liberal scholars such as
Fleming and Sugarman. Abel is in a position, however, to elaborate on these criticisms in a
CLS way.
493 SPECIAL COMM ON TORT LxL#,Btrr SYSTEKs TowARDs A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE
CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SusTsarrvE Jusmic IN AmmucAN Toar LAw (1984).
Shapo was the reporter for this ABA Special Committee.
Joseph Page has spoken out against the excessive rhetoric of the mid-19W0s tort reform-
ers. Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEo. L.J. 649 (1990). Yet his own attitude
toward the modem tort system is notably equivocal. Id. at 687-89. David Rosenberg has
defended modem tort law-but even in doing so has called for major structural reforms.
David Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story of Asbestos-Carnage, Cover-Up, and
Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1692, 1702-06 (1986) (reviewing PAUL BRODEUR. OUmRAGEOUS
MiscoNDuci. THE ASBSTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985)). Landes and Posner, despite their
"positive" economic theory of the common law, suggest that tort law has become somewhat
less efficient in the modem era. See LANDES & POSNER; supra note 412, at 23 (discussing
Califomia), 27. Moreover, their defense of modem products liability seems peculiarly half-
hearted. Id. at 272-308. The relevant point here is that while Landes and Posner generally
support rules of negligence liability, they also favor strong affirmative defenses that take
victim fault and contract considerations into account. And these are defenses that modem
tort law tends not to recognize.
4 My claim about the relevance of feedback is a limited one. Frequently, judges proceed
ahead without taking academic opinion into account; indeed, the Rehnquist Court obviously
appreciates that many of its rulings will be lamented by the majority of the most highly
regarded constitutional law scholars. Still, when judges have proceeded ahead with what
seems like general academic approval, and when they suddenly realize that a consensus of
leading academics are in fact deploring their efforts, that change will foreseeably have an
appreciable effect on judges' own attitudes.
"I" See supra notes 268-269 and accompanying text.
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the heavy criticism that Beshada had provoked in the law re-
views.496 To further assess the relevance of feedback, consider the
evolution of views of Justice Mosk. As a member of the California
Court in the 1960s and 1970s, -Mosk was deeply involved in the
fashioning of the strict products liability doctrine. In 1978, the
Court majority, in a somewhat conservative vein, ruled that princi-
ples of comparative negligence can reduce the plaintiff's recovery
in a strict products liability action.497 Justice Mosk's dissenting
opinion began with the complaint that "[t]his will be remembered
as the dark day when this court, which heroically took the lead in
originating the doctrine of products liability . . . beat a hasty re-
treat almost back to square one. The pure concept of products lia-
bility so pridefully fashioned and nurtured by this court. . . is re-
duced to a shambles."498 Ten years later, however, Justice Mosk
authored the California court's opinion in Brown v. Superior
Court, ruling that negligence principles, rather than hindsight
strict liability, apply in prescription drug cases. 499 The drug back-
ground for the Brown result has been emphasized above. Three
years after Brown, however, Justice Mosk concurred in the court's
ruling in Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. that a hind-
sight analysis should be rejected in all cases involving a failure to
warn, even when the product is asbestos. 00 Indeed, Mosk's concur-
ring opinion suggests that the entire doctrine of failure-to-warn in
products liability should probably be reclassified under the head-
ing of negligence. 0 1 In this concurrence, Mosk quotes his own
''pure concept of products liability" words from Daly-and then
goes on, in essence, to eat his words.502
What accounts for this dramatic shift in Mosk's position? One
possibility can here be mentioned. In 1985, Mosk was one of the
number of state court judges who attended a conference at Yale
put on by Yale's Program on Civil Liability. What Mosk might
well have learned from that conference was that leading academics
were quite hostile to modern tort law in general, and modern prod-
Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 387-88 (N.J. 1984).
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1168-69 (Cal. 1978).
Id. at 1181 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
', 751 P.2d 470, 480 (Cal. 1988).
50 810 P.2d 549, 559 (Cal. 1991).
... Id. at 561 (Mosk, J., concurring).
502 Id.
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ucts liability in particular. That conference included George
Priest's article on the emergence and likely follies of the idea of
enterprise liability;"'3 Alan Schwartz's article rejecting, largely on
economic grounds, the hindsight concept in products liability;5
and Richard Epstein's article formulating moral hazard and ad-
verse selection arguments against modern products liability.505
There is no reason to believe that Mosk was persuaded by the rea-
soning and analysis in these articles; they go uncited in Mosk's
opinion for the court in Brown and his concurring opinion in An-
derson. It seems easy to assume, however, that Justice Mosk was
taken aback to learn that his court's directions were being de-
plored rather than applauded by leading academics, and that there
might be a variety of policy arguments against those directions
which he and his judicial colleagues had never considered.506
VII. CONCLUSION
As a matter of doctrine, the expansion of liability in modern tort
law took place within the framework of the concept of negligence/
unreasonableness. As a matter of judicial purpose, that expansion
occurred in large part because of the inherent appeal of the negli-
gence standard-its apparent ability to concurrently achieve fair-
ness, deterrence, and a considerable measure of loss-spreading."
In broadening liability, modern courts were energized by the model
of the Warren Court. Those courts were also influenced both by
the general ferment in national public-policymaking and by a par-
ticular policy consensus that developed around the problem of
product-related injuries.0 Modern courts, operating under these
110 Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra note 5.
0 A. Schwartz, supra note 264.
505 Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
645, 650-54 (1985).
506 I am in a somewhat awkward position in pointing this out, since I do not mean to
concede the correctness of these various arguments. My own criticisms of Alan Schwartz
and Epstein can be found in Schwartz, Directions, supra note 91, at 770-75; and this Article
has set forth my critique of Priest. My observation rather is that the arguments do need to
be taken seriously, and that Justice Mosk may have realized that his court had failed to do
so.
507 Note, however, the issues left open in note 483 as to tort law's actual success in achiev-
ing its goals of fairness and deterrence.
"I' In this regard, consumer-movement leaders such as Ralph Nader were at least as influ-
ential as scholars such as Fleming James in the development of modern products liability.
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influences, ended up downplaying or ignoring considerations of
contract, liability costs, and administratability that might have
served to restrain the growth of liability.
What modern courts created was a broad practice of liability for
negligence (or its frequent analogue, product defect). If modern
tort law is sometimes described as approaching absolute liability,
that description is at best an exaggeration. To be sure, by the early
1960s a theory of enterprise liability was being supported by a
number of tort scholars. Standing on its own, this theory might
justify a practice of absolute liability. Moreover, the theory clearly
had some effect on the thinking of modern tort judges. For those
judges, however, enterprise liability was not the only theory in
town. Rather, it was an approach to liability that judges were able
to accommodate with more traditional tort approaches-which
themselves emphasized unreasonableness as the criterion for (se-
lective) liability. The meaningfulness of this criterion is confirmed
by a review of the liability exposure of products such as power
saws, bicycles, and automobiles-a review that uncovers no signs of
absolute liability. Granted, there is reason to believe that modern
judges have sometimes manipulated the concept of unreasonable-
ness in reaching results which themselves can be explained only in
loss-distribution terms. Nevertheless, there is inadequate reason to
believe' that this practice has become a commonplace.
By the early 1980s, a new tort era had begun. Undeniably, in
dozens of cases contemporary courts have routinely applied the
strong liability rules inherited from preceding years; moreover, in
some instances those courts have actually extended liability. Yet in
many recent cases, courts have also rejected particular strict liabil-
ity proposals, refused to recognize certain negligence-based causes
of action, affirmed no-duty rules, narrowly interpreted the negli-
gence concept, asserted the application of certain affirmative de-
fenses, conservatively ruled on a number of damage issues, and re-
jected legal doctrines that might have subjected employers to tort
liability on account of workers' injuries. This recent period can
hence be described in terms of the stabilization and the mild con-
traction of doctrine. An important question concerns whether
these tendencies are likely to continue into the future. (Otherwise,
the recent period may merely be a respite, which could soon give
rise to a new growth in liability.) The transition of tort law from its
famous modern era into its less-noticed post-modern era can itself
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be explained in several ways, and each of these explanations im-
plies its own answer to the question of what happens next. To the
extent that tort doctrine has leveled off on account of the identity
of judges, the answer will depend on the identities of those candi-
dates for national president and state governor that voters favor in
the future. Inasmuch as doctrine has stabilized because tort judges
have completed their reform agenda, that stabilization can be ex-
pected to continue-unless judges come up with a new reform
agenda that could justify further desirable expansions of liability.
Insofar as the recent period relates in some way to the ideas that
prevail among academics and within the more general discourse of
public-policy analysis, one obvious point is that the law-and-eco-
nomics school-with its concerns for various forms of social effi-
ciency-is certainly here to stay. Still, other schools of public-pol-
icy analysis which could diminish the law-and-economics school's
significance could easily emerge in the future. °0  To the extent that
the recent stabilization has resulted from a widespread apprecia-
tion of the costs and consequences of expanded liability, a new
round of expansion cannot be expected until those costs have
clearly subsided. The costs in question are in part a result of va-
garies in the insurance cycle, and are hence capable of declining. In
large measure, however, they are the natural result of broad rules
of liability, in conjunction with contemporary claiming patterns
and damage awards. Therefore, it seems unlikely that future years
will witness any substantial decrease in the cost of liability (and
liability insurance). Moreover, the effects of collective memory
should not be underestimated. The severe inflation of the late
1970s was a traumatic national experience that seared the minds of
federal policy-makers, and which will therefore influence their
decisionmaking for many years to come. It is at least possible that
the tort crisis of the mid-1980s was a similar trauma, which could
therefore bear a continuing legacy.
Even so, one can confidently predict that courts, at least at
times, will continue to innovate in imposing liability on institu-
tions whose conduct can be acceptably characterized as unreasona-
I" Of course, the whole point of new schools of thought is that they are very difficult to
predict in advance. In the late 1960s, no one anticipated the dramatic rise of law.and-eco-
nomics; nor did many in the mid-1970s predict the emergence of CLS.
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ble.5 10 Moreover, even if the recent era does continue and doctrine
hence remains relatively stable, that would by no means satisfy the
many critics of the modern tort regime. Their goal is the repeal of
much of modern tort. In fact, the last decade has witnessed a num-
ber of judicial overrulings. Thus New Jersey has reversed itself on
manufacturers' liability for unknowable hazards;511 Illinois has en-
gaged in an interesting effort to abrogate the traditional tort of
attorney malpractice; 12 the Fifth Circuit has essentially overruled
its presumption of causation for inherent-risk warning cases; 1'
Tennessee has eliminated joint-and-several liability;11 4 and Mary-
land has overturned precedent in reducing the availability of puni-
tive damages.5 15 Still, for the most part the recent years have been
marked by courts' unwillingness to extend precedent and by their
resolution of open legal questions in a liability-restraining way. It
seems unlikely that future courts will become more aggressive in
cutting down on liability. Most of modern tort law can hence be
expected to persevere.
51 Consider, for example, Eisel v. Board of Education, 597 A.2d 447 (Md. 1991), in which
a school board was held potentially liable for the suicide of a 13-year-old student after
school counselors had failed to notify her parents that she was telling her friends at school
of her suicide plans. Relying on the relationship between school counselors and students, the
court ruled that counselors, knowing of an "adolescent student's suicidal intent," have a
duty "to use reasonable means" in attempting to prevent that suicide. Id. at 450-52, 456.
5 See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
6" See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
8" See supra note 363 and accompanying text.
51 See supra note 390 and accompanying text.
5" See supra note 416 and accompanying text.
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